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Chapter 1
The political economy of
migration: Issues and challenges
Over the last few decades, how to manage immigration has occupied center-stage in the
policy making debate of many developed countries. Relying on standard international
trade models - such as the Heckscher-Ohlin model - free trade and free migration should be
equivalent measures of economic integration leading both to an equalization of factor prices.
However, despite this predicted substitutability between opening borders to trade and to
migration, the former has much more often been used in a globalization perspective. For
instance, based on this prediction, NAFTA was expected to help Mexico to export more
goods and fewer peoples - in the words of former Mexican president Salinas: Mexico wants
to export tomatoes and not tomato pickers. Following the same kind of reasoning, the EU
formed a custom union with Turkey in 1995. In this case also freeing trade was expected to
both lower the incentives of Turkish citizens to migrate into the EU and prepare EU citizens
to accept the adhesion of Turkey to the EU. More broadly, contrary to trade for which some
consensus has been found through regional or international agreements, immigration policy
is still mainly designed at a national level without much coordination. As a consequence,
for most developed countries, there is a much higher border e¤ect for migration than for
trade (Helliwell 1997).
One explanation to the observed asymmetry between trade and immigration policy
is that, contrary to the trade liberalization process, the shaping of immigration policy
does not mainly rely on economic arguments and citizens feel more directly threatened by
immigration than by trade. As aptly summarized by Wellisch and Wildasin (1995):
Immigration policy has proven to be a contentious issue in developed countries.
It often raises questions of race, culture, language, and religion, but intertwined
with all of these, and no less important, is the economic dimension of migration.
Immigration is alleged to have signicant e¤ects, favorable or unfavorable, on
labor markets, housing markets, and industry output, either in particular regions
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or throughout entire economies. Aside from these market impacts, it is also
frequently claimed that immigration may have important scal e¤ects.
Along with empirical evidence on the economic impact of immigration, citizens subjective
perceptions of these impacts on their daily life should be seen as a key element to consider for
understanding better the actual immigration policy implemented in a given country. At the
risk of simplication, one could argue that the perceived e¤ects of immigration are mostly
driven by labor market fears, welfare and scal arguments, or social concerns.1 The three
essays of this dissertation contribute to the debate about immigration policy by providing
new evidence dealing with one or several aspects of these fears.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. I start by describing some relevant
examples showing that public opinion pressures have not only widened the scope of the
immigration policy debate but have also played a signicant role in shaping of national
and international immigration policies. This provides a justication for a political economy
perspective in our quest to better understand the underlying determinants of individual
preferences towards immigrants. Then we present the Swiss direct democracy system on
which we will heavily draw for disentangling public from political preferences. Finally, we
emphasize the main scope of this dissertation and provide a summary of the three essays
composing this dissertation.
1.1 Individual perceptions of immigrants: Matter of fears?
1.1.1 Labor market fears
The impact of immigration on the labor market has been studied intensively by economists.
One of the most often cited prediction in this area is that individual preferences towards im-
migrants highly depend on the individual level of skills or of education. Indeed, immigration
of low-skill workers is broadly expected to have a negative e¤ect on wages of low-skill resi-
dent workers and - in addition - to induce a higher scal burden on host country residents.2
However, even if the empirical evidence in favor of this prediction is not clear cut,3 most
developed countries - which experienced large inows of relatively low-skill migrants - have
e¤ectively put more restrictions on the immigration of low-skill workers than of high-skill,
thereby reecting these perceptions.4
1See Chiswick and Hatton (2003) for an overview of the factors shaping immigration policy in many
developed countries.
2See next section for an overview.
3For instance, while the overviews of Longhi et al. (2005) and of Borjas et al. (1996) tend to emphasize
a very small inuence of immigration on wages, Borjas (2003) provides a new evidence that this inuence is
indeed high.
4According to most political economy models, if the median voter is a low-skill citizen, restrictions against
low-skill immigrants should be prevalent.
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For instance, Canada was the rst country, in 1965, to o¢cially institute an immigration
policy based on a point system. This system gives priority to citizens with a high degree of
education and/or with specialized skills to enter the country for working purposes. Following
the Canadian experience, Australia and New Zealand designed similar point systems.
Since the beginning of the nineties, the US also widened the scope for the admission of
skilled workers both by delivering more easily permanent resident permits and by creating
a series of temporary worker programs for high-skill workers. Moreover, since 2004,
NAFTA has been extended so as to permit to an unlimited number of Canadians, Mexicans,
Americans with a B.A. or more to cross borders for working reasons.
In the construction of the modern European Union, the acceptance of new members
has often been associated with an eager debate about the expected size and labor market
impact of migration ows from applicant countries with a lower degree of development. This
was especially the case for the EU enlargement to the ten new member states of eastern
Europe in 2004. Associated with mass migration fears, - strongly present in opinion polls
but not corroborated by economic predictions5 - 12 out of 15 old member states imposed
employment and/or welfare access restrictions on new member states citizens.
Another closely related and debated topic in EU is how to regulate the entry and stay of
third-country nationals who are seeking employment in EU. Answers to this question have
been quite diverse, ranging from a common immigration policy with EU level immigration
quotas to the introduction of a European Green Card allowing third country nationals
whose skills are highly needed to enter more easily.6
Not escaping the rule, immigration policy is also a hotly debated topic in Switzerland.
For instance, during the pre-vote debate on the bilateral agreements with EU - especially
the article on free mobility of labor - fears of mass immigration of low-skill workers and of its
subsequent negative e¤ects on the labor market have been taken as main arguments against
the acceptance of the project. In order to encourage Swiss citizens to accept the bilateral
agreements, various measures of accompaniment7 and safeguard clauses8 have been o¢cially
5See for instance Boeri et al. (2001) and Dustmann et al. (2003).
6January 11th, 2005, the European Commission proposed some common rules for the admission of eco-
nomic migrants in a Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration (COM/2004/0811
nal). This consultation led to the adoption in December 2005 of a Policy Plan on Legal Migration
(COM/2005/669) which lists the actions and legislative initiatives that the Commission intends to take so
as to pursue the consistent development of the EU legal migration policy.
7The measures of accompaniment are the following:
 The temporary provision of services by EU rms or workers is submitted to minimal guaranties both in
terms of labor market wages and of working conditions;
 Extension of the collective conventions regulating working conditions in Switzerland;
 Possible introduction of minimum wages in sectors not governed by collective conventions.
8The safeguard clauses are the following:
 Switzerland is allowed to restrict immigration during 12 years following the e¤ective date of the agreement
if there is some evidence of economic or social problems linked to immigration;
 After these 12 years, if Switzerland can provide further evidence of too a high immigration pressure on
the labor market, it can ask for new safeguard clauses;
 Finally, 7 years after the e¤ective date of the agreement, Switzerland can decide whether it wishes to
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added in the enactment. In 2000, the bilateral agreements have been accepted by the Swiss
electorate but fears of migration were still present. Indeed, in 2005, the enlargement of
these agreements to the ten new EU members has again awakened labor market fears and
needed further adjustments of the safeguard clauses. Once again, even if the enlargement
of these agreements has been accepted by popular vote, public pressures succeeded both in
slowing down the process of the opening of borders to immigrants and in getting guaranties
in case of disproportional immigration ows.
1.1.2 Welfare and scal arguments
Among the other economic reasons often evoked for explaining restrictive immigration poli-
cies, we nd scal concerns. Generally, in most developed countries, the immigrants are
younger and less skilled than natives, hence they may have a positive impact on the nanc-
ing of pensions and a negative e¤ect on tax revenues and on welfare spending. Even if no
negative scal impact of immigrants has been empirically assessed,9 opinion polls indicate
that many citizens believe that immigrants take out more from the public budget than they
put in.10 In addition to the potential scal burden of immigrants, there is the fear that
welfare-motivated migration would create competition among western European states to
frighten o¤ potential migrants, which would lead to an erosion of the traditional social
welfare state (Sinn 2002).
Taking into account these two arguments can be an additional explanation of why coun-
tries generally impose higher levels of restrictions to low-skill immigrants than on high-skill
immigrants. Moreover, these arguments have also often been widely used to put restrictions
on the access of immigrants to social security or welfare programs. For example, eager dis-
cussions about keeping illegal residents from using public schools, receiving social services
or non-emergency health care have emerged in some developed countries. In the US, this
principle has even been accepted - by popular vote - in 1994 in California (proposition 187)
and in 2004 in Arizona (proposition 200).
Another example to illustrate the fear of scal competition can be found in the recent
debate on the liberalization of services according to the origin country principle among
EU members. Indeed, according to its opponents, the directive on the liberalization of the
internal market of services - Bolkesteins directive 2003 - would seriously erode workers
rights and protection and led to a race to the bottom of EUs social system. Once again,
public pressure weighted heavily in the political process by slowing the back end of the
project.
ratify the agreement or not (decision subject to referendum).
9See IOM (2005) p. 170 for a survey.
10For instance, the following question from the European Social Survey 2002: Most people who come to
live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people
who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out? reports, on a scale from
0 - generally take out more - to 10 - generally put in more -, an average value of 4:18 for the north-western
European countries, 4:34 for the southern and 3:91 for the eastern.
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1.1.3 Social concerns
Cohabiting with economic fears, social concerns can also be seen as a very relevant source
of inuence on the public opinion. Indeed, the movement of people di¤ers from the move-
ment of goods and services, because people create attachments with those with whom they
share social capital, including norms, language, customs, values and culture (Schi¤ 2002).
Even if the denition of social capital di¤ers somewhat from one author to the other, it is
generally associated with norms of reciprocity and moralistic trust. However, in the context
of immigration policy, reciprocity and trust can lead to two opposed behaviors.
One the one hand, a high level of social capital may have a very positive inuence
on individual attitudes towards immigrants. Indeed, a trusting individual is expected to
believe that immigrants will not enter the country to abuse welfare or to pursue illegal
activities but rather to work hard to get a better wage and to enhance the economic ties
with their country of origin. Moreover, immigrants are also expected to enrich cultural life,
to accommodate to the recipient countrys customs and to stimulate economic growth.
On the other hand, individuals with a high level of social capital may be opposed
to immigration as they fear that immigration will undermine their countrys social norms,
weaken the existing social ties, or increase transactions costs.11 An illustration of the narrow
denition of social capital is the awakening of the extreme right parties in Europe. Since the
beginning of the nineties, extreme right parties have encountered much success in western
Europe, as for instance in France, Austria, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, not
only because their xenophobic and racist arguments pleased some citizens but also because
they were seen by many citizens as parties able to protect them against a loss in social
capital.
1.2 Scope and motivations
The shaping of immigration policy in a direct democracy: Overview
In almost all the events listed so far, the public opinion had, without dispute, a signicant
role to play in the shaping of immigration policy. However, given that most developed
countries are run by a representative democracy, it is not an easy task to disentangle
public preferences from politician preferences. Given that political outcomes are closer
to citizens preferences in direct democracy compared to representative democracy (Feld
and Kirchgässner 2000), the Swiss direct democracy provides a unique and arguably very
relevant setting to analyze the impact of individual preferences on the shaping of the im-
migration policy.
11As argued by Knack and Keefer (1997), individuals in higher-trust societies spend less to protect
themselves from being exploited in economic transactions.
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Indeed, Swiss nationals have broad voting rights and they have been using them ex-
tensively in the context of immigration policy making. Since 1970, the Swiss citizens have
had vote on 13 referenda and on 9 popular initiatives connected with immigration policy.
Given these extended political rights, the Swiss government had to take into account the
popular reactions given out in the context of the pre-vote discussions so as to avoid that the
initiatives asking for a sharp reduction in immigration ows be accepted by popular vote.
As most other similarly developed countries, the Swiss government has encountered
di¢culties to implement a coherent immigration policy since fears about immigration were
always strongly present during the political debates. Nevertheless, with more or less success,
the government succeeded to reconcile economic interests and public pressures while making
Switzerland successfully absorb a large inow of foreigners.12 Indeed, compared to most
European countries, Switzerland has had one of the highest immigrations share during the
whole post-war period. Figure 1-1 shows the ranking of Switzerland in terms of foreigners
share in the population in 2001.
Figure 1-1: Foreigners share in di¤erent European countries, 2001
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Drawing on the unique institutional features of Switzerland as well as on European survey
data, this dissertation seeks to shed light on the following issues: Why has the shaping of
immigration policy been so hotly debated not only in the political sphere but also on the
public place? How have individual perceptions - often very strongly opposed to immigration
- interfered in the political making process? How has the Swiss direct democracy inuenced
the immigration policy? What kind of lessons can be drawn from the Swiss experience with
12The share of foreigners in population increased from 6:04% in 1950 to 20:38% in 2003.
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voting on immigration policy? What are the main determinants of individual attitudes
towards immigration? Do political economy models help to understand better what shapes
individual preferences? How much do economic characteristics matter? How do social
preferences interfere with economic aspects? Have scal concerns about the impact of
immigrants been over-estimated by the public opinion? Is there e¤ectively a risk of scally
induced migration and of a race to the bottom of scal revenues? These issues are all
tabled in at least one of the three essays of this dissertation.
Each of the three essays of this dissertation is self-contained and focuses on a specic
issue linked to the political economy of immigration policy. Even if relying explicitly on
economic theory and on political economy frameworks, all three essays have a signicant
empirical content. The two rst essays focus on the determinants of individual preferences
towards immigration as reported by attitude surveys and the third essay presents an em-
pirical test of the impact of migration on local tax rates. Finally, it is worth emphasizing
that the rst and the third essay rely on the specicity of the Swiss direct democracy.
1.3 Chapter synopsis
Voting about immigration policy: What does the Swiss experience tell
us?
Over the last decade, opinions polls have been more and more widely used by economists to
understand better the determinants of individual preferences towards immigrants. Indeed,
opinions polls can be considered as a unique way to test the predictions of theoretical models
which cannot be easily identied otherwise. However, as the outcomes of opinion polls do
not directly inuence immigration policies, they may su¤er from diverse bias.
To circumvent most of the drawbacks of standard opinion polls data, the rst essay:
Voting about immigration policy: What does the Swiss experience tell us?, uses a unique
post-vote survey database to focus on the individual determinants of the participation and
of the voting choice.
This essay starts by reviewing the political economy dimension of immigration policy
in a direct-democracy framework. Using a Ricardo-Viner model, we discuss the medium
term impact of immigration on factor rewards and the conditions under which a vote on
immigration restrictions would be accepted in a popular vote. As a main prediction, we nd
that, whatever the skill mix of the immigrants, there will always be an opposition between
high- and low-skill native voters.
Relying on the numerous popular votes on immigration policy which took place in
Switzerland, this essay shows how the results at the voting booths have inuenced the im-
migration policy over the last thirty years. In particular, the system of direct democracy
has forced the Swiss government to stay a course accommodating the conicting interests of
the economic community - opposed to tight quotas - and of the public at large as expressed
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through many contestation votes. Nevertheless, the resulting exible system of annual quo-
tas by worker categories, combined with limited mobility and exemptions, has successfully
helped Switzerland to absorb a large inow of foreigners.
Drawing on two unique post-vote surveys on how citizens voted about immigration
policy, we could both test our political economy prediction and control for the selection
bias - not all citizen actually go and vote - which may a¤ect the outcome of a vote.
Furthermore, by using post-vote data, we were also able to improve on traditional opinion
poll data because they are free of any hypothetical bias - individual votes have a real
inuence on the nal outcome. Indeed, the two initiatives analyzed in this essay could
have, if accepted, a direct and immediate impact on the immigration policy as they both
proposed a signicant limitation in migration ows into Switzerland.
Estimating simultaneously the determinants of voting and participation decisions by
using a bivariate probit model with sample selection, we establish that, conrming political
economy predictions, education matters in the shaping of the attitudes towards immigrants
but non-economic arguments also play an important role. We also nd that turnout had
no decisive inuence on the outcome of the votes on immigration. However, by comparing
the outcome of the vote - rejection of the anti-immigrant initiatives - with the results of
pre-vote surveys - favorable to restrictions on immigration -, we emphasize that the results
from opinion polls may su¤er from a large hypothetical bias and may be overly pessimistic
if interpreted as reecting what peoples would actually vote if asked to. Given these two
results, the observed di¤erences between the outcomes of opinion polls and the real policies
implemented do not depend on turnout but rather on the hypothetical context in which
opinion polls take place.
Trust: The forgotten factor shaping attitudes towards immigrants?
Closely related to the preceding essay, the second essay: Trust: The forgotten factor shap-
ing attitudes towards immigrants?, uses European level opinion poll data to investigates
further the determinants of attitudes towards immigration. Even if opinion poll data may
be hampered by an hypothetical bias and not be accurate enough to predict the out-
come of a vote, their large sample size, the diversity of the countries sampled as well as the
number of variables available for direct use make them a powerful tool to disentangle the
economic from the social determinants of individual attitudes.
Relying on the rapidly growing experimental evidence stating that economists fail to
understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social preferences (Fehr
and Fischbacher 2002), this essay is, to our knowledge, the rst to explicitly introduce a
variable related to social preferences and reciprocity beliefs - trust - among the determinants
of attitudes towards immigrants. However, why focus on trust? This choice is not innocuous
since trust has been considered by may social scientists - such as Putnam (2000) - as a
key component of social capital because it acts a social lubricant that enables a variety of
forms of social interaction and cooperation. Moreover, there is an ever growing evidence
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that the level of trust of a country has an inuence on its economic performance, on its
government e¢ciency, on the participation in civic organizations, etc.
Using data from a new European opinion poll, the ESS, we could show that trust is a very
important determinant of preferences towards immigrants and that this result is robust to
many alternative specications. Moreover, considering explicitly the possible bias associated
with the use of subjective survey data both as explanatory and explained variables, we tested
the robustness of our results by estimating simultaneously trust and preferences towards
immigration within a Limited Information Maximum Likelihood framework. The results we
nd conrm that trust is an important determinant of attitudes towards immigrants and
that it is a moral value that spreads not only to neighbors or to community members but
also to immigrants.
Conrming past empirical evidence, we also show that education always signicantly
matters in the shaping of attitudes towards immigrants and that being active on the labor
market increases this e¤ect. In addition to this result, we could determine that the expected
skill structure of immigration ows - proxied by its past structure - highly inuences actual
preferences, i.e. low-skill citizens living in countries with a history of low-(high-)skill immi-
gration ows are much more against (in favor of) immigration than the high-skill citizens
living there. Furthermore, introducing trust - which highly depends on education - in our
estimations only slightly reduces the direct inuence of education on attitudes towards im-
migrants. This nding suggests that the social content of education emphasized by social
scientists cannot relevantly be linked to subjective expectations about reciprocity.
As for political implications, our results suggest that economic policy interventions to
reduce job insecurity or welfare concerns should be coupled with social actions such as, for
instance, promoting a better integration of immigrants, ghting discriminations, enhancing
access to education, reducing income disparities or prompting legal enforcement, to reduce
e¢ciently hostility towards immigrants.
Does scally induced migration enhance tax competition? Evidence from
Switzerland
Based on the often mentioned fear that scally induced migration would enhance scal com-
petition between states and/or countries, the third essay: Does scally induced migration
enhance tax competition? Evidence from Switzerland, seeks to identify if tax competition
for a higher tax base has been observed among Swiss local jurisdictions and has led to the
much feared race to the bottom of tax revenues.
Even if many determinants of tax rates have been mentioned theoretically, the empir-
ical literature has been almost exclusively endeavored to test the Meltzer-Richard (1981)
hypothesis13 as well as strategic tax interactions between communities. Given that almost
13Broadly, this model predicts that the lower the median voter income relative to the average income of
the community, the higher the tax level.
13
no empirical survey has taken explicitly into account the e¤ect of migration on taxes, we
try to answer both of the following questions: Are own tax rates inuenced by neighbor tax
rates? If yes, through which channel do these strategic interactions occur? The answers
to these questions may indeed have signicant implications from a scal federalism point
of view. If tax interactions occur mainly through a mimicking behavior of authorities or
mainly through tax induced migration, the optimal policies to be implemented may be quite
di¤erent. In the case of scally induced migration, the fear of a race to the bottom may
have to be considered seriously and decentralization of scal competencies be ine¢cient.
Relying on a unique communal level data-set, we were able to improve upon past em-
pirical evidence by controlling better for the institutional setting governing the tax setting
behavior of public authorities. First, the Swiss political system is built on direct democracy
with Swiss citizens having extended rights to participate in the policy making process and
to inuence the political outcome according to their preferences. Hence, compared with
most developed countries, Switzerland provides without doubt one of the most adequate
setting to match the predictions of the median voter model. Second, using Swiss municipal
data reduces considerably the problem of comparability of local jurisdictions scal compe-
tencies which usually hampers empirical tests. Indeed, the Swiss communes within a canton
all have the same public services to provide and the same constraints on the way of set-
ting taxes. Moreover, despite of these strong restrictions on the tax setting competencies,
di¤erences in communal tax multipliers have remained large during the last two decades.
Third, as Swiss municipalities highly rely on income taxes to nance their expenditures, the
tax rate chosen by a commune might have a substantial impact on households residential
choice. Combined with a high migration rate between communes, the database used in this
essay will be very informative to isolate the e¤ect of scally induced migration on local tax
rates.
As main results, we nd no signicant evidence in favor of the Meltzer-Richard hy-
pothesis but, once spatial interactions models are used,14 we nd a strong and signicant
evidence that taxes interact positively within a given geographical area. Moreover, we could
also identify that scally induced migration is only a minor channel through which taxes
interact strategically.
These results provide interesting policy implications as they suggest that concerns about
scally-induced migration and its detrimental e¤ect on tax rates should not be a main source
of concern for communities wanting to allow free mobility of workers with some neighboring
communities having a similar level of economic development or for communities wanting to
decentralize scal competencies to lower level jurisdictions. However, these results depend
heavily on Swiss communes being submitted to an exogenously given tax schedule which
implies that they cannot o¤er substantial tax cuts only to the high-earner individuals whose
residential choice is highly inuenced by taxes.
14Note that empirical tests of spatial interactions models implies the use of spatial econometrics and
instrumental variables.
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Chapter 2
Voting about immigration policy :
What does the Swiss experience
tell us ?
Abstract
Recently, many opinion polls and household surveys have revealed that a majority of devel-
oped countries citizens fear the consequences of increased immigration. At the same time,
immigration policy has become a very sensitive issue to manage for most host countries
governments. Drawing on the Swiss direct democracy, this paper reviews the Swiss expe-
rience with immigration which has been shaped strongly by regular voting on immigration
policies. Relying on two unique post-vote data-sets on how Swiss citizens voted on ini-
tiatives attempting to limit the share of foreigners to its current level, this paper improves
upon past empirical evidence by by-passing the problem of hypothetical bias plaguing the
analysis of conventional survey data. Following political economy predictions, we address
the question of whether the skill level of a citizen inuences his attitude towards immigra-
tion, and we correct explicitly for the participation bias due to non-mandatory voting. As
a main result, we nd evidence that the hypothetical bias hampering pre-vote surveys may
be large but that turnout has not a decisive inuence on the outcome of a vote. We also
nd that - conrming political-economy predictions - education matters in the shaping of
immigration preferences but non-economic arguments also play an important role.
JEL classication: F22, J15, J30, J61, P16
Key words: Attitudes towards immigrants, immigration policy, political economy, vote,
hypothetical bias, Switzerland
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2.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, how to manage immigration has occupied center-stage in the
policy-making debate of many developed countries. Indeed, squeezed between increasing
migration pressures, the move towards regional agreements, and the rather negative views
citizens have about immigration, the shaping of immigration policy has turned out to be a
very sensitive subject to manage for the authorities of nearly all the host countries.
Given that most developed countries are run by a representative democracy, opinion
polls have often been considered as a unique way to disentangle the publics preferences
from those of the politicians, and have been used more and more widely to better un-
derstand the determinants of individual preferences towards immigrants. Associated with
labor market e¤ects, welfare and scal concerns, or social arguments, many household sur-
veys have emphasized that a majority of developed countries citizens are fearful of the
consequences of increased immigration. However, as the outcomes of opinion polls do not
directly inuence immigration policies, they may su¤er from diverse bias and interpreting
them as reecting what people would actually vote if asked to, may not be appropriate.
In the context of the Swiss direct democracy where Swiss citizens vote regularly on
immigration policy, it is possible to identify citizens attitudes towards immigration by con-
trolling for the hypothetical bias hampering conventional opinion polls data. Thanks to
two unique post-vote data-sets, this paper seeks to explain the probability of participating
in a vote and of accepting more restrictions on immigration in terms of individual charac-
teristics. Moreover, as turnout is not mandatory in Switzerland, we can also explicitly take
into account the participation bias. As a relevant result, we nd that, while the participa-
tion choice seems not to have mattered for the outcome of the vote, the outcome e¤ectively
observed is far away from the predictions relying on pre-vote surveys, thus suggesting a
large hypothetical bias when using conventional opinion poll data.
More broadly, the paper contributes to the debate on the political economy of migra-
tion policy and expands on de Melo et al. (2004). It recounts the Swiss experience with
immigration and emphasizes the interaction of economic interests - mostly favorable to im-
migration - with the expression of citizens preferences via the political system - mostly
reluctant to further immigration. The system of direct democracy has forced the Swiss gov-
ernment to conduct its immigration policy so as to avoid that restrictive propositions would
be adopted by popular vote. At the same time - despite its very high share of foreigners
- anti-immigration attitudes seem to be less widespread in Switzerland than in other Eu-
ropean countries at least as reported in the Eurobarometer 53 and in the European Social
Survey Round 1.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the political
economy dimension of immigration policy in a direct-democracy framework which is rele-
vant both for Switzerland and for interpreting the results from recent post-vote surveys.
Section three is an overview of the empirical literature based on opinion polls. Section four
then briey recounts how popular votes on referenda and initiatives shaped Swiss immigra-
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tion policy over the last forty years. Section ve presents the two Swiss post-vote data-sets
and the econometric methodology used to estimate jointly the probability of participating
in the vote and of accepting more restrictions on immigration in terms of individual char-
acteristics. In section six, we analyze the results taking explicitly into account the possible
selection bias associated with non-mandatory turnout. Di¤erences or similarities between
the outcome of a vote and results from conventional opinion polls are also discussed further.
Conclusions follow in section seven.
2.2 The political economy of immigration in a direct democ-
racy
When studying the impact of immigration on host countries, it is customary to consider
labor-market, scal, and social e¤ects. Here, we will concentrate on labor market e¤ects,
emphasizing the channels through which immigration may a¤ect host-countries citizens.
While many di¤erent kind of models try to explain the impact of immigration on natives
labor market conditions, we focus on factor-endowment models which are probably the most
suitable to study the political economy of immigration in a direct democracy. Relying on
these models, we wish to emphasize the role of economic factors ownership in the determi-
nation of migration policies while discussing the political economy of skill requirements, e.g.
under what conditions low-skill immigrants are likely to be accepted under an endogenous
immigration policy.
2.2.1 Political economy predictions using factor-endowment models
Among the most often cited factor-endowment models connecting natives factor incomes
to immigration, we nd the Factor-Proportion analysis and the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
The main prediction of the Factor-Proportion analysis is that any change in a countrys
relative factor endowment will have an impact on factor prices, e.g. an inow of unskilled
immigrants in a country - by reducing the proportion of skilled versus unskilled workers
- will raise (reduce) the wage of skilled (unskilled) citizens. The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO)
model - in the standard case where the number of produced goods is at least as large as
the number of production factors - predicts that immigration will have no impact on the
factors rate of return as long as the country does not modify its output mix.1 However, the
larger the immigration ows and the more di¤erent the skills of the immigrants compared
to the skills of the natives, the higher the probability that a countrys output mix - and
hence the factors rate of return - will change, e.g. a large inow of low-skill immigrants in a
1This e¤ect is sometimes called the factor-price-insensitivity.
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country which is relatively richly endowed with high-skill workers will decrease the relative
wage of the low-skill workers.2
In 1996, Benhabib was the rst to introduce explicitly a median-voter approach in
factor-endowment models. By supposing that capital - including human capital - is distrib-
uted unequally among natives and that a xed pool of potential immigrants with di¤erent
capital endowments is wishing to enter a country, he was able to show that if the median
natives capital endowment is smaller than some critical level - which is the case when the
distribution of capital is su¢ciently skewed to the right -, a minimum skill requirement for
immigrants will defeat any other policy under majority voting with pairwise alternatives.
While a useful rst step, Benhabibs model does not allow us to take into account
the observation that attitudes toward immigration are shaped not only by households
characteristics but also by sectors of activity. Relying on the Ricardo-Viner model - which
seems to be the most adequate to examine the distributional issues raised by immigration in
a medium-term time-frame3 -, Grether et al. (2001) have argued that, if individual attitudes
towards immigration are entirely determined by expected income e¤ects, the acceptable level
of immigration will be determined by the interaction of the three following elements: (i)
the number of immigrants, (ii) the capital distribution among natives, and (iii) the capital
endowment of the immigrants. Probably the main testable implication of this model is that,
in the case where capital is evenly distributed within the groups of skilled and unskilled
citizens and where the immigration surplus is innitesimal, skilled natives will always adopt
a position which is systematically opposed by unskilled natives. For example, if unskilled
citizen are capital-poor and if the median voter is an unskilled citizen, unskilled capital-
poor immigration will be opposed in a direct democratic framework.
How does the Ricardo-Viner model help us predict the shaping of immigration policies?
At a country level, according to the characteristics - skill level and capital ownership - of
the median voter, we will be able to predict what are the acceptable characteristics for new
immigrants to enter the country. At an individual level, this model gives us some interesting
insights on who might loose and who might win from immigration according to labor market
characteristics.
2.2.2 Who votes?
In a direct democracy in which voting is not compulsory - as in the Swiss case examined
here -, one needs rst to analyze the vote-participation process.4 This process can be viewed
2See Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2006) for a more complete summary of the implications
of these models for predicting individual preferences towards immigration.
3For instance, Hillman and Weiss (1999) state: Yet, domestic mobile labor (which is of course mobile in
the short and the long run) ostensibly bases its trade-policy position on the factor-content propositions of
the long-run HO model, and its position on immigration policy on the short-run specic-factors model.
4Campbell (1999) has shown that [...] the alternative preferred by more expected zealous voters [...]
wins with a high probability [...] even if the expected proportion of the entire electorate that shares that
preference is arbitrarily small.
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as a cost-benet analysis5 where a citizen will only go and vote if the sum of the benets
of getting his favored alternative accepted is higher than his voting costs.
The costs of voting can be, for instance, the time spent to go to the booths or to get
informed about the issues of the vote. Even if we suppose that the average time needed to
go to the booths is the same for all citizens, we can expect middle-aged and well-educated
individuals, for instance, to be able to acquire information at less costs than the rest of the
population. However, since education and age are often positively correlated with income,
we can also expect their opportunity cost to get informed and to go to the booths to be
much larger.6
The benets for a citizen to see his preferred outcome accepted can be viewed from three
- not necessarily reinforcing - perspectives. According to an instrumental view, benets
are simply implied by an expected weighted di¤erence in utility between a citizens preferred
alternative and the other. This benet is high if the result of the vote has a great inuence
on the citizens utility and/or if the citizens choice is expected to be pivotal. According
to an expressive view, benets are associated with the pleasure a citizen gets when sup-
porting his preferred alternative and/or simply with the pleasure induced by participating
in the vote. The closer (farther) the citizens preferred (non preferred) alternative is to his
bliss point, the more he gets satisfaction by supporting his preferred alternative. Finally,
according to a signaling view, a citizen can earn benets either by abstaining to vote
in order to show his discontent or by voting for his preferred alternative even if his vote
in not seen as pivotal. According to the instrumental view, abstention is never a way
to inuence policy. On the contrary, according to the expressive and signaling views,
abstention is placed on the same level as voting yes or no. Therefore, abstention cannot
be explained on the basis of a sequential mechanism, where the question to vote or not is
answered prior to and independently of the question how to vote.
This observation is an important input for specifying our choice of econometric frame-
work as will be seen in section four. Unfortunately, the post-vote data-set we will use
does not allow us to disentangle which elements of the cost-benet analysis mattered most
for each citizens participation choice. For instance, in the Ricardo-Viner set-up considered
above, a skilled capital-rich citizen might expect his income to signicantly increase if new
unskilled and capital-poor immigrants enter the country. If voting costs are null, accord-
ing to the instrumental view, he will vote in favor of more immigration, but according to
the two other views, we cannot say if he will participate or not because of the unobserved
characteristics (cultural preferences, discontentment with the government, pleasure with
voting, etc.) which may enter his choice.
5For more details see Fauvelle-Aymar et al. (2000) or Kirchgässner and Schulz (2005).
6See Frey (1971) for an early contribution.
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2.3 What do empirical studies using opinion polls tell us?
Compared to the large theoretical literature on the determinants of attitudes towards im-
migration, empirical studies of these determinants have emerged only since the mid-nineties
and are still scarce. This sudden interest in empirical facts has probably been highly mo-
tivated by the increased immigration pressure on almost all the developed countries since
the beginning of the nineties and by the fear of mass immigration ows associated with,
for instance, the EU enlargement. Besides, the increased diversication of new immigrants
culture and country of origin as well as the decline in their average skill level have surely
had quite an important impact on the perception natives have about immigrants. Finally,
the rapidly growing number of surveys conducted - partly resulting from better interac-
tions between economists and social science researchers - and the increasing quality of data
sampling methods have enhanced interest in the empirical determinants of attitudes.
Relying generally on a question of the type: Do you think that the level of immi-
grants/foreigners in your country should be: decreased, kept the same or increased, most
- if not all - of the empirical analyses of the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants7
have reported that the skill level, either proxied by years of education or by occupation-
related wages, has a signicant positive impact on the probability of favoring immigration
as predicted by most factor-endowment models.8 Moreover, by looking at multi-country
databases, Mayda (2006) and ORourke and Sinnott (2006) found that in high (low) per
capita GDP countries,9 the high-skill individuals are more (less) in favor of immigration
than the low-skill individuals, which they interpret as a validation of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model.
In addition to the standard socioeconomic and demographic variables, most authors
included among their explanatory variables di¤erent measures of racial or cultural preju-
dice or of national pride. As expected these non-economic determinants also have a very
signicant inuence on citizens attitudes. Relying on these results, most studies conclude
that both economic and non-economic factors matter for the shaping of attitudes towards
immigrants.
However, virtually all studies of attitudes towards immigration discussed here rely on
opinion poll data.10 Even if the survey methodology is good, these kind of data are usually
7See for instance Espenshade and Hempstead (1996), Citrin et al. (1997), Bauer et al. (2000), Kessler
(2001), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Gang et al. (2002), Dustmann and Preston (2004), Mayda (2006) and
ORourke and Sinnott (2006).
8Nevertheless, alternatively to the economic literature in which the individual level of skill is considered
as a proxy for income gains or losses inquired in the labor market, most social scientists - such as Citrin et
al. (1997) - have emphasized that the skill level should rather be considered as a proxy for tolerance or for
more cosmopolitan social networks.
9The assumption behind this argument is that countries with a high per capita GDP are also relatively
richly endowed with high-skill labor.
10Such as, for instance, the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme), the WVS (World Value Sur-
vey), the ESS (European Social Survey), the NES (National Election Study), the Eurobarometer, the British
Social Attitudes Survey.
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a¤ected by an hypothetical bias as the surveyed individuals know that their answers will
not have any direct impact on the policies implemented in their country. Therefore, their
information costs when answering survey questions are much smaller than when voting and
the main benet they can get is a signalling one. Moreover, as abstention is not an option
in the context of an opinion poll, some important information might be lost.
Contrary to the opinion-poll data used so far to better understand the attitudes towards
immigration, the two databases we use for our empirical study are issued from post-vote
surveys which in turn explicitly consider turnout and are not subject to a hypothetical
bias.
2.4 The shaping of Switzerlands immigration policy
As has been emphasized by Feld and Kirchgässner (2000), political outcomes are closer
to citizens preferences in direct democracy compared to representative democracy. Since
voting rights are a central part of the Swiss democratic life11 - thus by far dominating other
countries with respect to the frequency of use12 -, relying on a median voter framework
may help us to get some useful insights on the shaping of public policies. Keeping in mind
this point of view, how has direct democracy contributed to the shaping of Switzerlands
immigration policy over the last fty years?13
During the period of strong growth in the early post-war period, labor shortages in
Switzerland were met by immigration, with the foreigners share in the population increasing
from 5:8% to 9:1% between 1950 and 1960 (see gure 2-1). But at the beginning of the
sixties, tensions started building up and the government decreed two federal orders - in 1963
and 1964 - aiming at limiting the inow of migrants.
In 1965, the rst popular initiative attempting to limit the number of foreigners to
10% of total population - instead of the prevailing 15% - was introduced. Confronted
with this threat, in 1968, the government decreed a new federal order aiming at stabilizing
the stock of foreigners while at the same time making it easier for foreigners children to
become naturalized and giving leeway on exemptions to assuage economic interests. The
initiative was withdrawn but, as the number of foreigners with renewable or long-term
permits actually increased by close to 5%, instead of falling by 3% as announced in the
Federal decree of 1968, a second initiative asking to limit the foreigners share to 10% of the
population was introduced in 1969. Since this time the instigators gave up the possibility
of withdrawing the initiative, the rst vote on immigration policy in Switzerland took place
in 1970.
11See Linder (1994) for an overview of the Swiss political system and of the critical role played by voting
rights.
12Swiss citizens called to the booths - on average - four times per year.
13This section draws and expands on de Melo et al. (2003). Appendix III provides an overview of all the
votes on initiatives and referenda which took place in Switzerland since the end of World War II.
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The vote of June 7, 1970 marks a watershed in Switzerlands policy towards immigrants.
It was the rst of a series of popular initiatives taken to the polls over the next thirty years,
and the beginning of a policy based on a complex system of yearly quotas that is still applied
today. This vote also registered one of the highest participation rates14 - 75% - and was
only narrowly rejected in spite of a last ditch e¤ort by the government to bring consensus
around its immigration policy by introducing further restrictions.
In reaction to this rst vote on immigration policy and squeezed between economic in-
terests and popular pressures, the Swiss government started to devise a complex system
of quotas. This system was designed to give it the exibility to play both sides and to
adjust rapidly to short-term objectives resulting from the combined pressures coming from
labor unions wishing binding quotas, rms wishing loose quotas, and parts of the public
wishing to preserve cultural identity as expressed in its xenophobic requests. For example,
family reunication was not included in the quotas, nor was the transformation of seasonal
to annual permits. Nevertheless, this loophole led to a third popular initiative seeking
to restrain immigration. With a high participation rate, the initiatives rejection on Octo-
ber 20, 1974 by a 2=3 majority heralded the success of the governments give and take
approach.
The role of the democratic process was also evident in the 1981 vote on a popular
initiative aiming at creating more equality between Swiss nationals and foreigners, and
eliminating the seasonal workers status. This proposal to abolish the seasonal workers
status was sharply opposed by the construction, catering, and agriculture sectors that rely
heavily on this category of labor and it was clearly rejected by the electorate. Nevertheless,
since by that time the foreign population was e¤ectively stabilized and the proportion of
annual permits had fallen from 70% in 1970 to 25% in 1980, exibility in migratory policy
had already substantially waned.
It is only in the late eighties with the surge in asylum seekers and the prospects of a
closer relationship with the EU that immigration policy started again to be questioned.
On the one hand, distinguishing between economic and political immigration motives was
becoming di¢cult, and, on the other hand, the guest-worker system appeared inappropriate
if closer ties with the EU were to develop. Sensing that the vote on the EEA act would be
rejected because it would call for an abolishment of the guest-worker system, an immigration
policy based on cultural proximity - often referred to as the three-circle policy15 - was
adopted by the government. In 1992, the referendum to join the EEA was nevertheless
rejected by Swiss citizens.
The introduction of the three-circle policy was rapidly the subject of much criticism
both within Switzerland from the business sector against the quota system and from the
anti-immigrant citizens on the weakness of the discriminatory cultural proximity policy,
14Note that the right to vote for women was only introduced in 1971.
15Under the three-circle system, work permits were granted preferentially to citizens of EU and EFTA
countries, then to citizens of certain other countries considered to be traditional migration partners of
Switzerland, and nally to citizens from the rest of the world.
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Figure 2-1: Foreigners share and migration policy in Switzerland, OFS data
and abroad by criticisms against the stigmatizing and discriminatory e¤ects of this policy
during the International Convention against racism in 1995. Hence, in 1998, a proposal of
a point system akin to the one in use in Canada and Australia was discussed by the Swiss
authorities. Although this proposal did not carry the day, the government shifted to a
two-circle policy to accommodate the desire for closer ties with the EU - with 67% of the
electorate accepting the bilateral agreements16 with the EU in May 2000 - while catering
to anti-foreigner feelings in the population. Meanwhile, guest-worker permits were cut in
half to 880000 during the decade of the nineties.
Since June 1st, 2002, the conditions for admitting immigrants from EU countries has
been regulated by bilateral agreements which insure a smooth transition to free mobility
of persons between these two areas. In September 2005, Swiss citizens had to vote on the
extension of the free mobility agreement to the ten new EU member states. The issue
of that vote was uncertain until the o¢cial results were published, but, once again, the
safeguard clauses negotiated by the Swiss government helped to insure a positive outcome.
For the citizens outside EU, their admission to Switzerland is actually governed by a new
foreignerss law which is based on a strict point system.
As highlighted by the preceding description, the Swiss direct-democracy system has
had a very important impact on the shaping of Swiss immigration policy. Indeed, the
system of popular initiatives - some aiming at controlling the ow of immigrants, others at
16Among the bilateral agreements there was the free mobility of labor between Switzerland and EU15
countries.
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improving the status of immigrants - forced the government to compromise and to design
over the years an e¤ective, though not economically e¢cient, immigration policy. Moreover,
minorities opinions have often been taken into account in the political process in order to
avoid opposition through the voting booths. Combined with the fact that the foreigners
share in population has always been one of the highest in Europe and half of the new
immigrants are entering Switzerland for labor purposes, Switzerland seems to be a good
country for analyzing the political and economic stakes at an individual level.
2.5 Data and empirical methodology
Drawing on a unique post-vote database,17 this section emphasizes the need to use an
appropriate empirical specication to take into account the specicity of both the voting
and the participation choice. It highlights also to what extent using post-vote data can help
us to get further insights on the determinants of attitudes towards immigration.
2.5.1 Two popular initiatives on immigration restrictions in Switzerland
The rst vote to be analyzed is the initiative for the regulation of immigration which
took place on September 24, 2000. The main requirement of this initiative was that the
foreigners share should not exceed 18% of the total Swiss population. Unconventionally
included in these 18% were asylum-seekers, international organization workers and guest
workers, but not high-skill workers, students and artists. Notice that the foreigners share
was already 19:3% in 2000. This initiative was rejected by 63:8% of the voters and the
participation rate was of 45:3%.18 The second vote analyzed here is the initiative for the
limitation of immigration which took place on December 4, 1988. The requirement of this
initiative was to limit the total annual immigration ows to Switzerland to two-thirds of
the total annual emigration ows (including asylum-seekers) and to limit the number of
seasonal workers and cross-border commuters. This initiative was rejected by 67:3% of the
voters and the participation rate was of 52:8%, a high participation rate in Switzerland.
For both initiatives, nearly all the political parties and the government recommended
to vote no arguing that these initiatives would have a negative impact on the economy
because of the rigidity of their application, and could put back in question the relations
with the EU as well as Swiss humanitarian policy. Among the other common points be-
tween these initiatives, both took place during a period of good economic conditions - low
unemployment and high GDP growth. Finally, between 1988 and 2000, the foreigners pop-
ulation in Switzerland evolved as follows: the foreigners share and the number of asylum
17For a description of the VOX post-vote sampling methodology and of the potential inherent biases,
please refer to appendix I.
18The average participation rate between 1993 to 1999 was 42%.
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seekers increased while the number of guest workers and the share of foreigners from EU
countries decreased. Since the implications of both initiatives on immigration policy di¤er
only slightly, comparing them should lead to interesting insights on how attitudes towards
immigrants evolved between 1988 and 2000.
2.5.2 Econometric framework
As mentioned in section two, the voting and the participation decisions have to be treated
within the framework of a simultaneous model. If we consider that p is the individual
participation choice (where p = 1 denotes participation) and v is the individual vote decision
(where v = 1 denotes an acceptation of the initiative) observed only if p = 1, the simplied
reduced form of a structural voting model is given by the two following equations:
v = x0 + " , v = 1 if v > 0 and p = 1, v = 0 if v 6 0 and p = 1(2.1)
p = x0+ z0 +  , p = 1 if p > 0, p = 0 otherwise (2.2)
Here, v, p are the two dependent latent variables; x, z are the vectors of explanatory
variables; " and  are the errors supposed to follow a bivariate normal distribution. The
possibility of interdependence between the decision to participate and to vote in favor of
the initiative is captured by the fact that the disturbances are assumed to be correlated:
Corr("; ) = .
To estimate this model, we use a maximum-likelihood probit model with sample selec-
tion.19 The three types of observations in the sample are:
p = 0 prob(p = 0 j x; z) = ( (x0+ z0))20
p = 1; v = 0 prob(v = 0; p = 1 j x; z) = c( x
0; x0+ z0; )
p = 1; v = 1 prob(v = 1; p = 1 j x; z) = c(x
0; x0+ z0; )
(2.2)
where (x; z) is the univariate normal CDF function and c(x; z; ) is the bivariate normal
CDF function. Based on these probabilities, the likelihood function can be written as
follows:
L =
N1Y
i=1
c( x
0
i; x
0
i+ z
0
i; ) 
NY
i=N1+1
c(x
0
i; x
0
i+ z
0
i; ) 
MY
i=N+1
( (x0i+ z
0
i))
19See van Ven and Praag (1981) for an early use of this method.
20The intermediate steps are:
prob (p = 0 j x; z) = prob(p 6 0 j x; z)
= prob( 6  (x0+ z0) j x; z)
= ( (x0+ z0))
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where the rst N1 observations represent the choices: pi = 1 and vi = 0, the following
(N  N1) observations: pi = vi = 1 and the last (M  N) observations: pi = 0.
This model has the advantage of handling simultaneously two distinct estimations with
possibly correlated disturbances. Explicitly modeling the correlation between the error
terms is important as some unobserved individual characteristics may inuence both the
participation and the vote choice. Besides, this model allows us to properly take into account
that only the characteristics of the citizens who voted matter for the nal outcome of the
vote.
2.5.3 Exclusion restrictions
The main di¢culty for identifying adequately a bivariate probit with sample selection is to
nd at least one instrument - z variable - which explains the participation choice but not
the vote decision, i.e. the attitude towards immigration. Indeed, in the absence of such a
variable the identication of the selection e¤ect would be entirely parametric, depending
exclusively on untestable assumptions about the unobserved heterogeneity.
The rst instrument we considered is political orientation squared. This variable may
be a good proxy for the level of importance an individual attributes to a given vote, i.e.
citizens in the extremes of the political spectrum are expected to participate more since,
according to an expressive view at least, the benets they will get by voting will be very
high.
As an alternative instrument, we used interest in politics. A priori, we expect this
variable to have a very signicant inuence on the participation choice whatever the object
of the vote.21 Unfortunately, this variable exists only in the 2000 post-vote survey.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics, di¢culty to understand the implications of the votes
Di¢culty 2000
Solar Counter-project Environment Immigration Referendum
Mean
Std
0.561
0.497
0.624
0.485
0.636
0.482
0.364
0.482
0.690
0.463
Di¢culty 1988
Speculation Work Immigration
Mean
Std
0.421
0.494
0.252
0.434
0.278
0.448
Finally, taking into account that usually Swiss citizens are called to the booths for
voting on more than one object at the same time,22 the various di¢culties an individual has
21To avoid the problems linked with the use of categorical variables - interest in politics was coded on a
four level scale -, we transformed this variable into dummies.
22The 4th December 1988, the citizens were called to vote on 3 initiatives: one against land speculation,
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to understand the consequences of the di¤erent objects under vote can also be appropriate
instruments,23 i.e. it surely a¤ect the participation choice but is independent of the attitude
towards immigration.24
2.6 Results
This section starts with presenting the results for the 2000 initiative which are the most
satisfactory given the increased availability of data. Then we turn to the presentation of
the results for the 1988 initiative. Finally, some comparisons of both initiatives are made.
Appendix II describes the variables used for estimation.
2.6.1 The September 2000 initiative
In table 2.2, we report the results of three joint estimations of the voting and participation
equations using alternative sets of the instruments presented in last section. Note that
specications [4] and [5] are identical to specications [2] and [3] except for the education
dummies replaced by a potential earning variable and a dummy for being retired.
Before discussing the results of our estimations in details, we present some evidence on
the relevance of our instruments. First, whatever the specication chosen, there is always
at least one instrument which signicantly inuences participation. Second, according to
an F -test on the joint signicance of the instruments, we could always reject the hypothesis
of weak instruments.25
Since our instruments seem to be adequate, we start by focusing on the estimation of
the coe¢cients of correlation between the errors which may allow us to identify a possible
sample-selection bias. As can been seen in table 2.2 in no estimation - according to a Wald
and to a likelihood ratio test - this coe¢cient is signicantly di¤erent from zero at a 1%
level, i.e. no unobserved characteristic has a simultaneous and systematic inuence on the
vote and on participation decision. This result means that there is no sample selection bias
and that the estimations of the vote and participation equations could have been made
separately.
one for reducing mandatory working hours and the one against immigration. The 24th September 2000, the
citizens were called to vote on 5 topics: three concerning the introduction of a new taxation of non-renewable
energies, the one against immigration and one about a change in political rights.
23Using aggregate data on Swiss votes from 1981 to 1999, Kirchgässner and Schulz (2005) found that the
complexity of the object of the vote had a signicant negative impact on turnout.
24Given that many surveyed answered dont know to these questions, we classied them with the
surveyed who answered it was di¢cult. Moreover, in 2000, as the di¢culties to understand the implications
of three questions about environmental policy were very highly correlated (0:82), we used only the rst
question in our estimations.
25See Bound et al. (1995) for an overview of the use of F -tests to identify weak instruments.
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Table 2.2: Estimation results, 2000 initiative
Vote Participation Vote Participation Vote Participation Vote Participation Vote Participation
[1a] [1b] [2a] [2b] [3a] [3b] [4a] [4b] [5a] [5b]
Compulsory school -0.16 -0.309** -0.354 -0.133 -0.392 -0.22
[0.48] [2.01] [1.36] [0.76] [1.51] [1.29]
High school -0.453 -0.032 -0.626* -0.098 -0.626* -0.129
[1.14] [0.16] [1.71] [0.45] [1.72] [0.60]
Professional school 0.034 0.519*** 0.265 0.494** 0.318 0.495**
[0.11] [2.80] [1.22] [2.31] [1.50] [2.48]
HES / university -0.570*** 0.377*** -0.511*** -0.06 -0.473** 0.136
[3.46] [2.65] [2.74] [0.37] [2.53] [0.86]
Earnings /100 -0.011** 0.002 -0.010** 0.007*
[2.30] [0.39] [2.01] [1.66]
Retired -0.985** 0.185 -0.879** 0.404
[2.36] [0.53] [2.08] [1.19]
Age -0.048** 0.032* -0.042 0.009 -0.04 0.024 -0.018 0.013 -0.018 0.014
[2.08] [1.76] [1.58] [0.43] [1.52] [1.21] [0.66] [0.55] [0.65] [0.64]
Age2 / 1000 0.463** -0.161 0.457* 0.007 0.455* -0.094 0.27 -0.06 0.279 -0.023
[2.05] [0.91] [1.82] [0.03] [1.81] [0.47] [0.97] [0.24] [1.00] [0.10]
Married -0.317** 0.261** -0.271* 0.153 -0.248 0.265** -0.298* 0.142 -0.280* 0.231*
[2.25] [2.36] [1.69] [1.22] [1.53] [2.17] [1.89] [1.13] [1.75] [1.90]
Female -0.179 -0.101 -0.260* 0.003 -0.273* 0.218* -0.335** 0.002 -0.348** 0.243**
[1.06] [1.03] [1.79] [0.03] [1.88] [1.94] [2.22] [0.02] [2.31] [2.05]
Owner 0.122 0.389*** 0.333** 0.385*** 0.381** 0.369*** 0.362** 0.394*** 0.423*** 0.392***
[0.42] [3.70] [2.14] [3.27] [2.51] [3.22] [2.35] [3.40] [2.82] [3.46]
Political orientation 0.179*** 0.033 0.223*** 0.033 0.221*** 0.008 0.240*** 0.045 0.240*** 0.014
[2.63] [0.88] [5.09] [0.83] [5.03] [0.19] [5.55] [1.13] [5.51] [0.36]
Political orientation2 0.048*** 0.018 0.042*** 0.019 0.042***
[4.06] [1.35] [3.21] [1.37] [3.25]
3
0
Vote Participation Vote Participation Vote Participation Vote Participation Vote Participation
[1a] [1b] [2a] [2b] [3a] [3b] [4a] [4b] [5a] [5b]
French 0.098 -0.374*** -0.065 -0.267* -0.121 -0.304** -0.015 -0.279* -0.084 -0.315**
[0.40] [2.82] [0.33] [1.78] [0.61] [2.13] [0.08] [1.87] [0.42] [2.20]
Italian 0.422 -1.036*** -0.031 -0.535** -0.178 -0.984*** 0.155 -0.431** -0.011 -0.915***
[0.80] [4.99] [0.08] [2.33] [0.49] [4.32] [0.41] [1.96] [0.03] [4.17]
Foreigners share -0.009 0.020** -0.001 0.026*** 0 0.015* -0.004 0.026*** -0.002 0.015*
[0.71] [2.49] [0.11] [2.92] [0.02] [1.69] [0.35] [2.92] [0.19] [1.75]
Political interest very high 2.829*** 2.794***
[10.55] [10.57]
Political interest high 1.961*** 1.944***
[9.01] [9.04]
Political interest low 0.810*** 0.788***
[3.55] [3.48]
Di¢culty solar -0.535*** -0.532***
[3.71] [3.71]
Di¢culty immigration -0.897*** -0.892***
[6.89] [6.92]
Di¢culty referendum -0.462*** -0.472***
[3.02] [3.09]
Rho -  - 0.722 - 0.125 0.147 - 0.163 0.134
Log-likelihood - 714.425 - 602.313 - 615.587 - 611.317 - 624.554
Absolute value of z-statistics in brackets, Constants not reported, 810 observations
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%, ***signicant at 1%
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However this result informs us only on the behavior of unobserved characteristics. In
terms of observed characteristics, it may well be that participation has had an impact on
the outcome of the vote. According to specication [2], had all the citizens participated
in the vote, the percentage of no to the initiative would have increased only by a little
less than 2%. Moreover, even if the participation and the voting choice are independent
- which would suggest that opinion polls may be accurate enough for predicting voting
attitudes -, we must not forget that, contrary to opinion polls, our post-vote data are not
subject to the hypothetical bias. Despite having no direct way to assess the size of this
hypothetical bias, it is still interesting to compare our results with pre-vote survey results.
According to two independent opinions polls, one carried out in July 2000 for the Swiss
television (DSR/TSR) and the other in May 2000 for the Swiss government, the initiative
should have been accepted by the electorate. For example in the July 2000 opinion poll,
40% of respondents were in favor of the popular initiative, 42% against and 17% did not
have an opinion. Given that the question asked in these pre-vote surveys was identical to
the question asked at the exit of the booths, we are tempted to interpret this result as
evidence of the existence of an hypothetical bias in standard opinions polls.26
To close our discussion about sample selection, we have to mention that specication
[1] reports a very large and negative coe¢cient of correlation between the errors which,
surprisingly, is not signicant. This result may be attributed either to a very at likelihood
function or to a non-normal distribution of the errors. Given this possible misspecica-
tion problem, the rest of this section discusses almost exclusively the results obtained for
specications [2] to [5].
The result that individuals with the highest level of education, university or HES,
and with a high school degree have a signicantly higher probability to reject the anti-
immigration initiative than the other education groups deserves to be emphasized. As an
illustration, an increase at sample means in the education level from apprenticeship to high
school or university (whose coe¢cients are statistically identical) increases the probability
to vote no by about 15 percentage points. Since the number of years of education for
getting a professional school degree is higher than that for obtaining a high school degree,
this result seems to only conrm partially the theoretical predictions, i.e. skilled natives will
always adopt a position which is systematically opposed by unskilled natives. In Switzer-
land both apprenticeship and professional schools are vocational trainings, thus the years of
education attached to the di¤erent kind of education may not be a good proxy for the level
of skill acquired and the situation in the labor market. Once we look at the specications
where education levels are replaced by potential earnings, we nd that this variable has
the expected sign and is highly signicant: an income increase of 10000 Frs increases the
26See Schläpfer and Hanley (2006) for another evidence of an hypothetical bias in a Swiss vote. By using
both contingent valuation survey data and real vote outcomes, they have shown that the voting-based
willingness to pay was only a small fraction of stated willingness to pay, indicating an ination in values due
to the hypothetical context. See also Cummings et al. (1997) for another example of hypothetical bias in
contingent valuations.
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probability to reject the initiative by about 3 percentage points. At the same time, the
retired are more favorable to immigration which may conrm that they are not afraid of
possible labor market e¤ects associated with immigration.
Similarly to Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2006), having left-wing convictions
has a very large and signicant inuence on the vote on immigration.27 Furthermore, being
owner of his housing increases the probability to accept the initiative by about 11 percentage
points which could be explained by owners being less mobile than renters and hence being
more strongly submitted to the consequences of immigration ows. Being married and
being a woman are both associated with a higher probability of rejecting the initiative even
if only signicant at a 10% level. Besides, it is interesting to note that living in an area
with a high foreigners share has no signicant inuence on the voting choice.
The estimation of the participation equation yields interesting results in its own right.
First, referring to estimation [1b], having a high level of education has a positive and very
signicant inuence on participation. However, when adding the political interest or the
di¢culty to understand the objects of the vote in the participation equation, the e¤ect
of the education dummies - except of the professional school dummy - vanishes. This
result suggests that the positive e¤ect of education on the participation choice is mainly
driven by high-skill individuals having lower information costs and more interest in politics
than low-skill individuals.28 That the professional school dummy remains signicant in
specications [2b] and [3b] can be explained by a very weak correlation between this variable
and the instruments. This implies that the participation behavior of the individuals with a
professional school degree is governed by some specic and unobserved characteristics.
Second, estimations [1b],[3b] and [5b] report that persons at the political extremes are
more likely to participate than those who hold centrist beliefs. Indeed, the probability of
participation is related to the political scale by a U -shaped relationship with a minimum
around 0 which is close to the sample mean ( 0:09). When the di¢culty to understand the
implications of the votes is replaced by the self-reported political interest - as in estimations
[2] and [4] - the political orientation squared looses its signicance which suggests that this
variable is e¤ectively closely related to the intensity of political preferences.
Third, the participation of Swiss citizens living in a minority language area or in an
agglomeration with a small share of foreigners is signicantly lower. The former result is
quite common in Switzerland whatever the objects of the vote29 and the latter is surely
27Even if it might be argued that the political orientation is endogenous to the attitude towards immigrants,
this problem is in fact very limited in our case since we are not working with general attitudes about a given
topic but with a well dened vote choice.
28Note that the correlation between a very high interest in politics and a university (compulsory school)
degree is: 0:26 ( 0:05), and between the average di¢culty to understand the issues of the vote and a
university (compulsory school) degree is:  0:18 (0:11).
29 It has to be mentioned that in addition to the federal objects, most cantons and communes also ask
their citizens to vote on cantonal and/or communal objects. Hence, it may be that some of these objects
generate a large cantonal mobilization which, in turn, will also a¤ect the participation to the federal vote.
In 2000, among the minority language cantons, only one - Geneva - had a high participation rate (51% vs
45% on average).
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due to immigration policy a¤ecting much more those who have a higher probability to be
in close contact with foreigners.
Fourth, the woman, married, and owner dummies often have a signicant positive impact
on the probability to participate in the vote. For instance, being owner increases the
probability to go to the polls by about 14 percentage points, being married by about 10
and being a woman by about 8.
Finally if we look at the inuence of our instruments on participation, we nd that,
compared with having no interest in politics, reporting a little interest increases the prob-
ability to participate by 27 percentage points and reporting a very high interest by about
61 percentage points. In specications [3] and [5], admitting to have had di¢culty to un-
derstand the implications of the immigration initiative reduced the probability to vote by
about 34 percentage points whereas having had di¢culty to understand the implications of
a change in the voting rights reduced it only by about 17 percentage points.
2.6.2 Nonparametric bounds
Even if the estimations of specications [2] to [5] are helpful to understand better the
determinants of voting attitudes, the large but insignicant correlation coe¢cient reported
by the estimation of specication [1] casts some doubts on the validity of the estimation
methodology to identify adequately a possible selection bias. Indeed, the use of a bivariate
probit with sample selection is not assumption-free, e.g. the errors of the model are assumed
bivariate normal and the instruments used not to inuence the outcome of the vote. In order
to relax these two assumptions, we present some calculations of non-parametric bounds as
introduced by Manski (1990).30
Using the law of iterated expectations and taking into account that both v and p are
binary variables, the probability to vote in favor of the anti-immigrant initiative - conditional
on observed exogenous characteristics x - can be written as:
Pr(v = 1 j x) = Pr(v = 1 j x; p = 1)  Pr(p = 1 j x) + Pr(v = 1 j x; p = 0)  Pr(p = 0 j x)
where the data identify Pr(v = 1 j x; p = 1);Pr(p = 1 j x) and Pr(p = 0 j x) but not
Pr(v = 1 j x; p = 0). If we dene K0 and K1 as, respectively, the lowest and highest
possible value Pr(v = 1 j x; p = 0) can take, Pr(v = 1 j x) can be bounded as follows:
BL = Pr(v = 1 j x; p = 1)  Pr(p = 1 j x) +K0  Pr(p = 0 j x)  Pr(v = 1 j x)
 Pr(v = 1 j x; p = 1)  Pr(p = 1 j x) +K1  Pr(p = 0 j x) = BU
Without any additional assumption, we can set K0 = 0 and K1 = 1. By taking this
information into account, we obtain Manskis worst-case bounds: B
M
L = Pr(v = 1 j
x; p = 1)  Pr(p = 1 j x) and B
M
U = Pr(v = 1 j x; p = 1)  Pr(p = 1 j x) + Pr(p = 0 j x).
30The use of this method has been kindly suggested by an anonymous referee.
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On the upper part of table 2.3, we report a series of calculations of these worst-case
bounds. Except for the individuals who are politically on the left or who have a university
degree, all these bounds include the threshold value of 50%. Nevertheless, given that these
upper bounds are only slightly over 50%, the outcome of the vote would have depended on
turnout only if the abstentionists preferences had been dramatically di¤erent from those
of the individuals who voted.
Since abstention can often be explained by citizens indi¤erence towards the outcome
of the vote, the bounds we just discussed could be reduced further. If we suppose that
the number of indi¤erent citizens is signicant and if we suppose that in a mandatory vote
these indi¤erent citizens would have voted in favor of the initiative with a probability of
50%, we can persuasively consider that K0 > 0 and K1 < 1. However, which values should
be given to K0 and K1? Without any additional assumption, the only thing we can state is
that for the unconditional upper bound (BU ) to be equal to 50%, we must have K1 = 0:79
which, in the context of the Swiss votes, seems to be a much more realistic upper value for
Pr(v = 1 j x; p = 0).
Table 2.3: Bounds on the probability to accept the initiative, 2000 initiative
x; z BL Pr(v = 1 j x) BU x; z BL Pr(v = 1 j x) BU
Manski worst-case bounds
uncond. on x 16.30 28.33 58.77 age 18/39 10.10 21.74 63.64
compulsory s. 8.33 19.05 64.58 age 40/65 17.28 28.11 55.81
apprenticeship 16.97 30.86 61.99 age >65 25.63 36.94 56.25
high school 5.45 12.5 61.82 left 6.09 9.92 44.67
professional s. 34.72 49.02 63.89 center 13.53 26.46 62.39
university 14.48 19.81 41.38 right 34.46 50.00 65.54
Instrumental variables bounds
pol. interest 26.46 28.33 32.59 di¤. immig. 20.74 28.33 45.03
di¤. solar 23.66 28.33 39.73 di¤. ref. 23.99 28.33 36.44
Even if having the advantage of being assumption-free, the worst-case bounds are
quite wide and do not allow us to properly reject the possibility that full turnout would
have changed the outcome of the vote. To reduce these bounds, we assumed that the
instruments discussed in last section are relevant and valid, i.e. they signicantly explain
participation and they satisfy mean independence: Pr(v = 1 j x; z = zv) = Pr(v = 1 j x).
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Using this additional information reduces the bounds as follows:31
B
IV
L = sup
zv2z
[Pr(v = 1 j x; zv; p = 1)  Pr(p = 1 j x; zv)]  Pr(v = 1 j x; zv)
 inf
zv2z
[Pr(v = 1 j x; zv; p = 1)  Pr(p = 1 j x; zv) + Pr(p = 0 j x; zv)] = B
IV
U
The estimations of these bounds are provided in the lower part of table 2.3. In no case,
we nd evidence of a turnout e¤ect, i.e. had all the individuals participated in the vote,
the initiative would never have been accepted. This evidence supports the initial results
obtained by relying on the assumption that the errors of equations (2.1) and (2.2) are jointly
normal.
2.6.3 The December 1988 initiative
To extend our analysis, columns [6] of table 2.4 report the estimations of the vote and
participation choices for the December 1988 initiative. Similarly to the 2000 initiative, the
coe¢cient of correlation between the errors is not signicantly di¤erent from 0, i.e. there is
no sample selection bias. Looking at the vote estimation [6a], as most of the explanatory
variables turned out to be insignicant, we tested the overall explanatory power of this
regression. According to a Wald test (W = 33:4 > 24:7 = 211), we could reject the
hypothesis that only the constant belongs to the equation at a 1% level. The most signicant
explanatory variable is having a high education level. If an individual decides to increase
his education level from intermediate to high, his probability to vote yes will decrease
by about 13 percentage points. In addition to education, we nd that being a women has
a rather negative impact on immigration restrictions as was the case in 2000. However,
contrary to 2000, being owner of his housing has a positive, though only signicant at a
10% level, impact on the rejection of the initiative.
Turning to the participation equation, we nd that most variables - married, owner,
political orientation squared as well as our instruments - have the same inuence as the
ones reported in the estimation of the 2000 initiative. Education also matters since low-
skill citizens participated signicantly less in the vote. Surprisingly, living in an Italian
speaking region32 turns out to have the opposite, and signicant, sign as in 2000. However,
the explanation is probably to be found in the very small sample size - less than 5% - of
this population in the whole sample.
Given that for the 1988 initiative we also have data about what the citizens who did
not participate to the vote would have voted had they participated, using the same sample,
specications [7] and [8] present the estimations of a bivariate probit model with and without
sample selection. Since adding information on the hypothetical vote of the abstentionists
31See Manski and Pepper (2000) for further details.
32 In 1988, the italian speaking Swiss region reported an average participation rate of 48:5% below Swiss
average 52:8%.
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Table 2.4: Estimation results, 1988 initiative
Vote Participation Real vote Participation Hypo. vote Participation
[6a] [6b] [7a] [7b] [8a] [8b]
Low education 0.299 -0.461*** 0.289 -0.566*** 0.358** -0.564***
[1.51] [3.40] [1.35] [3.86] [2.58] [3.84]
High education -0.504*** 0.003 -0.500*** -0.101 -0.627*** -0.105
[3.08] [0.03] [3.08] [0.79] [4.42] [0.82]
Age 0.001 0.024 0.001 0.016 -0.011 0.016
[0.03] [1.44] [0.04] [0.86] [0.60] [0.86]
Age2 / 1000 0.051 -0.172 0.052 -0.049 0.151 -0.05
[0.23] [1.04] [0.23] [0.26] [0.84] [0.27]
Married 0.051 0.205* 0.056 0.327*** 0.079 0.325***
[0.32] [1.89] [0.33] [2.80] [0.66] [2.80]
Female -0.226* -0.133 -0.233* -0.128 -0.151 -0.129
[1.73] [1.39] [1.81] [1.22] [1.45] [1.23]
Owner -0.260* 0.284*** -0.249* 0.287** -0.260** 0.285**
[1.80] [2.78] [1.71] [2.56] [2.38] [2.54]
Political orientation 0.033 0.029 0.033 0.024 0.019 0.025
[1.08] [1.16] [1.10] [0.88] [0.74] [0.89]
Political orientation2 0.015* 0.022** 0.022**
[1.85] [2.38] [2.39]
French 0.231 0.237 0.23 0.246 0.173 0.245
[1.27] [1.60] [1.26] [1.53] [1.14] [1.52]
Italian 0.338 0.584** 0.34 0.533* 0.513** 0.547*
[1.08] [2.13] [1.11] [1.76] [2.01] [1.80]
Foreigners share -0.005 -0.018* -0.005 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014
[0.35] [1.93] [0.37] [1.40] [1.27] [1.41]
Di¢cult speculation -0.249* -0.320** -0.332**
[1.94] [2.32] [2.46]
Di¢cult work 0.081 -0.003 -0.002
[0.43] [0.01] [0.01]
Di¢cult immigration -0.453** -0.306 -0.291
[2.48] [1.50] [1.43]
Rho -  - 0.000 0.046 - 0.098
Log-likelihood - 772.866 - 694.770 - 804.130
Absolute value of z-statistics in brackets, Constants not reported, Observations: [6] 847, [7] + [8] 786
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%, ***signicant at 1%
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can a¤ect both the coe¢cient of correlation between the unobserved characteristics and the
coe¢cients associated with the observed variables, identifying a possible participation bias
requires a deeper discussion of these two points. First, for both specications, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the errors are uncorrelated, i.e. the vote and participation choice
can relevantly be explained in terms of observed characteristics. Second, according to a
Wald test (W = 17:6 < 19:7 = 211), we also nd that the coe¢cients reported by the vote
estimations [7a] and [8a] are identical at a 5% level.33 These two results taken together
seem to indicate that participation had no signicant inuence on the outcome of the vote.
Table 2.5: Marginal and conditional probabilities of accepting the intiative
Entire sample (786) Sub-sample of voters (583)
Specication [7a], P (v = 1jp = 1) 22.39% a 22.60%
Specication [8a], P (vhypo= 1) 23.88% 23.89%
a
a sample adjusted predicted outcomes
That the participation choice had no inuence on the outcome of the vote is conrmed
in table 2.5. Indeed, the outcome of the vote obtained by considering, in turn, the sub-
sample of voters and the whole sample are very close, i.e. had voting been mandatory, the
percentage of yes to the initiative would have increased by only 1:3%.
2.6.4 How have the attitudes between 1988 and 2000 evolved?
Even if the phrasing of the question to limit immigration di¤ered somewhat in the 1988
and 2000 votes, some comparisons can nevertheless be made. First, both initiatives were
rejected by about 3=4 of the voters and no participation bias seems to have inuenced the
outcome. Thus, the observed di¤erence between opinion polls and real vote outcomes is
more certainly due to an hypothetical bias than to non-mandatory voting. To put this
result into perspective, consider what would have happened if the Swiss government had
followed opinion polls to dene its immigration policy?
Second, similarly to most empirical analyses of attitudes towards immigration using
opinion polls data, we found that, in both initiatives, education mattered in the choice of
vote. This supports the predictions based on the Ricardo-Viner model discussed in section
33Nevertheless, the coe¢cients associated with having a low level of education and living in the Italian
speaking region both became signicant in specication [8a]. These results may certainly be attributed
to di¤erences in sample sizes. For the former, since having a low level of education has a signicant and
large inuence on the probability not to participate to the vote, adding the abstentionists to the estimations
increases their representativeness in the whole sample from 14:9% to 17:1% which in turn may a¤ect the
standard error of the estimated coe¢cient. The latter result is probably linked to the same problem as
mentioned in preceding vote analysis, i.e. the sample of surveyed living in the Italian speaking region is very
small.
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two, i.e. there is an opposition between low- and high-skill citizens. However, based on
the evolution of the Swiss immigration policy which became, between 1990 and 2000, more
and more restrictive towards low-skill non EU workers, we should have observed low-skill
natives being more positive to immigrants in 2000 compared to 1988. That this has not
been observed can be explained by a high level of persistence in the perceptions citizens
have about the composition of immigration ows.
Finally, turn now to the political factors which are certainly important in determining
attitudes, but are absent from the models that concentrate only on economic e¤ects. Note
the high explanatory power of the political variable on the vote outcome in 2000 and the
absence of a signicant inuence in 1988. Indeed, in the voting choice, we notice an increased
opposition between the citizens who reported themselves as right- or left-wing. To nd a
consistent explanation to this increased political polarization on the immigration topic, one
must reect on how the Swiss political landscape changed between 1988 and 2000.34 Until
the end of the eighties, Switzerland was known for its very moderate opposition between
the right- and the left-wing and its decision-making process was characterized by a very
high degree of compromises. Since the beginning of the nineties, with the vote about the
EEA and the start of a period of long recession, the condence in the political elites has
been questioned. As a result, the shares of the UDC, a right wing party explicitly opposed
to immigration and to the adhesion of Switzerland to the EU, and of the Social Democrats
who are much more left-leaning than in parliamentary regimes, increased in the national
parliament both in 1999 and in 2003.
2.7 Conclusions
Fears of large inows of immigrants have been apparent in many economy-wide opinion
polls. These fears however are in sharp contrast with studies suggesting a net welfare gain
from increased labor mobility and low labor market e¤ects. This paper informs about the
debate in three areas.
First, we reviewed Switzerlands long-standing experience with immigration. The review
of the debate and of the votes on initiatives and referenda over the last thirty-ve years shows
that the results at the election booths have inuenced the government policy on immigration.
Immigration policy has stayed a course accommodating the conicting interests of unions,
rms owners, and the public at large as expressed through regular voting. The resulting
exible system of annual quotas by worker categories combined with limited mobility and
exemptions has turned out to be crucial in the case of Switzerland. Indeed, this experience
suggests that large immigration ows can be absorbed in the context of a direct democracy
since the foreign population share has tripled over a forty-year period. Moreover, the
34For a survey, see for instance Niggli (1999).
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benets of the Swiss accommodating immigration policy has lead Swiss citizens to respond
more favorably than their European counterparts to most opinion polls on migration.
Second, conrming past empirical evidence, we found that the education level of an in-
dividual signicantly inuences his attitude towards immigration. Individuals with a high
skill level, mostly acquired through non-vocational training, tend to vote for less restrictions
on immigration as predicted by the political economy models. Note that this result does
not exclude that a part of this positive e¤ect of education can be attributed to more social
characteristics such as tolerance or more cosmopolitan social networks. We also found evi-
dence that non-economic arguments - such as political convictions - can have an important
inuence on individual attitudes towards immigrants.
Third, and perhaps most interestingly, we have been able to show that the observed
di¤erence between predictions of pre-vote opinion polls - often very pessimistic with regard
to immigration policy - and real vote outcomes - as observed at the exit of the booths - is not
linked to turnout but rather to an hypothetical bias. This result may inform us on at least
two important facts. On the one hand, results from opinion polls may be overly pessimistic
if interpreted as reecting what people would actually vote if asked to. Indeed, opinion
polls may be well adapted to understand better the underlying determinants of attitudes
towards immigrants but not to predict the real level of desired immigration. On the other
hand, as a policy implication, this result suggests that it is not worth for a government to
invest too much money through to encourage citizens to go and vote but rather to continue
spending money to inform citizens about the real consequences of a vote.
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2.8 Appendices
Appendix I: Survey methodology
To collect individual-level data about the voting behavior, the Gfs institute used a combined
random/quota system. In a rst step about 100 localities were randomly chosen so as to
respect the distribution of agglomeration types and linguistic areas. In a second step, in
all the chosen localities, about ten individuals were randomly selected so as to match the
distribution of gender, age and occupation. This type of methodology leads generally to an
adequate representation between the surveyed sample and the total population. Neverthe-
less, as voting on immigration policy can be a¤ected by racial arguments, there is often a
upward bias in the percentage of surveyed being against of a more restrictive immigration
policy, i.e. citizens who voted against immigration sometimes do not reveal it when asked
to. In both anti-immigrationist initiatives considered here, the percentage of rejection in the
real vote and in the VOX survey was respectively 63:8% versus 71:7% for the 2000 initiative
and 67:3% versus 77:4% for the 1988 initiative. The participation rate in the survey sample
is also often upward biased. Indeed, it has been shown by the Gfs institute (Analyse VOX
des votations fédérales du 12 juin 1994, p. 5-6) that the citizens who are more invested
in politics are also the citizens who answer to survey questions more often. This bias is
conrmed for our two initiatives. For the 2000 initiative, the real participation rate was
45:3% and the survey reported participation rate was 57:5% and, for the 1988 initiative, it
was respectively 52:8% and 69:1%.
Appendix II: Descriptive statistics
Table 2.6 summarizes the mean and standard deviation of the variables used for the em-
pirical estimations presented in this paper. For each of these estimations, we considered
only the individuals for which no missing or dont know answers were reported among
the explanatory variables. It implies a reduction of the entire sample in the range of 20%.
Since the random/quota methodology, used to collect the data, gives at a 5% level a 3%
average error between the sample and the real population values, most mean values found
in the sample are quite close to the mean values one would get when looking at the entire
Swiss population in 1988 and in 2000.
As we are especially interested in testing whether skill or human capital is a signif-
icant determinant of attitudes towards immigration - as expressed through voting -, we
constructed several measures of skills for each initiative given the availability of data.
For the 2000 initiative, table 2.7 presents the education types reported in the survey
and the usual number of study years corresponding to each level of education. Relying on
this information, we could construct two di¤erent measures of skills to explore the role of
economic determinants on attitudes towards immigrants.
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Table 2.6: Summary statistics, initiatives 2000 and 1988
Initiative 2000 Initiative 1988
Variables Type Mean
Standard
Deviation
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Vote dummy 0.283 0.451 0.226 0.418
Participation dummy 0.575 0.495 0.691 0.463
Compulsory school
High school
Professional school
University + HES
9>>=>>; dummy
0.119
0.068
0.089
0.179
0.323
0.252
0.285
0.384
- -
Low education
High education

dummy - -
0.174
0.246
0.379
0.431
Earnings / 100 continuous 50.478 30.930 - -
Retired dummy 0.205 0.404 - -
Age continuous 47.786 17.060 46.000 17.830
Married dummy 0.580 0.494 0.614 0.487
Female dummy 0.483 0.500 0.481 0.500
Owner dummy 0.479 0.500 0.424 0.495
Political orientation
integer
2 [-5;5]
0.086 1.478 0.133 2.036
Foreigners share
- agglomeration
- canton
continuous
in %
19.192
-
6.689
-
-
15.257
-
6.478
French speaking
Italian speaking

dummy
0.195
0.068
0.397
0.252
0.209
0.046
0.407
0.210
Political interest very high
Political interest high
Political interest low
9=; dummy
0.196
0.454
0.232
0.397
0.498
0.422
- -
Notes: - for the 2000 initiative, number of observations: 810, except for the vote choice: 466
- for the 1988 initiative, number of observations: 847, except for the vote choice: 585
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Table 2.7: Education levels, 2000 initiative
Type of education received Years of studies
Compulsory school 9 years
Apprenticeship 12 years
High-school 13 years
Professional school 14 years
University of applied sciences (HES) 15 years
University 17 years
First, we created four dummies corresponding to the education types reported in table
2.7. The omitted category was apprenticeship, which is the most common education type
in Switzerland, and university and HES were merged given the similarity of the diplomas
delivered.
Second, we used a wider measure of skills by including also on-the-job training. The two
types of skills, schooling and on-the-job training, can be aggregated into a common indicator
by appealing to Mincers concept of potential earnings.35 To construct the aggregate skill
measure, earnings, we ran a standard Mincer wage equation36 on data from the Swiss
Wage Structure (LSE) survey 2000.37 The standardized monthly earnings indicator was
constructed using the following equation:38
ln(earnings) = const  0:24  edu_9 + 0:23  edu_13 + 0:27  edu_14
+0:41  edu_15 + 0:54  edu_17 + 0:03  exper   0:51  exper2=1000
+0:04 married  0:17  female+ 0:09  public
where experience is dened as: (age  schooling 6). To improve further on this approach,
we set the wage of retired citizens equal to 0 and introduced a dummy variable for the
retired individual in the econometric specication. As seen in section two, on theoretical
grounds, this is justied by the fact that the rents of the retired are not supposed to depend
on labor market adjustments - as for instance to increased immigration - but are xed at a
given level.
For the 1988 initiative, as only a rough classication of the education types is available,
we constructed two dummy variables: one for a high level of education (university, HES,
professional school and high school) and another for a low level of education (obligatory
school). The omitted category is the intermediate level of education (apprenticeship).
35See Heckman et al. (2003) for an overview.
36Empirically, observed wages and potential earnings have been shown to be highly correlated.
37The sample we used only contains data on the individuals having the Swiss nationality. This sample
contains 2820616 observations. The results of this estimation are available upon request.
38As the unemployed represent less than 1% of the entire sample, we treat them on the same way as the
employed.
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In addition to the standard socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, we repre-
sented the political beliefs of citizens by a variable based on the individuals own judgment
of their political position on a scale between  5 (left) and +5 (right). Cultural di¤er-
ences between the German, French and Italian speaking parts of Switzerland were captured
by dummy variables for minorities and the macroeconomic context was captured by the
prevailing foreigners share in the region where the surveyed individual lives.
2.8.1 Appendix III: Voting about immigration in Switzerland
Table 2.8: Votes on immigration policy: Popular intitiatives
Date Content Result Parti.
7 June 1970
Foreigners share in population 6 10%
(25%) in each Canton (Geneva).
rejected
54%
74%
20 Oct. 1974
Foreigners share in population 6 12%
(25%) in each Canton (Geneva)
with total in Switzerland 6 500000.
Naturalizations 6 4000 per year.
rejected
65.8%
70%
13 March 1977 Foreigners share in population 6 12.5%:
rejected
70.5%
45%
13 March 1977 Naturalizations 6 4000 per year.
rejected
66.2%
45%
5 April 1981
Abolish seasonal worker status.
Indenite renewal of working permits.
Immigration ows to match emigration ows.
rejected
83.8%
39%
4 Dec. 1988 *
Immigration ows 6 2/3 of emigration
ows (including asylum seekers).
Limit on seasonal workers and
cross-border commuters.
rejected
67.3%
52%
1 Dec. 1996
Illegals cannot ask asylum seeker status.
Restrictions on rights of appeal
for asylum seekers.
rejected
53.7%
46%
24 Sept. 2000 *
Foreigners share in population 6 18%
(including asylum seekers).
rejected
63.8%
45%
24 Nov. 2002
Asylum seekers entering Switzerland by a
well-known country will be pent-up directly.
rejected
50.1%
48%
* initiatives analyzed in this paper.
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Table 2.9: Votes on immigration policy: Referenda
Date Content Result Parti.
6 June 1982
Counter project to the initiative
from April, 5 1981:
indenite renewal of working permits.
Immigration ows to match migration ows.
rejected
50.4%
35%
4 Dec. 1983
Tightening of naturalization criteria.
Children of any Swiss citizen
can get the Swiss nationality.
accepted
60.8%
35%
4 Dec. 1983
Loosening of naturalization requirements
for the foreigners children, the refugees,
asylum seekers and the nationless.
rejected
55.2%
35%
5 April 1987
Distribution of asylum seekers across Cantons.
Faster admission process.
Tightening of asylum law.
accepted
67.3%
42%
5 April 1987
Amendment of the law regulating the stay
and establishment of foreigners, e.g.
imprisonment of dangerous asylum seekers
or who refuse to leave the country.
accepted
65.7%
42%
12 June 1994
Easier naturalizations right for young
foreigners who grew up in Switzerland.
rejected
by Cantons
46%
4 Dec. 1994
Expanded search rights
in asylum-seekers domiciles.
Tightening of the foreigners law.
accepted
72.9%
43%
13 June 1999
Amendment of the asylum law, i.e. less
restrictive provisory admission rights.
accepted
70.6%
45%
13 June 1999
Stricter criteria for asylum status.
Asylum seekers must be cooperative
with the authorities.
accepted
70.8%
45%
21 May 2000
Bilateral agreements - free mobility of labor -
between Switzerland and EU15 countries.
accepted
67.2%
48.3%
24 Sept. 2004
Easier naturalizations right for young
foreigners who grew up in Switzerland.
rejected
56.8%
54%
24 Sept. 2004
Automatic naturalization of third
generation foreigners.
rejected
51.6%
54%
25 Sept. 2005
Extension of the bilateral agreements - free
mobility of labor - to the 10 new EU members.
accepted
56.0%
54.5%
24 Sept. 2006
Amendment of the law regulating the stay
and establishment of foreigners of non EU
countries (explicit obligation of integration).
accepted
68.0%
48%
24 Sept. 2006
Amendment of the asylum law, i.e.
stricter admission rights.
accepted
67.8%
48%
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Chapter 3
Trust : The forgotten factor
shaping attitudes towards
immigrants ?
Over the last decade, analyses of opinion polls to understand better individual attitudes
have become more and more frequent. In order to test the political economy predictions,
economists focused mainly on the role of skills in the shaping of attitudes towards immi-
grants and found some evidence in favor of their predictions. However, based on the recent
development of experiments showing that economists fail to understand fundamental eco-
nomic questions when they disregard social preferences (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002), this
paper is the rst, to our knowledge, to introduce trust - a proxy for social values and reci-
procity - among the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants. Relying on data from
a new European opinion poll, the ESS, we nd, in a rst step, that education signicantly
matters in the shaping of attitudes and that this e¤ect is larger for working individuals as
predicted by economic models. In a second step, we show that trust is a very signicant
determinant of preferences towards immigrants. This result suggests that the individual
level of trust is a moral value that spreads not only to neighbors or to community members
but also to immigrants. Finally, we asses that this result is robust to many alternative
specications. As a policy implication, our ndings suggest that both economic and social
policy interventions may reduce hostility towards immigrants.
JEL classication: A13, D71, F22, J61, P16, Z13
Key words: Attitudes towards immigrants, political economy, trust, survey data
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3.1 Introduction
In the actual context, how to manage immigration occupies a center stage in the political
discussions of most developed countries. Indeed, squeezed between economic interests and
public pressures, adequately managing the immigration policy represents a challenge for
most governments. Contrary to economic interests which are often well organized into
lobbies, the public opinion is much more di¤use and not easy to dene. However, in a
representative democracy in which citizens cannot directly inuence their governmental
policies, understanding better the citizens opinions is fundamental for the good functioning
of the democratic system and for avoiding tensions between natives and immigrants.
Thanks to the recent development of opinion polls, individual attitudes have started
to be analyzed more deeply. Given the variety of possible determinants of preferences
towards immigration, the empirical literature on this topic has been burgeoning. One of
the most recurrent results emphasized is that education signicantly matters in the shaping
of individual attitudes towards immigration. However, interpreting this result is not easy
since education can be considered, among others, as a proxy of labor market e¤ects, of
social characteristics, or of scal concerns.
The main goal of this paper is to investigate further the determinants of preferences
towards immigrants by emphasizing not only the economic arguments but also the role
of reciprocity and trust. Indeed, while economic arguments surely matter in the shaping
of individual attitudes, behavioral economists have shown that economists fail to under-
stand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social preferences (Fehr and
Fischbacher 2002). Drawing both on Putnams (2000) argument that trust is a key com-
ponent of social capital because it acts as a social lubricant that enables a variety of forms
of social interaction and cooperation and on the increasing empirical and experimental
evidence showing that social interactions and reciprocity enter signicantly in individual
choices, this paper improves upon past analyses by focusing on trust as a possible determi-
nant of attitudes towards immigrants.
As a main result, we nd a large and signicant positive inuence of trust on attitudes
towards immigrants. We also nd that this result is robust to a variety of alternative speci-
cations as well as to a simultaneous modelling of trust and preferences towards immigration
by using a Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) method. These ndings in-
form us that trust is a moral value that spreads not only to neighbors or to community
members but also to immigrants.
More broadly, the other results obtained in this paper largely conrm past empirical
evidences and are robust to the introduction of our trust variable. For instance, similarly
to Mayda (2006), we nd that the expected skill structure of immigration ows highly
inuences actual preferences, i.e. low-skill citizens living in countries with a history of low-
(high-)skill immigration are much more against (in favor of) immigration than the high-skill
citizens living there.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the recent
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development of the empirical studies on attitudes towards immigration and of the literature
related to the concept of reciprocity and trust. Section three discusses the survey data used
and emphasizes its main features. In section four, we present the main determinants of at-
titudes towards immigrants and emphasize the role trust plays among these determinants.
Section ve then discusses some empirical issues important to consider when estimating
equations comprising subjective data both as explained and as explanatory variables. The
determinants of trust as well as the results obtained by estimating jointly trust and im-
migration preferences are presented and analyzed further. Finally, robustness checks are
provided in section six and conclusions follow in section seven.
3.2 Literature review
With the increasing availability of survey data and the constant improvement of sampling
methods, opinion polls data have been more and more widely used to understand better
the determinants of individual preferences. At the boundary of economics and social sci-
ences, the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration as well as the trusting
behavior of peoples have awakened an increasing interest among researchers. Since, to
our knowledge, evidence on the inuence of trust on attitudes towards immigrants is still
lacking, the main goal of this paper is to provide a rst evidence on this issue.
3.2.1 Classical determinants of attitudes towards immigrants
Opinion poll data - by allowing to isolate empirically the underlying determinants of atti-
tudes which cannot be easily identied otherwise - have recently been considered by many
economists as a unique way to test the predictions of theoretical models. For instance,
opinion polls have been used to test standard political economy models which predict that
a perfectly rational individual will be against immigration if he expects it to have a neg-
ative impact on his income, e.g. low-(high-)skill workers are expected to be more against
low-(high-)skill immigrant workers competing for the same jobs. Based on the assumption
that income and labor market status are closely linked and that immigrants are mostly low
skilled, the signicant positive inuence of the skill level - either proxied by education years
or by occupation related wages - on the preferences towards immigrants has been interpreted
by economists - Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006), ORourke and Sinnott (2006)
- and by some social scientists - Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) and Kessler (2001) - as
empirical evidence in favor of the labor market competition hypothesis.1 Moreover, draw-
1As an additional evidence of labor market e¤ects, Mayda (2006) and ORourke and Sinnott (2006)
found that in high (low) per capita GDP countries, the highly skilled individuals are more (less) in favor
of immigration than the low-skilled. This result conrms the prediction of the standard Hecksher-Ohlin
model since countries with a high GDP are also those relatively richly endowed with high-skilled labor and
attracting low-skilled immigrants.
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ing on the observation that state intervention - either through taxes or redistribution - may
also play an important role in the shaping of preferences towards immigrants, Hanson et al.
(2004, 2005) and Facchini and Mayda (2006) found some relevant evidence that high-skill
individuals, while being favorable to immigration on a labor market basis, are rather hostile
to immigrants in a tax perspective.
Departing from the economic interpretation of education, the majority of social scientists
have emphasized that education should rather be considered as a proxy for some social values
or characteristics - such as tolerance,2 more diverse and cosmopolitan social networks,3 or
di¤erent habits in answering survey questions4 - which in turn may also fairly well explain
the observed positive e¤ect of education on attitudes towards immigrants.
Beyond the debate on the interpretation to give to the education variable, both social
scientists and economists agree that hostility towards immigration may also have racial
motives that are unrelated to any economic considerations (Dustmann and Preston 2004).
Taking this argument into account by adding di¤erent measures of racial and cultural prej-
udice or of ideology into their empirical models, almost all the empirical surveys on the
determinants of preferences towards immigrants found that these non-economic argu-
ments also have a large and signicant inuence on citizens attitudes.
3.2.2 Trust and reciprocity as determinants of individual preferences
While most empirical papers on the determinants of preferences towards immigration almost
exclusively focus on individual characteristics and ideology, there is growing experimental
evidence suggesting that social interactions matter a lot in the shaping of individual at-
titudes: recent experimental research has revealed forms of human behavior involving
interaction among unrelated individuals that cannot be explained in terms of self-interest
(Bowles et al. 2003). Some additional evidence can be found in Fehr and Fischbacher (2002):
economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social
preferences.5
Since the end of the eighties, in parallel to the development of experiments designed by
behavioral economists to isolate social preferences, social scientists have emphasized and
developed the concept of social capital. Among the early contributors in building of this
concept, we nd Coleman (1988) who rst introduced social capital in a similar way as
2For instance, Citrin et al. (1997) argue that a higher level of education leads to a more tolerant outlook
toward all out-groups, including foreigners and ethnic minorities and Burns and Gimpel (2000) that the
contribution of education to liberal attitudes on racial policies [is] associated with the learning of tolerance.
3See Chandler and Tsai (2001).
4According to Burns and Gimpel (2000), better educated people are simply trained to avoid sounding
bigoted when they express opposition to racial policies.
5Where, according to their denition, a person exhibits social preferences if the person not only cares
about the material resources allocated to her but also cares about the material resources allocated to relevant
reference agents [i.e.] a particularly important type of social preference is the preference for reciprocity or
reciprocal fairness.
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nancial, physical and human capital and Putnam (1993) who gave the rst widely used
denition of social capital: social capital [...] refers to features of social organization, such
as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the e¢ciency of society by facilitating
coordinated actions. Some renement is found in Putnam (2000, p. 19): social capital
refers to connections among individuals - social networks and the norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness that arise from them.
How can these social preferences a¤ect attitudes towards immigration? As an illustration
consider an individual who must decide if he is for or against allowing new immigrants to
enter his country. Given that ex-ante this individual does not know the behavior immigrants
will have after having settled down, his decision will depend on the expectations he has
about their e¤ects. As emphasized by many economists, the expected labor market and
scal e¤ects of immigration will have a large inuence on the individual choice. However,
the shaping of the expected e¤ects of immigration - including economic e¤ects - may not
only be driven by selsh arguments but also by social norms or trust levels.
The central hypothesis we wish to test in this paper is that an individual who exhibits
a large level of trust towards unknown individuals, also supports further immigration.6
Indeed, if trust captures some kind of moral reciprocity, e.g. you will treat the others as
you would wish to be treated by them, a trusting individual will have a higher probability
to believe that immigrants are trustworthy and thus will not abuse welfare, harm their labor
market perspectives, or have a negative impact on cultural life. If this hypothesis is correct,
our empirical estimates should report that trust is a signicant determinant of attitudes
towards immigrants and that it leads to a more positive view of immigrants.
In the literature, the evidence that trust has an important inuence on economic and
social outcomes as well as on personal attitudes is growing very rapidly. At an aggregate
level, trust has been found, for instance, to have a large and signicant inuence on the
quality of government and of life satisfaction (Bjørnskov 2006), on subjective well-being
(Helliwell 2005), on economic performance, i.e. GDP growth and investment/GDP (Knack
and Keefer 1997), and on the performance of large organizations, e.g. government e¢ciency,
participation in civic organization, size of the large rms relative to GDP, social e¢ciency
(La Porta et al. 1997). At the level of an individual, trust has been shown to positively
shape his attitudes towards unemployment insurance and welfare (Soroka et al. 2004) and
towards the use of nancial instruments, e.g. writing checks, investing in stocks, using
institutional credits (Guiso et al. 2004).
6A similar hypothesis has been emphasized by Uslaner (2002 p. 196): people with faith in others are
also supportive of immigrants.
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3.3 The European Social Survey (ESS)
Among the available survey data-sets which report attitudes towards immigrants, we de-
cided to use the ESS which characteristics are discussed in more details in appendix I. While
appendix II reports the summary statistics of the variables used for our empirical tests, this
section discusses our choice of variables capturing trust and attitudes towards immigrants.
3.3.1 How to measure trust?
To be able to establish that the trusting behavior of an individual inuences his attitude
towards immigrants, we need to nd a survey question which proxies trust as well as possible.
However, given that trust cannot be considered as an unidimensional concept,7 both the
choice of the survey question and how this question is on average interpreted by the surveyed
individuals have to be discussed further.
Relying on a trust game8 without face-to-face interaction and on answers to a survey
questionnaire, Fehr et al. (2003) could establish that a composite indicator of the level of
trust of an individual - composed of the answers to the following survey questions: (i) in
general one can trust people, (ii) in these days you cant rely on anybody else, and (iii) when
dealing with strangers it is better to be careful before you trust them - does signicantly
explain the trusting behavior of this individual in a trust game.9
Among the questions available in the ESS, we decided to use the following: Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cant be too careful
in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you cant be
too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted as a measure of the trusting
behavior of an individual. This choice was motivated by the wording of this question being
the closest to the questions used by Fehr et al. to construct their composite indicator.10
7According to Uslaner (2002), the two main dimensions underlying trust are: strategic trust [which]
reects our expectations about how people will behave [and] moralistic trust [which] is the belief that others
share your fundamental moral values and therefore should be treated as you would wish to be treated by
them.
8The game they used is called the trust game. It goes as follows: a Proposer receives an amount
of money x from the experimenter and then can choose to send an amount between zero and x to the
Responder. The experimenter then doubles the amount sent and the Responder is then free to return any
amount of it to the Proposer.
9Relying on a trust game with face-to-face interaction, Glaeser et al. (2000) found a very di¤erent result,
i.e. people who answered that they trust others in a survey questionnaire did not act as such in experimental
games, i.e. standard trust questions may be picking up trustworthiness rather than trust. However it has
to be emphasized that using a face-to-face methodology is probably e¢cient to get information on the
strategic behavior of individuals in a typical e¤ort enforcement problem - in labor markets for instance - but
not to capture their general reciprocal attitude.
10 It has to be emphasized that the two following questions available in the ESS: Do you think that most
people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? and Would
you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?
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The advantage of using this question as a proxy of moralistic trust is that it has already
often been used in empirical studies and that there is a large body of evidence that assesses
that the surveyed individuals interpret it in the way we expect them to do. As an illustration,
relying on the 2000 ANES Pilot Survey, Uslaner (2002 pp. 72-74) reports that 57:8% of the
surveyed individuals think about this trust question in a general way and only 22:5% as
related to life experience. Conrming this result, Helliwell et al. (2006) nd that responses
to this standard trust question are highly shaped by cultural norms, whereas responses to a
lost wallet question are inuenced by life experience and by the neighborhood context.11
Using the Pew Philadelphia Study 1996 and a factor analysis, Uslaner (pp. 52-56) also
nds that most people can be trusted is closely related to trust people you meet on the
street or trust people where you shop, but not with trust your family, your boss,
or people at your club. Finally, Uslaner provides some evidence that the answers to this
trust question are remarkably stable in time and do not depend on daily experiences
what conrms that moralistic trust does not depend on experience but rather on enduring
values or a general feeling about life [and] measures better moral values than considerations
about whether to trust someone in particular situation.
3.3.2 Dening attitudes towards immigrants
The questions available in the ESS to capture preferences towards immigration are: (Q1)
To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group
as most [country] people to come and live here?, (Q2) How about people of a di¤erent race
or ethnic group from most [country] people?, and (Q3) How about people from the poorer
countries outside Europe?. For each question, we codied the answers as follows: (4) allow
many to come and live here, (3) allow some, (2) allow a few, and (1) allow none. According to
Card et al. (2005), the main advantages of the wording of these questions are the following.
First, not explicitly using the word immigrants in the question allows a better comparison
of the answers between countries. Indeed, the interpretation of this word may substantially
di¤er between countries depending, for instance, on their actual immigration policy. Second,
the term to live is general enough to refer to both permanent and temporary immigration.
Finally, the phrasing of the answers to these questions is also adequate for our study since
it avoids any reference to the actual immigration policy implemented by a given country.
For our empirical study, we decided to focus on the question about immigrants from
poor non European countries (Q3). Indeed, the two other questions, (Q1) and (Q2), by
referring to race and ethnic group, can be interpreted very di¤erently depending on the
were not found to explain signicantly trust in the game of Fehr et al. Therefore, we do not consider these
questions in our empirical work.
11An additional evidence is provided by Knack and Keefer (1997) who found that the correlation between
the regional trust in strangers (in family) and the percentage of wallets returned by strangers in that region is
high (low). This result conrms that trust is primarily capturing generalized trust as opposed to specic
trust placed in people one has repeated interactions with.
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country in which an individual lives. For instance, a Portuguese may consider the Polish as
belonging to a di¤erent ethnic group whereas a Czech would not. Moreover, compared with
questions linked to geography and wealth, questions linked to race or ethnic attributes are
more likely to be driven by cultural motives which are di¢cult to model.
3.3.3 Some insights on country level averages
Given that foreign born individuals might have a very di¤erent perception of immigrants
than natives and be inuenced by the trust level of their country of origin, all the reported
statistics of this paper are exclusively based on the native individuals sub-population which
reduces our sample by about 7:4%. Luxembourg, Island and Ukraine were excluded from
our sample since their characteristics are too di¤erent from those of the other European
countries included in the ESS, and Estonia and Slovakia because they were not part of the
2002 ESS survey.
In gures 3-1 and 3-2, we represent the country averages12 of trust and of preferences
towards immigrants from poor non European countries. As we can notice, these values are
highly scattered. Figure 3-1 shows that the di¤erences between the levels of trust are large
but closely related to GDP as well as to geographical location and to cultural background.
If we suppose that there is no heterogeneity between countries in the way of interpreting and
answering survey questions, Denmark should be considered as the most trusting country
followed closely by the other Scandinavian countries whereas Greece, Poland and Portugal
as the least trusting followed closely by the other southern and eastern European countries.
What about immigration preferences? As shown in gure 3-2, the most restrictive
countries are Greece13 and Hungary closely followed by Portugal. Sweden is the country
the most open to immigration followed by Poland, Switzerland, Ireland and Norway. While
geographical and cultural patterns seem to show up when considering trust, preferences
towards immigrants seem to be more complex and need for sure a deeper analysis. In
addition to the result presented in table 3-2, it has to be emphasized that, at a country
level, the answers to the questions about immigrants from poor non European countries
and belonging to racially di¤erent group are highly correlated (0:988) whereas answers to
the question about immigrants of the same race are less correlated with the two former
questions (0:832 and 0:861). For every country, immigrants of the same race are also, on
average, more welcomed than immigrants of a di¤erent race or from poor non European
countries.
The large disparities observed in the levels of trust and in the attitudes towards immi-
grants are certainly linked to the large di¤erences in historical backgrounds, in languages,
in legal structures, in experiences with immigration, in economic developments, etc. ex-
isting amongst European countries. To take these di¤erences into account, we have two
12Each country sample comprises on average 20000 individuals.
13The very recent immigration pressure - especially from Albania - is probably highly responsible for the
very negative perception Greek natives have about immigration.
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Figure 3-1: Trust and GDP
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Figure 3-2: Attitudes towards immigrants from poor non European countries and GDP
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possibilities: we can use either country xed-e¤ects, or country and regional14 observed
characteristics. Using country xed-e¤ects allows one to control for all kind of unobserved
country specic characteristics but at the expense of understanding better the driving forces
behind these e¤ects. Using country and regional observed characteristics has the advantage
to help identify the most important aggregate factors inuencing attitudes. However, the
drawback of this approach is that we may omit to control for some relevant country charac-
teristics. Since it is not possible to assess which approach is better, all our estimations were
done once using country xed-e¤ects and once using country and regional characteristics.
Which country and regional characteristics should be included in our estimations instead
of the xed-e¤ects? As is quite standard GDP per capita can been seen as a proxy of the
level of economic development and of the wealth of a country which in turn probably
signicantly a¤ect the quality of living of an individual and his attitudes. In addition to
GDP, the level of income inequality as well as the unemployment rate can also signicantly
a¤ect the environment of living. Departing from economic characteristics, heterogeneity can
play an important role in explaining both trust and attitudes towards immigrants. In this
paper, we consider ethnic and religious fractionalization15 as well as the foreigners share in
the population as proxies for heterogeneity.
3.4 Determinants of attitudes towards immigrants
In this section, we start by estimating the impact of the standard socioeconomic and de-
mographic characteristics on the attitudes towards immigration. To test our hypothesis
that the trusting behavior of an individual matters in the shaping of his attitude towards
immigrants, we then add a trust variable in all our estimations. Given the encouraging
results obtained, we then look at a more specic setup which controls better for the e¤ect
of education on attitudes.
3.4.1 Classical determinants
In most of the empirical papers on the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants, indi-
vidual preferences (y1) have been assumed to depend on a whole set of socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics (x) as well as on ideology or on political beliefs. Given that
the two latter variables may be endogenous,16 we do not include any of such variables in
14The regional decomposition reported in the ESS questionaire correspond to the Eurostat NUTS classi-
cation at the levels 2 or 3 depending on the country.
15See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for an overview of the importance to consider fractionalization among
the country characteristics.
16For instance, in many European countries, the self-reported political orientation of an individual is
largely determined by his perception about immigrants.
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our estimations. The specication considered in this section can be written as follows:
y1 = 
0x+ "
where " is an error term. Given that the answers to the question about attitudes towards
immigrants are qualitative, we used an ordered probit for all our estimations. The results
obtained by estimating the above mentioned specication are reported in columns [1], [3]
and [5] of table 3.1 and the corresponding marginal e¤ects in table 3.2.
Conrming past empirical evidence, all our estimations report that the education level
strongly inuences the attitudes towards immigration, i.e. the higher the education level, the
higher the openness to immigration. In addition to this result, education has a signicantly
higher inuence on working individuals. As reported in table 3.2, working can a¤ect the
probability of being in a given category of preferences towards immigration from less than
5% to more than 35%. These results can interpreted as follows. On the one hand, the
positive impact of education on the working individuals can be considered - as emphasized
by economists such as Scheve and Slaughter (2000), Mayda (2005), ORourke and Sinnott
(2005) - as a conrmation of the standard economic theory on the labor market e¤ects of
immigration.17 On the other hand, the overall positive e¤ect of education can be seen - as
suggested by social scientists such as Citrin et al. (1997) or Haimueller and Hiscox (2006)
- as proxying some social e¤ects or di¤erent habits in answering survey questions.18
Among the additional results, age and being student have a signicant impact on atti-
tudes towards immigrants whatever the specication chosen. Contrary to the students who
often get to know many foreigners during their formation and are stimulated to analyze
critically the actuality, the older citizens are rather opposed to immigration. In some speci-
cations, women, individuals who are married, and those who live in a town have a positive
view of immigrants.
Looking at the country and region characteristics, we nd that a high level of GDP, a
large foreigners share, a high rate of unemployment and a low religious fragmentation all
lead to a signicantly more positive view of immigration. The rst result can be explained
by citizens of richer countries either having a su¢ciently good quality of life to be more
generous towards foreigners, or feeling less threatened by immigration. The second result
indicates that citizens who are surrounded by foreigners are less afraid about them since they
know them better and hence are also less opposed to new immigrants entering the country.
The third result is probably the most surprising. Indeed, according to economic theory, if
17The hypothesis usually tested is: if education is a good proxy of labor market fears, it should signicantly
enter in the preferences of the working individuals.
18For instance, Chandler and Tsai (2001) suggest that the greater tolerance of persons with higher levels
of education has been attributed to their wider knowledge, more critical habits of thought, greater security,
or merely a more sophisticated defence of their class interests and Haimueller and Hiscox (2006) that more
educated respondents might feel more pressure to respond in a more politically correct way to these survey
questions, understating their anti-immigrant sentiments and overstating their commitments to tolerance and
cultural diversity.
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Table 3.1: Ordered probit, immigration estimations
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Trust 0.075*** 0.071*** 0.066***
[25.60] [23.17] [20.80]
Education 0.065*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.060*** 0.054***
[27.25] [22.53] [23.47] [20.75] [21.83] [19.55]
Education  working 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008***
[7.59] [5.93] [7.30] [6.07] [6.11] [5.20]
Unemployed 0.016 0.031 0.009 0.018 0.028 0.04
[0.45] [0.87] [0.27] [0.51] [0.78] [1.12]
Student 0.430*** 0.352*** 0.426*** 0.364*** 0.404*** 0.350***
[13.28] [10.77] [13.11] [11.11] [12.15] [10.44]
Age -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
[8.39] [10.14] [9.28] [10.29] [9.71] [10.34]
Female 0.017 0.021 0.021 0.025* 0.031** 0.034**
[1.32] [1.58] [1.62] [1.90] [2.30] [2.53]
Married -0.01 -0.009 0.011 0.004 0.028** 0.02
[0.70] [0.62] [0.74] [0.30] [1.97] [1.38]
Town -0.017 0.003 -0.02 -0.003 0.095*** 0.101***
[1.27] [0.23] [1.50] [0.24] [6.77] [7.15]
Foreigners share 0.013*** 0.014***
[6.99] [8.01]
Unemployment rate 0.013*** 0.017***
[7.36] [9.37]
GDP per capita 0.294*** 0.189***
[10.49] [6.62]
Ethnic fractionalization 0.028 0.054
[0.55] [1.06]
Religious fractionalization -0.304*** -0.270***
[8.38] [7.42]
Inequality measure 10% -0.006* -0.001
[1.89] [0.40]
Country xed-e¤ects no no no no yes yes
t-statistics in brackets, country xed-e¤ects and cuts not reported, 33 603 observations
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
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Table 3.2: Marginal e¤ects (evaluated at sample means), immigration estimations
[3] [4] [5] [6]
Increase of trust (1/2 ), working
Allow many - 2.83 - 2.44
Allow some - 4.14 - 4.06
Allow a few - -3.01 - -2.98
Allow none - -3.96 - -3.52
Increase of education (1/2 ), working
Allow many 3.86 3.28 3.51 3.05
Allow some 4.80 4.33 5.08 4.63
Allow a few -3.98 -3.51 -4.14 -3.73
Allow none -4.68 -4.10 -4.45 -3.95
Increase of education (1/2 ), non working
Allow many 2.76 2.43 2.62 2.34
Allow some 4.48 4.00 4.76 4.31
Allow a few -2.74 -2.53 -3.05 -2.84
Allow none -4.50 -3.90 -4.33 -3.81
immigrants and natives are competing on the same labor market, immigrants may either
have a detrimental e¤ect on natives wages or increase unemployment. Combined with the
fact that being unemployed has no signicant inuence on attitudes towards immigrants,
the positive inuence of the regional unemployment rate does not support the economic
prediction. It is also possible that the positive inuence of the unemployment rate is linked
to a problem of omitted variables. The fourth result is conrming that heterogeneity in
religious beliefs may exacerbate fears against foreigners and immigrants. Finally, there is
only a little evidence (at a 10% level), that inequality makes people less open to foreigners.
The ranking of the country xed-e¤ects, not reported, is closely related to the ranking
of the country averages reported in table 3-2. All things equal, Hungary and Greece are
the countries most opposed to immigration. Following them, we nd the Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark and Finland. Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland and Poland are the most open
countries.
3.4.2 Trust: A determinant of attitudes towards immigrants?
Based on our discussion about the importance of reciprocity in the shaping of attitudes, we
introduce trust (y2) as an additional determinant of preferences towards immigrants. The
specication to estimate is now given by:
y1 = y2 + 
0x+ "
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In this section, we consider trust as exogenous. However, next section discusses further
eventual problems of endogeneity and provides a more sophisticated framework to isolate
the inuence of trust on preferences towards immigrants.
As shown in columns [2], [4] and [6] of table 3.1, trust is a very signicant and important
determinant of preferences towards immigrants, i.e. an individual who is more trusting
has also a more positive view of immigrants. As already mentioned, this result could
be explained by trusting citizens having more positive expectations about the impact of
immigrants on their daily life or on the country in general. For instance, trusting individuals
may be more condent that immigrants are trustworthy and wont have a negative e¤ect
on their host country.
Interestingly, introducing a measure of trust - which is highly and signicantly deter-
mined by education as will be discussed in next section - lowers only slightly the size of the
direct e¤ect of education on preferences towards immigration as shown in table 3.2. This
result suggests that the social content of education emphasized by social scientists cannot
persuasively be linked to subjective expectations about reciprocity.
In addition to lowering the direct inuence of education on attitudes towards immi-
grants, trust also lowers the e¤ect of GDP per capita and makes the inequality measure
loose its signicance. Finally, comparing the estimations without and with trust included
as a regressor, all country xed-e¤ects - except for Denmark, Finland and Norway - are
attenuated which implies that the individual level of trust explains a part of the unobserved
country characteristics.
3.4.3 Education as a proxy for labor market fears: Further evidence
According to the standard political-economy models, if native and immigrant workers are
substitutes, an arrival of low-(high-)skill immigrants may have a negative impact on the
labor market wages of the low-(high-)skill natives, thus we expect low- and high-skill natives
to have systematically a di¤erent attitude towards immigration. Supposing that immigrants
are expected to be mostly low-skill, natives should be more against immigration than high-
skill natives which indeed has widely been conrmed by empirical analyses. However, since
all the countries included in our sample have not the same level of economic development,
nor the same immigration policy, the expectations about the skill level of the immigrants
may di¤er, and simply considering education as a proxy for labor market characteristics
may be overly simplistic.
Given that we dont know the individual expectations about the skill mix of the new
immigrants, we assume that native citizens expect future immigration ows to have the same
structure as past immigration ows. Thus, we should observe high-skill natives in countries
which experienced relatively large inows of (low-) high-skill immigrants to be signicantly
less (more) favorable to immigration than low-skill natives. To test this hypothesis, we
follow Maydas (2006) work and consider the actual ratio of skilled to unskilled individuals
in the native relative to the immigrant population as a proxy for the expected structure
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of immigration ows. To test for robustness, we also used GDP per capita as an indirect
proxy for the expected immigration ows.19
Table 3.3: Ordered probit, immigration estimations, decomposition of the education e¤ect
[7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
Trust 0.075*** 0.071*** 0.066*** 0.066***
[24.74] [23.35] [20.73] [20.68]
Education 0.070*** 0.059*** -0.156*** -0.085*** 0.034*** 0.030*** -0.018 -0.005
[25.07] [20.78] [6.81] [3.69] [5.91] [5.16] [0.68] [0.20]
Edu.  rel. skill -0.004** -0.002 0.032*** 0.029***
[1.97] [1.02] [5.37] [4.97]
Edu. rel. skill  work 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005***
[7.08] [6.00] [4.92] [4.29]
Edu.  GDP 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.006**
[9.65] [6.10] [2.98] [2.27]
Edu.  GDP  work 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[7.25] [6.08] [6.10] [5.22]
Country xed-e¤ects no no no no yes yes yes yes
t-statistics in brackets, 33 603 observations
Country xed-e¤ects, cuts and other control variables not reported
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
Referring to estimations [7] and [8] of table 3.3 - which control for country and regional
characteristics -, we nd a large and signicant inuence of education on attitudes towards
immigrants but this e¤ect is signicantly lowered in countries relatively richly endowed
with low-skill immigrants. However, once we consider only the working individuals, the
inuence of education in countries with relatively many low-skill immigrants becomes, as
expected, clearly positive. The estimations controlling for country xed-e¤ects, reported in
columns [11] and [12], show that the education level, whatever the skill mix, has a positive
inuence on preferences towards immigrants. Moreover, high-(low-)skill citizens in countries
which are expecting immigrants to be relatively low skilled are also more (un)favorable to
immigration and this e¤ect is even larger for currently working individuals.
If we now consider our indirect measure of the expected skill structure of immigration
ows, columns [9], [10], [13] and [14] of table 3.3 report that the interaction term between
education and GDP has a positive inuence on preferences towards immigrants, i.e. high-
skill natives in high (low) GDP countries are more (un)favorable to immigration than low-
19Following the assumption of ORourke and Sinnott (2006): GDP per capita is positively correlated
with countries human capital endowments, individuals in a country should expect, according to a standard
Heckscher-Ohlin model, unskilled workers to migrate from unskilled-labor abundant (low GDP) countries to
skilled-labor abundant (high GDP) countries.
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skill natives.20 When we control for country xed-e¤ects, the level of education has no
longer a direct e¤ect on immigration preferences whereas, when we consider country and
regional characteristics, the direct e¤ect of education is negative. Taking into account that
the lowest GDP level (in log) in our sample is 8:737, the negative direct impact of education
can never o¤set the positive e¤ect of our interaction term, thus, in none of our countries,
the low-skill individuals are more favorable to immigration than the high-skill individuals.
As an additional result, we nd that the interaction term between education, GDP and
working is always signicantly positive which suggests that working individuals are more
reactive to economic arguments.
Departing from our estimations of the impact of education on preferences towards im-
migrants, the other results obtained are strikingly close to those reported in table 3.1 and
therefore are not reported. The only thing we wish to emphasize one more time is that
trust has a large and signicant inuence on immigration preferences.
3.5 Endogeneity of trust: Some evidence
Given that we used answers to subjective survey questions to proxy both the attitudes to-
wards immigrants and the individual level of trust, we cannot exclude that some unobserved
characteristics may have a systematic inuence on them. If this is indeed the case, our es-
timations may be a¤ected by an endogeneity problem.21 Moreover, even if we suppose that
the level of trust is an important determinant of preferences towards immigrants, nothing
guarantees us that the level of trust is not itself inuenced by attitudes towards immigrants.
In this case, we may be confronted with a simultaneity bias.
In this section, we start by providing an empirical framework to take into account both
of these potential biases. Then, we discuss the exclusion restrictions needed to identify our
model as well as the determinants of trust. Finally, we present and analyze the results
obtained by estimating simultaneously trust and attitudes towards immigrants.
3.5.1 A Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) framework
Since our main interest is to understand the determinants of preferences towards immigrants
and since we want our estimations to be robust to a possible simultaneity bias, we decided
to rely on a LIML estimation which has, at least, two advantages over the Full Information
20Contrary to ORourke and Sinnotts (2006) results replacing the inequality index by an interaction term
between this index and education never revealed signicant.
21Subjective survey questions can be awed by attempts at controlling ones self-image, cultural biases,
interactions with the surveyor, memory and lucidity failures, question formulation, order e¤ects, answers
to irrelevant questions, mood e¤ects, di¢culty of interpreting the answers. See Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2001) for an overview of these problems.
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Maximum Likelihood (FIML). First, it is robust to an eventual simultaneity bias22 and,
second, it implies that we need only to nd a relevant identication variable for the trust
equation as will be discussed further on.23 The only drawback of using a LIML instead of
a FIML is a possible loss of e¢ciency.
The system of equations to be estimated simultaneously and jointly is composed of a
structural form for the individual preferences for immigration (y1) and of a reduced form
for the level of trust (y2):
y1 = y2 + 
0x+ "1 where y1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if y1 6 k1
2 if k1 < y

1 6 k2
...
...
N if y1 > kN 1
(3.1)
y2 = 
0x+ 0z + "2 (3.2)
where y1 is the dependent latent variable, y2 is the endogenous variable, x is a set of
common explanatory variables, z is a set of exogenous identication variables, k1; :::; kN 1
are unknown threshold parameters to be estimated along with ; ; ;  and "1; "2 are error
terms.
It has to be mentioned that we decided to treat our trust variable as continuous. Indeed,
given that the answers to our trust question were coded on a scale from 0 to 10 - which
implies a very large number of cases to consider - using another latent variable would have
dramatically hampered the interpretation of our results.24 To estimate this model, we also
assumed that the errors ("1; "2) follow a bivariate normal law:"
"1
"2
#
 N
 "
0
0
#
;
"
21 12
21 
2
2
#!
where 12 = 21 =  is an unknown coe¢cient of covariance and 
2
1; 
2
2 are the variances
of y1; y2 respectively. Furthermore, to identify the parameters of our model, the following
normalization was made:25 21 = 1.
To estimate this setup by maximum likelihood, we have to write equation (3.1) in a
reduced form. Substituting equation (3.2) into equation (3.1) and then dividing the resulting
expression by  = (1 + 222 + 2)
1=2 to normalize the variance of the error term to 1, we
22Since the LIML relies a reduced from of the trust equation, this allows us to control for a possible
inuence of attitudes towards immigrants on trust.
23Rivers and Vuong (1988) also show that the LIML is the most e¢cient limited information estimator.
24As a robustness check, we estimated most of our specications with a bivariate ordered probit. Since
the results we obtained were similar - both in terms of signs and of signicance levels - to the one obtained
with trust considered as continuous, we do not report them here but they are available upon request.
25This normalization does not change the results as y1 is a qualitative variable.
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get: ey1 =  (0x+ 0z) + 1 (0x) + " (3.3)
where " =
"1+"2
 . Considering the system of equations (3.3) and (3.2), the matrix of
variances-covariances is:
V =
"
1
+22

+22
 
2
2
#
To derive the maximum likelihood function, we need to know the joint distribution ofey1 and y2:
f(ey1; y2 j x; z) = f(ey1 j y2; x; z)  f(y2 j x; z)
The marginal distribution of y2 is:
f(y2 j x; z) =
1
2


y2   !
2

(3.4)
where ! = 0x+ 0z and  (:) is the standard normal distribution. Given that both ey1 and
y2 follow a normal law, the conditional pdf of ey1 given y2 can be written as:
f(ey1 j y2; x; z) = 1
(1  2)1=2
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 + 
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 (
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+22
 and  =

2
is the coe¢cient of correlation
between the errors " and "2. Taking into account that y1 is a qualitative variable, we have:
Pr (ey1 = i j y2; x; z) = Preki 1 < ey1 6 eki j y2; x; z
= 
0@eki  
h
 + 
22
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where (:) is the standard normal CDF . Considering expressions (3.4) and (3.5), the
maximum likelihood function is straightforward to get.
3.5.2 Discussing the exclusion restrictions
The main di¢culty to be handled when estimating a LIML is to nd at least one exogenous
variable z which explains - relevantly - the individual level of trust but not the attitudes
towards immigration. Finding such a variable is fundamental to identify correctly our model
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and is not an easy task.
Given that we couldnt nd any individual level variable in the ESS which potentially
satisfy all the conditions mentioned above, we considered the average regional level of trust
as a possible identication variable. Drawing on the social interactions models,26 it is cus-
tomary to suppose that the utility of an individual depends on his own attributes, on the
exogenous environment in which he lives and on his region- (group-) specic attributes
and/or behavior. The last argument of this utility function, if interpreted as an endogenous
e¤ect,27 implies that the behavior - not the exogenous characteristics - of a given reference
group can have an inuence on the behavior of an individual. In our context, it could be il-
lustrated as follows: if most of the inhabitants of a region exhibit high levels of trust towards
strangers, the transactions costs may be low, the economic e¢ciency high, the government
less corrupted, etc., which, in turn, creates positive incentives for each inhabitant of this
region to be also individually more trusting.28 Some support for this prediction has been
provided by Guiso et al. (2004) who found, in a rst step, that the level of social capital of
both the origin and the residence country has an inuence on the behavior of an individual
and, in a second step, that the level of social capital of the residence country represents 2=3
of this inuence.29
Since the variance of trust between regions (4:9) is much larger than the variance within
regions (1:0), the average regional level of trust may not be the most appropriate instrument
to be used. However, by taking into account that the main source of variance in the
individual level of trust is to be found at the regional level, we focused on regional cultural
and institutional features to nd alternative relevant instruments. First, following the
argumentation of Guiso et al. (2004) which suggests that the regional participation rate
should be a good proxy of the level of regional trust since participating in an election is highly
driven by social pressure and internal norms, we considered the regional participation rate
in the elections as an instrument. Second, relying on La Porta et al. (1997) who have shown
that the level of trust in a country with a majority of citizens belonging to a hierarchical
religion - catholic, eastern orthodox, muslim - is signicantly smaller,30 an index of the
predominance of the hierarchical Christian religions, i.e. catholic and orthodox, in a given
region was also used as instrument. Finally, drawing on Guiso et al. (2003) who emphasized
26See Brock and Durlauf (2001) for an overview.
27See Manski (1993) for a distinction between endogenous and contextual e¤ects.
28As noted by Guiso et al. (2004): in high-social-capital communities, people may trust each other more
because the networks in their community provide better opportunities to punish deviants [or] people may
rely more on others keeping their promises because of the moral attitude imprinted with education.
29From an econometric point of view, two points need to be discussed further. First, depending on
the criteria used to dene peer or neighborhood groups, social interaction models may be contaminated
by a problem of self-selection. Second, as shown by Manski (1993), the reection problem may induce a
non identication of social e¤ects. To circumvent the rst problem, we used geographical regions whose
composition is independent of the level of trust and to avoid the second problem, we used the past levels of
regional trust computed with data from the ESS which took place in 2002.
30LaPorta et al. also emphasize that hierarchical religion and distrust [...] both reect some underlying
basic factor in a society.
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that being member of the dominant religion can induce a di¤erent social attitudes, a term of
interaction between the hierarchical index and the individual membership in these religions
has been added amongst the instruments.
3.5.3 Determinants of trust
Since our trust variable is qualitative, we should use an ordered probit model to identify
its main determinants. However, since the results we obtained by using an ordered probit31
are very similar to those obtained by using OLS adjusted for heteroscedasticity,32 we only
report the latter. Indeed, OLS estimations are easier to interpret. Table 3.4 summarizes
the results of di¤erent specications of the trust equation.
Conrming past empirical evidence,33 we nd that the level of education has a very
signicant and positive impact on the level of trust in all the specications, i.e. the higher
the level of education of a citizen, the higher his probability to be trusting others. To
explain this recurrent result many hypotheses have been evoked. For instance, Freitag
(2003 a, b) suggests that education expands the horizon of individuals and makes people
more open minded to accept otherness and Uslaner (2002) that education, especially
through university, broadens ones perspective on the world and brings one into contact
with a wider variety of people. Helliwell et al. (2006) argue that ignorance breeds fear,
which can then be dispelled by education. It is also possible that the positive e¤ect of
education on trust might occur because more educated people associate with other more
educated people who are, for some reason, more trustworthy [...] alternatively, education
might create individual social capital by raising social skills or because high status increases
the ability to reward and punish others (Glaeser et al. 2000). Another interesting result
is that education has a greater impact on the trust level of individuals who are currently
working. Among the other signicant individual characteristics, we nd that age, being
student, not living in a town and being married make more trusting. Being unemployed
and being a woman have a negative e¤ect on trust but not always signicantly so.
When looking at the estimations including regional and country characteristics - columns
[16], [18], [20] and [21] -, we notice that adding these variables considerably increases the
overall t of the estimations, e.g. the R-squared of estimation [16] is more than the double
of that of the benchmark estimation [15]. As main results, we nd that living in a region
with a high foreigners share and in a country with a large level of religious fractionalization
have a negative impact on the individual trust level. These e¤ects have both already
31To test for robustness, all the specications presented in this section were also estimated by using an
ordered probit, but, since all the results obtained revealed similar, both in terms of sign and of level of
signicance, to those obtained by using OLS, we do not present them here. Results are available upon
request.
32The standard errors have been corrected by using Whites estimator of the variance.
33At an individual level, see Glaeser et al. (1997), Li et al. (2005), Freitag (2003 a, b), Helliwell et al.
(2003), Uslaner (2002), Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and, at an aggregate level, see Knack and Keefer
(1997).
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been emphasized in the literature. For instance, Knack and Keefer (1997) argue that in
polarized societies, individuals are less likely to share common backgrounds and mutual
expectations about behavior, so it is more di¢cult to make self-enforcing agreements, and
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) that the e¤ect of heterogeneity on trust is in large part
due to the fact that individuals trust those more similar to themselves. Following the
same argumentation, it is also no surprise that column [16] reports a signicantly negative
inuence of ethnic fractionalization on trust. However, when looking at columns [20] and
[21] which control for hierarchical religions, this variable becomes signicantly positive. This
result suggests that it is not the ethnic di¤erences between individuals which harm trust
but the religious a¢liations associated with the members of di¤erent ethnic groups. The
prediction of Uslaner (2002), i.e. a more equitable distribution of income creates stronger
bonds between di¤erent groups in society [i.e.] when some people have far more than others,
neither those at the top nor those at the bottom are likely to consider the other as part of
their moral community, nds only very little support in our estimations. In addition to
heterogeneity issues, individuals living in a region with a high unemployment rate as well
as with a low GDP per capita are also less trusting.
Replacing regional and country characteristics by country xed-e¤ects - columns [17],
[19] and [22] -, increases the overall t of the estimations but the estimated values of the
variables change very little. This result suggests that the omitted variables bias should
not be a source of concerns when using regional and country characteristics instead of
country xed-e¤ects. The size of the country xed-e¤ects - not reported here - conrms
the clustering of trusting attitudes, all things equal, individuals living in the Scandinavian
countries - Finland, Norway and Denmark - are the most trusting whereas individuals living
in the eastern countries - Poland, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic - and in Greece
are the least trusting.
Turning now to the identication variables, we nd - in column [18] - that the past
average regional level of trust has a very strong and signicant impact on the individual
level of trust. This result conrms that social interactions are strongly present at a regional
level. Moreover, once regional trust has been controlled for, the direct e¤ect of all the
regional and country level variables decreases. This is not a surprise since the regional trust
level itself depends on these variables. The size of the impact of the average regional trust
presented in column [19] is much lower than that discussed above. Indeed, as the average
regional levels of trust are highly correlated with the country averages (0:95), a large part
of their e¤ect is captured by the country xed-e¤ects which may, in turn, induce problems
of identication for our LIML estimations.
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Table 3.4: OLS, trust estimations
[15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22]
Education 0.150*** 0.104*** 0.100*** 0.093*** 0.100*** 0.097*** 0.098*** 0.100***
[30.10] [20.10] [18.44] [18.33] [18.41] [19.04] [19.22] [18.46]
Education  working 0.036*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
[11.12] [8.93] [7.39] [7.46] [7.31] [7.46] [7.54] [7.42]
Unemployed -0.201*** -0.123* -0.183*** -0.165** -0.182*** -0.202*** -0.191*** -0.180***
[2.80] [1.73] [2.68] [2.41] [2.68] [2.90] [2.74] [2.64]
Student 1.123*** 0.942*** 0.877*** 0.860*** 0.871*** 0.892*** 0.890*** 0.877***
[17.14] [14.64] [13.88] [13.68] [13.81] [14.06] [14.04] [13.89]
Age 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004***
[10.42] [6.26] [4.39] [4.42] [4.34] [3.70] [3.23] [4.27]
Female -0.043 -0.048* -0.041 -0.039 -0.041 -0.036 -0.045* -0.044
[1.51] [1.77] [1.56] [1.48] [1.55] [1.33] [1.66] [1.64]
Married -0.016 0.092*** 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.149*** 0.139*** 0.130***
[0.50] [3.09] [4.56] [4.47] [4.55] [5.08] [4.73] [4.48]
Town -0.273*** -0.248*** -0.073** -0.128*** -0.075*** -0.231*** -0.215*** -0.069**
[9.36] [8.70] [2.57] [4.56] [2.65] [8.20] [7.61] [2.44]
Foreigners share -0.023*** -0.006* -0.025*** -0.027***
[6.24] [1.72] [6.76] [7.19]
Unemployment rate -0.051*** -0.019*** -0.045*** -0.047***
[13.41] [5.10] [12.01] [12.47]
GDP per capita 1.533*** 0.403*** 1.114*** 1.137***
[26.51] [6.25] [17.40] [17.74]
Ethnic fractionalization -0.360*** 0.061 0.604*** 0.711***
[3.49] [0.59] [5.61] [6.51]
Religious fractionalization -0.533*** -0.163** -0.370*** -0.285***
[7.33] [2.24] [4.86] [3.69]
Inequality measure 10% -0.062*** 0.008 -0.005 -0.007
[10.11] [1.18] [0.77] [1.14]
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[15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22]
Regional trust 2002 0.716*** 0.209***
[40.01] [4.94]
Regional participation 0.174 0.059 -0.088
[1.16] [0.39] [0.28]
Hierarchical religion share -1.217*** -1.392*** 0.071
[31.77] [28.92] [0.57]
Member hier.  hier. religion 0.241*** 0.062
[5.80] [1.43]
Country xed-e¤ects no no yes no yes no no yes
R-squared 0.06 0.14 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.19
t-statistics in brackets, country xed-e¤ects and constants not reported, 33 603 observations
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
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The estimations in columns [20], [21] and [22] all report that the average regional elec-
toral participation rate has no signicant inuence on trust. This implies that a high
electoral participation rate does not contribute to create a favorable environment to en-
hance the individual level of trust. If we now focus on columns [20] and [21], we notice that
individuals living in regions populated with a majority of citizens belonging to a hierarchi-
cal Christian religion are signicantly less trusting conrming the argument of LaPorta et
al. (1997). However, as shown in column [21], the members of the hierarchical Christian
religions are more trusting if they are living in a region in which their religion is dominant.
If we now look at specication [22] which rely on the same set of instruments as specication
[21], we notice that none of them has a signicant inuence on the individual level of trust.
Similarly to the problem discussed above, our regional level variables are strongly correlated
within a country and thus adding country xed-e¤ects in our estimation removes the e¤ect
of these variables.
Given the very small explanatory power of our instruments when relying on estimations
with xed-country e¤ects and given that using weak instruments may highly bias our es-
timations, we will only use our LIML method to estimate specications including country
and regional level characteristics.34
3.5.4 LIML estimations
The estimations presented in columns [23b], [24b] and [25b] of table 3.5 correspond to the
estimation of column [4] in table 3.1 but this time controlling for the possible endogeneity
of trust. The estimation of trust in specication [23a] corresponds to specication [18] of
table 3.4 whereas specications [24a] and [25a] correspond to specications [20] and [21]
respectively.
If we rst look at estimation [23b] of table 3.5, we nd that trust has a positive and
signicant inuence on attitudes towards immigration. However, compared to the ordered
probit results reported in table 3.2, we notice that the estimated size of the inuence of
trust on preferences towards immigrants is much larger when using the LIML as can be
seen in table 3.6. Moreover, we also nd that the e¤ect of education, once trust has been
instrumented for, is signicantly reduced compared to estimation [4] of table 3.2. As an
illustration, in an ordered probit estimation considering trust as exogenous, a 1 standard
deviation increase in education has a slightly larger inuence on preferences towards im-
migrants than a 1 standard deviation increase in trust. When using a LIML, the size of
34According to a Sheas partial-R2 test-statistic (used to identify weak instruments), we found, for speci-
cation [18], a value of 0:0509 which is statistically di¤erent from 0 according to a F -test and, for specication
[19], a value of 0:0009 also statistically di¤erent from 0, thus the average regional trust variable should not
be a weak instrument (see Bound et al. (1995) for more details on these tests). However, given that we are
working with a very large sample of individuals, our F -test may be too powerful and thus reject H0 even
if correct. In our case, since the latter partial R2 is very small, the problem of weak instrument should be
seen as relevant. While specications [20] and [21] report no evidence of weak instruments, specication [22]
signicantly does.
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Table 3.5: LIML estimations
Trust Immig. Trust Immig. Trust Immig.
[23a] [23b] [24a] [24b] [25a] [25b]
Trust 0.174*** 0.057*** 0.047***
[16.14] [3.27] [2.69]
Regional trust 2002 0.716***
[40.01]
Regional participation 0.211 0.12
[1.24] [0.71]
Hierarchical religion share -1.217*** -1.394***
[31.70] [29.02]
Member hier.  hier. religion 0.246***
[5.88]
Education 0.093*** 0.040*** 0.097*** 0.054*** 0.098*** 0.055***
[18.33] [13.91] [19.05] [17.83] [19.22] [18.36]
Education  working 0.023*** 0.006*** 0.023*** 0.009*** 0.023*** 0.010***
[7.46] [3.83] [7.46] [6.02] [7.54] [6.20]
Foreigners share -0.006* 0.016*** -0.025*** 0.014*** -0.027*** 0.014***
[1.72] [9.22] [6.75] [7.55] [7.19] [7.40]
Unemployment rate -0.019*** 0.022*** -0.045*** 0.016*** -0.047*** 0.016***
[5.10] [11.67] [12.01] [8.17] [12.48] [7.90]
GDP per capita 0.403*** 0.022 1.109*** 0.210*** 1.131*** 0.225***
[6.25] [0.65] [17.13] [5.24] [17.51] [5.67]
Ethnic fractionalization 0.061 0.090* 0.605*** 0.049 0.715*** 0.045
[0.59] [1.79] [5.63] [0.96] [6.55] [0.89]
Religious fractionalization -0.163** -0.205*** -0.362*** -0.277*** -0.271*** -0.282***
[2.24] [5.60] [4.69] [7.41] [3.44] [7.57]
Inequality measure 10% 0.008 0.005* -0.005 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003
[1.18] [1.73] [0.72] [0.64] [1.09] [0.83]
Correlation 0.243*** 0.032 0.055
t-statistics in brackets, country/region characteristics, cuts and individual level control variables
(unemployed, student, age, female, married, town) not reported, 33 603 observations
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
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Table 3.6: Marginal e¤ects (evaluated at sample means), immigration equation
[23b] [24b] [25b]
Increase of trust (1/2 ), work
Allow many 7.06 2.59 2.13
Allow some 9.92 3.04 2.50
Allow a few -7.14 -2.69 -2.21
Allow none -9.84 -2.94 -2.42
Increase of education (1/2 ), work
Allow many 2.33 3.61 3.69
Allow some 3.34 4.22 4.31
Allow a few -2.41 -3.73 -3.81
Allow none -3.26 -4.10 -4.19
Increase of education (1/2 ), non work
Allow many 1.85 2.67 2.71
Allow some 3.06 3.96 4.04
Allow a few -1.86 -2.71 -2.74
Allow none -3.05 -3.92 -4.01
these e¤ects reverses and the di¤erence between them becomes very large. If this result is
correct, it could mean that a part of the positive e¤ect of education on attitudes towards
immigrants is due to positive expectations about reciprocity. Finally, the negative and sig-
nicant coe¢cient of correlation (=2) obtained when estimating specication [23] informs
us that endogeneity is present in our estimation and that it is linked to some unobservable -
omitted - characteristics which inuences, in an opposite manner, immigration preferences
and trust.
Turning to estimations [24] and [25] which report very similar results, trust has a positive
and signicant inuence on attitudes towards immigration but this e¤ect is rather smaller,
in terms of marginal e¤ects, than the one obtained without explicitly considering trust as
endogenous. Moreover, since the coe¢cient of the correlation between the errors is not
signicant, endogeneity may not be a problem and running separate estimations of our
trust and immigration equations should not a¤ect the results.35 This is conrmed since the
results obtained in columns [24b] and [25b] are similar to those obtained in column [4] of
table 3.1.
How can we reconcile the contrasted results obtained in specication [23] and in spec-
ications [24b] and [25b]? Since the only thing which di¤ers between these two sets of
estimations is the choice of instruments, this issue has to be considered further. Given
that the variance of trust within regions is rather small, specication [23] which uses the
past average of trust in a region as an instrument may be misspecied. Therefore, the
35Note that running two separate estimations may even be more e¢cient.
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estimations of the alternative specications [24] and [25] may be better identied and their
results be considered as more relevant. Finally, it has to be emphasized that whatever the
specication considered, our variable of interest, trust, has always a positive and signicant
inuence on attitudes towards immigrants.
3.6 Robustness checks
This section starts by replicating our main estimations by using alternative measures of the
individual level of skill as well as of the attitudes towards immigrants. Then, we focus on
sub-samples of more homogeneous countries to assess the importance of considering trust
amongst the determinants of preferences towards immigration. It has to be emphasized
that, following the preceding section discussion, all the results presented in this section rely
on the assumption that trust is exogenous.
3.6.1 Alternative ways to dene skill levels
In all our preceding estimations, we used the median years of education necessary to get
a given degree in a country region as a proxy for the individual level of skill. Even if this
indicator is probably the best suited to make comparisons across countries, we tested the
robustness of our results by using two alternative measures of skills.
First, we decomposed the variable identifying the highest level of education attained into
ve categories: primary (ISCED 0, 1), low secondary (ISCED 2), high secondary (ISCED
3, reference group), post secondary (ISCED 4) and tertiary (ISCED 5, 6).
Second, following ORourke and Sinnotts (2001) argument, we used the ISCO88 (In-
ternational Standard Classication of Occupations) of the ILO as a proxy for the skill level
of an individual. The advantage of this indicator is that, in addition to formal schooling,
it captures the role of on-the-job training and of the nature of the work. Its disadvantage
is that it may not be very relevant for individuals not active on the labor market since a
long time. The coding was made as follows: elementary occupations, i.e. manual labour,
jobs with simple and routine tasks (ISCO 9), plant and machine operators and assemblers,
craft and related trades workers, skilled agricultural and shery workers, service workers
and shop and market sales workers, clerks (ISCO 4 to 8, reference group), technicians and
associate professionals (ISCO 3) and professionals (ISCO 2). The legislators, senior o¢cials
and managers (ISCO 1) - which do not have a specic skill coding - were included as a
separate skill category and members of the armed forces (ISCO 0) were excluded since it is
unclear what their skill levels are.
The specications [26a] and [27a] of the trust equation reported in table 3.7 correspond to
specication [18] of table 3.4, the specications [26b] and [27b] of the immigration equation
correspond to specication [3] of table 3.1 and [26c] and [27c] to specication [4]. Focusing
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Table 3.7: Trust and immigration estimations, alternative education variables
Trust Immigration Trust Immigration
[26a] [26b] [26c] [27a] [27b] [27c]
Trust 0.072*** Trust 0.076***
[23.59] [23.55]
Edu. primary -0.405*** -0.191*** -0.151*** Legislator/manager 0.025 0.103** 0.101**
[8.26] [8.08] [6.33] [0.30] [2.48] [2.43]
Edu. low secondary -0.268*** -0.090*** -0.071*** Professional 0.619*** 0.380*** 0.341***
[5.85] [4.05] [3.20] [8.61] [10.75] [9.58]
Edu. post secondary 0.206** 0.086* 0.081 Technician 0.248*** 0.191*** 0.172***
[2.09] [1.73] [1.61] [4.15] [6.19] [5.54]
Edu. tertiary 0.428*** 0.269*** 0.241*** Elementary occ. -0.318*** -0.102*** -0.081***
[7.33] [8.69] [7.85] [4.90] [3.36] [2.63]
Primary  work. 0.086 0.089** 0.082** Legislator  work 0.333*** 0.155*** 0.124**
[1.12] [2.44] [2.25] [3.25] [3.03] [2.39]
Low sec.  work. 0.065 0.044 0.043 Professional  work 0.178** 0.151*** 0.132***
[1.07] [1.49] [1.45] [2.16] [3.66] [3.17]
Post sec.  work. 0.052 0.196*** 0.185*** Technician.  work 0.201*** 0.146*** 0.129***
[0.43] [3.28] [3.08] [2.78] [4.00] [3.51]
Tertiary  work. 0.252*** 0.186*** 0.165*** Elementary  work 0.163* 0.084* 0.073
[3.90] [5.38] [4.78] [1.66] [1.77] [1.52]
R-squared 0.18 R-squared 0.18
Observations 33 603 Observations 29 741
t-statistics in brackets, cuts, country characteristics and other control variables not reported
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
rst on the estimations [26], we notice that the use of educational dummies does not change
the main results obtained so far, i.e. more educated individuals are signicantly more
trusting and open to immigration. However, being active on the labor market does not
a¤ect preferences on a similar smooth manner. The trust equation reports that working
only inuences the attitude of individuals with a tertiary degree. For the estimation of the
preferences towards immigrants, the inuence of being active on the labor market is more
surprising. As expected, we nd that being working and having a high education level has a
positive inuence on accepting more immigrants, however, we also nd that being working
and having a very low level of education has a positive inuence. This puzzling result may
suggest that the positive e¤ect of social interactions linked with working with other peoples
more than compensate economic fears.36
Turning now to the estimation of specication [27], we nd results similar to those
36Note that the argument that low-skilled workers are more favorable to immigrants since they are often
themselves immigrants, is not relevant here because we excluded the foreign born individual from our sample.
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just discussed, e.g. the higher the individual skill level, the more trusting and open to
immigration. Moreover, as expected, the legislators and managers - whose skill level is hard
to assess - show almost the same attitudes as the majority of the population which has
been used as reference group. On what concerns the inuence of working, we nd that its
e¤ect is positive for the individuals highly skilled and for the legislators and managers. As
before, we nd the puzzling result that the working individuals with the lowest skill level
are rather more favorable to immigration than the non working. However, this result is only
signicant at a 10% level in specication [27b] and is non signicant in specication [27c].
As expected, the country characteristics and the other control variables - not reported
here - have a similar inuence on attitudes as already discussed. One signicant di¤erence
is nevertheless worth mentioning. Compared to our preceding estimations which reported a
negative impact of age on trust, specications [26a] and [27a] both report a non signicant
impact. The latter result is very informative since using the ISCO classication - which
combine formal schooling with on-the-job training - allows to control for the impact of age
on the kind of occupation in the labor market and hence to isolate the non-economic
inuence of age on attitudes.
3.6.2 Alternative questions about immigration
As already mentioned earlier, the ESS provides two alternative questions about preferences
towards immigrants. The results obtained with the question about immigrants of the same
race or ethnic group are reported in columns [28] of table 3.8 and those about immigrants
of a di¤erent race or ethnic group are reported in columns [29].37 Conrming the results
reported in table 3.1, changing the wording of the question has almost no impact on the size
of the e¤ect of education and of trust on attitudes towards immigration. However, some
other interesting results are worth emphasizing.
First, men and married individuals are signicantly more open to immigrants of the
same ethnic group whereas this positive e¤ect vanishes once immigrants from poor non
European countries or of di¤erent race are concerned. Second, the e¤ects of the country and
regional level characteristics show a very di¤erent pattern depending on the wording of the
question. Contrary to the estimations of the preferences towards immigrants of a di¤erent
ethnic group or from poor non European countries, the measures of ethnic fractionalization
and of inequality show a signicantly negative inuence on attitudes towards immigration of
the same ethnic group. Moreover, compared to specication [29], specication [28] reports
that the positive inuence of GDP and of the unemployment rate has signicantly decreased
whereas the positive e¤ect of the foreigners share has signicantly increased. These results
are worth emphasizing since they informs us that country characteristics do not only shape
37We do not report the results obtained with country xed-e¤ects since they are similar to those presented
here.
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Table 3.8: Ordered probit, immigration estimations, alternative questions
Same ethnic group Di¤erent ethnic group
[28a] [28b] [29a] [29b]
Trust 0.074*** 0.078***
[23.78] [25.42]
Education 0.076*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.064***
[29.52] [26.79] [28.30] [25.36]
Education  working 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.011***
[5.55] [4.31] [8.60] [7.28]
Unemployed -0.032 -0.023 0.029 0.039
[0.91] [0.65] [0.81] [1.09]
Student 0.418*** 0.354*** 0.424*** 0.356***
[12.79] [10.76] [13.18] [10.99]
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004***
[3.30] [4.31] [7.58] [8.73]
Female -0.036*** -0.032** -0.01 -0.006
[2.68] [2.43] [0.72] [0.45]
Married 0.031** 0.025* 0.008 0.001
[2.16] [1.73] [0.55] [0.07]
Town 0.005 0.023* 0.011 0.030**
[0.35] [1.69] [0.83] [2.23]
Foreigners share 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.012*** 0.014***
[14.45] [15.66] [6.58] [7.67]
Unemployment rate 0.003* 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.015***
[1.67] [3.60] [5.96] [8.09]
GDP per capita 0.162*** 0.05 0.281*** 0.166***
[5.36] [1.63] [10.10] [5.86]
Ethnic fractionalization -0.175*** -0.149*** -0.066 -0.036
[3.38] [2.88] [1.29] [0.70]
Religious fractionalization -0.314*** -0.279*** -0.232*** -0.193***
[8.69] [7.68] [6.53] [5.44]
Inequality measure 10% -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.004 0.001
[10.26] [8.78] [1.25] [0.39]
Observations 33 662 33 662 33 644 33 644
t-statistics in brackets, cuts not reported
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
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citizens preferences over a given group of immigrants but also over di¤erent groups of
immigrants.
3.6.3 Evidence from sub-samples of countries
Even if in the preceding estimations we controlled, alternatively, for country xed-e¤ects
and for country and regional characteristics, it is nevertheless possible that the specicity of
some groups of countries was hidden by this aggregation. Indeed, the explanatory variables
- such as education - were supposed to have exactly the same impact on the attitudes of the
Scandinavian citizens as of the citizens of southern European countries. By disaggregating
our estimations into sub-samples of similar countries we will be able to gain some renement
in the understanding of the determinants of attitudes.
In order to get more homogeneous groups of countries, we split our sample of countries
as follows. The Scandinavian countries: Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, which
are characterized by large public sectors, a high GDP and moderate inows of foreign-
ers. The Western European countries: Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Germany, France,
Netherlands, Great-Britain and Ireland, which almost all have a long history of immigra-
tion and high GDP levels. The Eastern European countries: Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Poland and Slovenia, which have a common communist background and rather low but
highly growing GDP levels. Finally, the Southern European countries: Spain, Greece, and
Portugal, which are rather new countries of immigration and have the lowest GDP levels
amongst the EU15 countries.
The regional level estimations of the preferences towards immigrants we report in table
3.9 correspond to estimations [5] and [6] of table 3.1.38 Interestingly, our sub-sample esti-
mations report that the impact of all the explanatory variables - except the gender dummy
- go in the same direction as in the aggregated estimations presented earlier but not always
signicantly so.
If we now look at trust as a determinant of preferences towards immigrants, we notice
that its impact is always signicantly positive and that its marginal e¤ect - not reported - is
similar for all the groups of countries. The robustness of this result is striking and conrms
that reciprocity and social preferences have to be considered as serious determinants of
attitudes. The usual view about citizens behaving in a purely selsh manner has thus to
be taken with caution.
38We decided to report only the estimations with country xed e¤ects since the variability of our country
and regional characteristics is too small to get accurate estimates of their e¤ects.
79
Table 3.9: Ordered probit, immigration estimations, by countries sub-samples
North North West West East East South South
Trust 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.060*** 0.056***
[9.03] [14.96] [8.60] [7.20]
Education 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.085*** 0.077*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.030*** 0.026***
[9.11] [8.26] [19.16] [17.26] [8.63] [7.82] [5.02] [4.40]
Education  working 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.005** 0.004* 0.006* 0.006 0.018*** 0.016***
[3.67] [2.97] [2.33] [1.91] [1.73] [1.52] [3.91] [3.54]
Unemployed 0.065 0.068 -0.018 0.013 -0.008 0.003 0.154** 0.144*
[0.85] [0.88] [0.32] [0.22] [0.10] [0.04] [2.00] [1.85]
Student 0.337*** 0.302*** 0.335*** 0.284*** 0.519*** 0.453*** 0.429*** 0.382***
[5.02] [4.50] [6.74] [5.67] [6.45] [5.56] [5.06] [4.43]
Age -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.002*
[7.51] [7.98] [7.50] [7.89] [4.03] [3.91] [1.25] [1.68]
Female 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.036* 0.043** -0.02 -0.02 -0.098*** -0.094***
[7.11] [7.08] [1.81] [2.12] [0.63] [0.64] [2.90] [2.77]
Married 0.012 0.003 0.015 0.003 0.051 0.044 0.054 0.055
[0.41] [0.10] [0.71] [0.14] [1.47] [1.26] [1.44] [1.48]
Town 0.073** 0.073** 0.117*** 0.129*** 0.053 0.051 0.132*** 0.133***
[2.54] [2.53] [5.66] [6.22] [1.52] [1.45] [3.57] [3.56]
Observations 6 647 6 647 14 740 14 740 6 808 6 808 5 408 5 408
t-statistics in brackets, country xed-e¤ects and cuts not reported
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
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Conrming our preceding estimations, education shows a signicant and positive inu-
ence on preferences towards immigration in all the groups of countries, however, the size of
this e¤ect is not statistically identical for all these groups. For instance, the level of edu-
cation has a much larger inuence on native citizens of western countries than of southern,
conrming the hypothesis tested in the last sub-section. Indeed, all the western countries -
except Ireland - experienced inows of relatively low-skill migrants whereas all the south-
ern countries experienced inows of rather high-skill migrants. In addition to this result,
the interaction term between education and working also shows an interesting pattern. In
the eastern countries - which all have a common communist background - being working
has no inuence on the way of judging immigration. This evidence suggests either that
eastern citizens are not aware of the possible economic impacts of immigration or have a
su¢ciently discriminating labor market so that immigrants can never have access to the
good jobs o¤ered in the country. Similarly to our aggregated estimations, once trust has
been controlled for, the inuence of education diminishes.
Finally, the signicant variation in the attitudes of women between the sub-groups of
countries is certainly due to the very di¤erent role they play in these regions. For instance,
compared to women living in southern countries, women living in northern countries are
much more active on the labor market and also much more invested in political life.
3.7 Concluding remarks
Over the last ten years, substantial progress has been made to better understand individual
attitudes towards immigration. Nevertheless, concerned about testing political economy
predictions as well as the impact of political and national ideology on preferences towards
immigrants, a wide range of possible determinants of these preferences have been neglected
in recent empirical analyses. Drawing on the rapidly growing experimental evidence stating
that economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard
social preferences (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002), we focused on social preferences and reci-
procity beliefs - proxied by individual trust attitudes - as possible determinants of attitudes
towards immigration.
This paper provides new and robust evidence that the individual level of trust has a
positive and large inuence on the openness to immigration. This result suggests that trust
can be seen as a moral value that spreads not only to neighbors or to community members
but also to immigrants. Indeed, trusting individuals may be more condent about the
economic and social e¤ects immigrants may have for their country or region. Interestingly,
introducing a measure of trust - which is highly and signicantly determined by education -
does not signicantly a¤ect the size of the direct e¤ect of education on preferences towards
immigration. This result suggests that the social content of education emphasized by social
scientists cannot persuasively be linked to subjective expectations about reciprocity.
What policy implications can be drawn from these results? While economic policy
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interventions to reduce job insecurity or welfare concerns are certainly adequate to reduce
hostility towards immigrants, a large increase in e¢ciency could be gained by coupling
these economic interventions with more social actions. For instance, promoting a better
integration of immigrants, ghting discriminations, enhancing access to education, reducing
income disparities or prompting legal enforcement may be seen as e¤ective ways to increase
the individual level of trust and, in turn, a¤ect positively the perception natives have on
immigrants.
Moreover, since at the regional and the country level, large di¤erences in trusting atti-
tudes have been observed, our results suggests that, contrary to economic predictions, we
could observe two countries having exactly the same structure of human capital implement-
ing very di¤erent immigration policies. As for further research, based on the fact that trust
enters strongly in individual attitudes towards immigrants, it would be interesting to look
at the e¤ects of the country level of trust on real policy outcomes linked to migration. For
instance, a high level of regional trust may induce a higher naturalization rate, a shorter
delay for immigrants to get welfare benets, more political rights for foreigners, etc.
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3.8 Appendices
3.8.1 Appendix I: Survey methodology and sampling design
For this paper, we chose to use the ESS database which provides many interesting features.
Contrary to the Eurobarometer, to the European Values Survey (EVS) and to the World
Values Study (WVS), the ESS has not been designed to focus on specic issues as mostly
required by policy-oriented institutions paying for these surveys. Indeed, the ESSs main
goal is to serve more academically-orientated or curiosity-driven concerns and to measure
changes over time in the underlying attitudes, values, perceptions and behavior patterns
of European citizens.39 Furthermore, contrary to the International Social Survey Protocol
(ISSP) which covers only one topic per year and is restricted to a 15 minute self-completed
questionnaire, the ESS both covers a larger set of issues with a follow-up in time and
relies on standardized face-to-face interviews. Indeed, one of the most relevant qualities
of the ESS is that it has been designed so as to achieve uniform methodological standards
among countries and to make it at least as rigorous as most national surveys within Europe.
Moreover, it has been conceived to conform as closely as possible to the standards of the
Eurostat time-series.40
Given that the ESS seeks to contribute to the development of a uniform cross-national
methodology, all participating countries had to adhere to a detailed specication about all
aspects of conducting the survey. Among these specications some are worth emphasizing:
(i) every country-level sample has to be selected by a strict random probability methods at
every stage, (ii) neither quota sampling nor substitution can be used, (iii) all interviews have
to be conducted face-to-face, and (iv) the translated questionnaires have to be rigorously
pre-tested in order to minimize interpretation problems.
From a methodological point of view, depending on the frames and funding used in
each country, the sampling designs used in the ESS are more or less complex, ranging from
simple random sampling (e.g. Finland) to multistage stratied and clustered sampling
(e.g. Poland, Spain). Since every sampling design which deviates from a random sampling
based on a register of the entire population may attribute a slightly di¤erent probability
of selection to a given surveyed individual, we used probability weights for every statistical
estimation we report in this paper.41
3.8.2 Appendix II: Descriptive statistics
In table 3.10, the mean and the standard deviation of our endogenous variables are provided.
39The nancing of the ESS is assured by the European Commission, the European Science Foundation
and diverse national funding bodies which all warrant a large level of autonomy to the coordinating team in
charge of the implementation of the questionnaire.
40For a more complete description of the ESS, see Jowell et al. (2003).
41A complete description of the country level sampling design and of the computation of the probability
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Table 3.10: Summary statistics, trust and immigration variables, ESS 2004
Trust More poor non EU More same race More di¤erent race
0 to 10 1 to 4 1 to 4 1 to 4
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
5.07 2.48 2.42 0.93 2.73 0.92 2.44 0.92
Table 3.11 reports the summary statistics of the socioeconomic and demographic vari-
ables used as individual level explanatory variables in this paper. All these variables are
issued from the ESS database 2004 and do not include data for the foreign born surveyed
individuals. The education and occupation dummies reported in this table are described in
details in the robustness checks section (6.1). The only variable which deserve some addi-
tional explanations is education. To make the comparison of the education levels between
countries easier, we focused on the self-reported years of education accomplished by an in-
dividual. However, since this variable may be a¤ected by a measurement bias, we computed
an indicator of the median42 years of education needed in a given country region43 to reach
a given education degree (coded according to 7 ISCED categories).
Table 3.11: Summary statistics of individual level explanatory variables, ESS 2004
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
Education [years] 11.43 3.10 Unemployed [%] 4.97 23.56
Edu. primary [%] 19.02 40.08 Student [%] 10.92 36.64
Edu. low secondary [%] 23.94 45.73 Age 44.58 19.88
Edu. post secondary [%] 5.35 24.04 Female [%] 52.96 54.75
Edu. tertiary [%] 18.11 40.49 Married [%] 55.62 54.21
Working [%] 49.71 54.66 Town [%] 61.18 52.07
Observations: 33 603 Observations: 33 603
Elementary occupation [%] 10.15 32.88 Professional [%] 12.84 36.07
Technician [%] 15.56 38.99 Legislator / manager [%] 8.37 29.90
Observations: 29 741 Observations: 29 741
Countries: AT, BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SI
All the means are weighted by the probability weights reported in the ESS
Finally, the regional and country characteristics - which are the only variables not issued
weights is given in Jowell et al. (2003).
42We chose to use the median instead of the mean to avoid outliers to have too big an inuence on the
value of this variable.
43The regional decomposition reported in the ESS questionaire correspond to the Eurostat NUTS classi-
cation at the levels 2 or 3 depending on the country.
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from the ESS - are reported in table 3.12. Given that both Norway and Switzerland do
not belong to EU, the Eurostat database - when mentioned - has been completed with data
from Statistics Norway and from the Swiss Federal Statistical O¢ce.
Table 3.12: Summary statistics of regional and country characteristics, by country
GDP Unemp. Foreigners Ethnic Religious Inequality Relative
per capita a rate b share c frac. d frac. e 10% f skill g
AT 10.137 4.061 8.092 0.1068 0.4146 7.6 1.421
BE 10.088 8.060 7.852 0.5554 0.2127 7.8 1.031
CH 10.238 3.585 19.564 0.5314 0.6083 9.9 1.824
CZ 9.551 7.880 1.247 0.3222 0.6591 5.2 1.292
DE 10.039 10.196 8.705 0.1682 0.6571 6.9 1.896
DK 10.146 5.444 4.653 0.0819 0.2333 8.1 0.772
ES 9.911 11.830 3.753 0.4165 0.4514 9 0.437
FI 10.026 9.279 1.573 0.1315 0.2531 5.6 0.809
FR 10.043 8.855 3.912 0.1032 0.4029 9.1 1.506
GB 10.081 4.878 6.849 0.1211 0.1211 13.8 1.111
GR 9.760 9.777 6.475 0.1576 0.153 10 0.602
HU 9.351 6.164 0.795 0.1522 0.5244 5.5 0.513
IE 10.268 4.762 7.062 0.1206 0.155 9.7 0.340
NL 10.167 3.657 3.914 0.1054 0.7222 9.2 0.978
NO 10.332 4.055 3.912 0.0586 0.2048 6.1 0.885
PL 9.198 19.453 1.573 0.1183 0.1712 8.6 0.757
PT 9.655 6.668 2.153 0.0468 0.1438 15 0.283
SE 10.104 5.700 4.816 0.06 0.2342 6.2 0.882
SI 9.659 6.882 1.902 0.2216 0.2868 5.9 0.868
Observations: 222 regions and 19 countries
a GDP per capita: regional level, in log, Eurostat completed for CH and NO, 2003
b Unemployment rate: regional level, in %, Eurostat completed for CH and NO, 2003
c Foreigners share: regional level, in %, Eurostat completed for CH and NO, 2001
d Ethnic fractionalization: country level, Alesina et al. (2003), various years
e Religious fractionalization: country level, Alesina et al. (2003), various years
f Inequality 10%: country level, ratio of richest 10% to poorest 10%, World Bank, 2005
g Relative skill: country level, ratio of skilled (ISCED 0-2) to unskilled labor (ISCED 3-6)
in the native relative to the immigrant populations, in log, OECD SOPEMI, 2002/03
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Chapter 4
Does scally induced migration
enhance tax competition ?
Evidence from Switzerland
Abstract
The impact of migration on scal policies has become an important subject of concern
among countries wanting to allow free mobility of persons with some foreign countries,
as is the case for instance for EU members, or for countries wishing to decentralize scal
competencies. Indeed, there is a fear that scally induced migration might enhance scal
competition between communities and lead to an ine¢ciently low level of taxes. This
paper analyzes the problem of strategic tax setting at the local level in a direct democracy
using Swiss data for a canton (Vaud). This setting is useful to isolate the determinants
of tax rates and to test the predictions of the political economy models as both the scal
autonomy of the Swiss municipalities and the internal migration rate are very high. Using
spatial econometrics and instrumental variables, we provide strong evidence that municipal
income taxes interact positively. However, only a small part of these interactions can be
explained by a tax base e¤ect linked to scally induced migration. These results suggest
that concerns about a race to the bottom of tax rates should be minimal and alleviate
fears of excessive scal competition induced by migration.
JEL classication: D72, H2, H3, H7, P16, R23
Key words: Strategic interactions, tax competition, residential choice, spatial economet-
rics, political economy, Switzerland
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4.1 Introduction
Between countries as well as within countries, disparities in tax levels are rather large. With
the ever decreasing migration costs and the opening of borders to migration - as is the case
for instance within the EU - fears about a race to the bottom of the tax levels as well
as of the redistributive expenditures have become an important subject of debate in many
developed countries. Indeed, big di¤erences in tax rates between jurisdictions might have a
signicant impact on the residential decision of households, thus fostering tax competition
between them.
Since the beginning of the eighties, there has been an outpouring of literature on the
determinants of tax rates. In their inuential 1981 article, Meltzer and Richard have argued
that the tax rate set by a jurisdiction governed by a median voter is negatively inuenced by
its median to mean income ratio. However, empirical evidence in favor of this prediction is at
best mixed.1 Based on the observation that, in an ever more globalized world, jurisdictions
cannot be considered as independent from each other, Case et al. (1993) have opened
the way to a strategic interaction modelling of public expenditures. At the theoretical as
well as at the empirical level, strategic interactions seem to have an important role to play
among the determinants of scal policy.2 Nevertheless, even if many reasons governing scal
interactions have been evoked in the literature, there is almost no evidence on the channels
through which these strategic interactions occur.3 Finding answers to this question may
yet have signicant implications from a scal federalism point of view. For instance, if scal
interactions occur mainly through spillover e¤ects, i.e. residents of one jurisdiction consume
or pay for the public goods provided by neighboring jurisdictions, or mainly through tax
induced migration, the policy implications may be quite di¤erent. In the case of scally
induced migration, the fear of a race to the bottom might have to be taken seriously and
decentralization of scal competencies might be ine¢cient.
The main goal of this paper is to attempt to ll this gap by explicitly considering tax
induced migration as a potential vector of strategic tax interaction between jurisdictions in
Switzerland. Moreover, relying on a unique municipal level data-set, we could also improve
1For instance, Meltzer and Richard (1983), Lindert (1996), Milanovic (2000) and Borge and Rattsø (2004)
nd some support for the Meltzer-Richard prediction while Persson and Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996) and
Bassett et al. (1999) nd no support at all.
2For instance, Case et al. (1993), Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), Figlio et al. (1999), Saavedra (2000),
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Revelli (2002), Baiker (2005), Feld and Reulier (2005), Solé-Ollé (2006) nd
that strategic interactions of tax rates or of expenditures levels between geographically close jurisdictions
are strong and signicantly positive. See also Brueckner (2003) for an overview.
3To our knowledge, the few exceptions are Besley and Case (1995), Solé-Ollé (2006) and Brett and Pinkse
(2000). The rsts emphasize that, in a representative democracy, an incumbent politician who can run for
reelection considers his neighbor jurisdictions tax rate as a yardstick to determine his own. The second
tests local crowding spillovers against benet spillovers but without considering scally induced migration.
The thirds nd some evidence that tax base competition among local jurisdictions is small and that it does
not have a detrimental e¤ect on business property taxes in Canada.
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upon past empirical evidence by controlling better for the institutions governing scal policy
making.
First, the Swiss political system is built on direct democracy with Swiss citizens having
extended rights to participate in the policy-making process and to inuence the political
outcome according to their preferences. Hence, compared with most developed countries,
Switzerland provides without doubt one of the most adequate settings to test the predictions
of the median voter model.
Second, using Swiss municipal data reduces considerably the problem of comparability
of decentralized scal competencies which usually hampers empirical papers. Indeed, the
Swiss municipalities located within a given canton all have the same public services to
provide and the same constraints on the way of setting taxes. Basically, every year, every
municipality has to choose a percentage to levy - a tax multiplier - on an exogenously
given income tax schedule. This means that the scal competition between municipalities
is restricted to an unidimensional choice. However, despite this constraint, di¤erences in
municipal tax multipliers have remained large during the last two decades.
Third, as Swiss municipalities rely heavily on income taxes to nance their expenditures,
the tax multiplier chosen by a municipality might have a substantial impact on households
residential choice. Combined with a high migration rate between municipalities, the data-
base used in this paper should be very informative to isolate the e¤ect of scally induced
migration on local tax rates. Worth noting is that the municipalities chosen are geograph-
ically very close together, thus households are supposed to be exposed to the same labor
market conditions wherever they choose to reside.
As main results, we nd no signicant evidence in favor of the Meltzer and Richard
model but a strong and signicant evidence that taxes interact positively within a given
geographical area. Moreover, we were also able to identify that tax base e¤ects - largely
driven by scally induced migration - are only a minor channel through which taxes interact
strategically.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two illustrates Switzerlands
federal system and its unique direct democracy set-up. It also presents the advantages of
using Swiss communal data for testing the tax setting behavior of local communities and
summarizes some stylized facts about scally induced migration in Switzerland. Section
three then discusses a political economy model of scal policy and of residential choice that
provides an appropriate set-up to be tested empirically in section four. Section four reviews
the relations to be estimated and discusses further the empirical methodology to be used. It
also presents the main results obtained, analyses them in light of the theoretical predictions
and discusses some robustness checks. Conclusions follow in section ve.
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4.2 Fiscal autonomy and direct democracy: Considering the
Swiss communes
Thanks to its federal structure and to its direct democracy, Switzerland provides a unique
setting to study the shaping of tax and redistributive policies. The Swiss federal structure
is built on three levels of jurisdictions: the confederation, the cantons and the communes,
which all have a great level of scal autonomy. Furthermore, in the context of the Swiss
direct democracy, at every level of jurisdiction, Swiss citizens have extended rights to par-
ticipate in the scal policy making.
4.2.1 Fiscal policy in an homogeneous setting
In Switzerland, the tax and redistributive competencies are spread almost equally among
the three levels of jurisdictions. The local jurisdictions, even if submitted to the limits
imposed by their cantonal Constitution, must provide diverse public services and have the
obligation to nance them. On the income side of their budget, the Swiss communes rely
mainly on personal income taxes which represent about 60% to 70% of their scal revenues.4
However, their ability to raise income taxes is limited to setting an annual tax multiplier,
i.e. to levy a surcharge on the cantonal tax schedule. Hence, the level of progressivity of
local taxes is totally independent of the communal policy. On the expenditure side of their
budget, the communes have large expenditures on education (especially primary school),
environment, culture and recreation, health and social security. Interestingly, this well
dened scal set-up has not prevent very large disparities in tax rates and in expenditures
per capita to be observed between the Swiss communes.
To avoid having to deal with the multidimensional nature of personal income taxes -
level and progressivity -, we chose to focus only on the communes located in one canton.5
Moreover, as the distribution of competencies between the communes and the canton di¤er
from one canton to the other, choosing a unique canton should also help to avoid this source
of bias.
The canton we focused on is Vaud. Vaud is interesting because it is composed of not
less than 384 communes, i.e. a su¢ciently large number to avoid dealing with small sample
statistics, and the level of variability in the communal tax multipliers is one of the highest
in Switzerland, i.e., in 2000, an unmarried individual with a yearly taxable income of 600000
Frs had to pay up to 60075 Frs communal income taxes in Fontanezier and only 10800 Frs
in Dully. Moreover, in 2000, the intercommunal migration rate in the canton of Vaud
4Wealth taxes represent about 10% of their scal revenues and corporate and capital taxes about 14%.
Moreover, the communes have a rather low dependence - on average 14% of total revenues - on transfer
payments.
5To circumvent this problem, Feld and Reulier (2005) chose to estimate simultaneously the Swiss cantonal
tax interactions for 11 di¤erent income intervals.
92
was about 17%6 which by large exceed the intercantonal and international migration rates.
Finally, from a political-economy point of view, as reported by Feld and Kirchgässner [?],
the budget draft, the tax rate and the budget decits of the communes of the canton Vaud
were mainly controlled by the voters in an obligatory referendum, an optional referendum
or a local assembly.
4.2.2 A rst insight on strategic tax interactions
According to the recent strategic interaction models, spillover e¤ects, a tax mimicking
behavior of authorities, or scally induced migration may all lead to tax interdependencies
between neighboring communes. How does this prediction t the data for the communes of
Vaud?
To assess a possible spatial correlation between communal tax multipliers, we represent
them in a Moran scatterplot. The Moran scatterplot reports the standardized communal tax
multipliers (on the horizontal axis) against the standardized weighted average of neighbors
tax multipliers (on the vertical axis). To obtain the weighted average of neighbor tax
multipliers, we considered as neighbor the communes geographically close together and
used a geographical weight matrix as described in appendix II. The Moran scatterplot
reported in gure 4-1 shows that most observations are located on the upper right and on
the lower left, suggesting that spatial dependences between communal tax multipliers seem
to be strongly present, i.e. a commune with a low (high) tax rate is mostly surrounded by
other communes with low (high) tax rates.
Supporting the observed pattern of gure 4-1, the Moran I7 and the Gearys C8 sta-
tistics - I(d = 15km) = 0:439 and C(d = 15km) = 0:552 - report that the communal tax
multipliers are signicantly and positively spatially autocorrelated. Note that the Moran I
statistic can be represented in gure 4-1 by a regression line passing through the origin.9
6This information is based on individual information about the place of residence ve years before the
census.
7The Moran I is a spatially weighted autocorrelation measure given by: I(d) =
NP
i
NP
j
wij(xi x)(xj x)
S2
NP
i
NP
J
wij
where S2 = 1
N
NP
i
(xi   x)
2. Its theoretical mean in the absence of serial autocorrelation is   1
N 1
w 0 and it
follows a normal law.
8The Gearys C is a spatially weighted sum of square di¤erences between observation as given by: C(d) =
(N 1)
NP
i
NP
j
wij(xi xj)
2
2
NP
i
NP
j
wij(xi x)2
. Its theoretical mean in the absence of serial correlation is 1 and it follows a normal
law.
9Appendix III provides some additional statistics on communal tax multipliers of the canton of Vaud.
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Figure 4-1: Moran scatterplot for tax multipliers, 15 km distance threshold
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4.2.3 Fiscally induced migration: Some evidence from Switzerland
The two central conditions to be satised for tax competition over the mobile tax base to
occur are, rst, that tax rates signicantly enter the residential choice of an individual (this
assumption also needs to be satised in the Tiebout-like sorting of population model10)
and, second, that the communal authorities signicantly take into account changes in their
tax base when deciding upon their tax rates. The latter condition implies that tax base
e¤ects may strongly limit the ability of communes to raise revenues and/or to redistribute
resources adequately.
Given that tax multipliers can inuence the tax base available for a commune and vice-
versa, both variables should be highly negatively correlated. This is indeed the case since the
correlation coe¢cient, in 2000, is  0:71, i.e., on average, the low tax communities are also
the communities with the highest tax base. Moreover, when mapping these variables in a
geographical space, clustering of low tax/high income and high tax/low income communities
seems to be strongly present. For instance, the low tax and the high income communities
are mainly clustered around lake Geneva, especially on its western coast.
By now, is there some evidence of scally induced migration in Switzerland? By using al-
ternatively the 26 Swiss cantons and the 137 biggest Swiss communes, Feld and Kirchgässner
(2001) nd some evidence that the level of taxation inuences signicantly the distribution
10Tiebout (1956) main argument is the following: the consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that
community which best satises his preference pattern for public goods, i.e. migration ows between com-
munities will reveal citizens preferences for local scal policy and hence sorting of population according to
intrinsic preferences will lead to an e¢cient combination of scal burden and of local public goods provided.
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of income in a given jurisdiction. The higher the tax rate, the lower the share of high
income earners in a jurisdiction, which conrms that scal incentives on average matter in
the residential choice of Swiss citizens.11 This conclusion holds both at the cantonal or at
the communal level but it is stronger at the communal level. Furthermore, they nd that
tax di¤erentials mainly a¤ect the residential choice of the high income group and that scal
incentives rather a¤ect tax rates than transfer levels. Using a random utility model on in-
dividual residential choices for a set of Swiss communes within the same area, Schmidheiny
(2006a) establishes that rich households are substantially and signicantly more likely to
move to low-tax municipalities than poor households.
4.3 The political economy of scal policy in a direct democ-
racy: A framework
In Switzerland, self-interested nationals can vote on tax levels both in the voting booth - in
their residential locality - and with their feet since barriers to mobility are low and internal
migration rates are high. Moreover, at a communal level, the median voters tax choice is
unidimensional as he only chooses the tax level and not the shape of the tax schedule.
4.3.1 Tax setting in a median voter framework without relocation
To start our analysis, suppose that the economy is composed of J jurisdictions which are
populated by a continuum of individuals i who can move freely between these jurisdictions
and locate only in one. Suppose also that each local jurisdiction j nances the supply of its
local public services gj exclusively by a proportional income tax tj on its residents. Given
that the local jurisdictions budget has to be balanced, we get:
gj = (tj  
1
2
t2j )yj
where yj is the mean income in jurisdiction j and tj 2 [0; 1] is the local jurisdictions
proportional income tax level. Note that levying public funds entails a cost12 represented
by the term 1
2
t2jyj .
Individuals derive utility from the consumption of a private good ci and from local public
services gj where the amount of public services received is supposed to be the same for every
individual in a given jurisdiction. Further assume that the individuals are heterogeneous
with respect to their exogenously given income wi and to their preference intensity for
11Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1996) reached the same conclusion using earlier data.
12Without this assumption, the median voter could vote for a tax rate of 100%. For an overview of the
other reasons explaining the limits to redistribution, see Harms and Zink (2003).
95
public services i  1.
13 If these preferences are supposed to be distributed uniformly and
independently from income, the utility of individual i is given by:
Ui(ci; gj j i) = ci + igj
and his budget constraint is the following:
ci = (1  tj)wi
Subject to the local jurisdiction budget constraint, the median individual living in ju-
risdiction j - with income wmj and preference 
m
j - will choose the tax level tj so as to
maximize his indirect utility function:
V (tj ; g(tj j yj) j w
m
j ; 
m
j ) = (1  tj)w
m
j + 
m
j (tj  
1
2
t2j )yj
Under the constraint that tj 2 [0; 1], this maximization problem yields the following solution:
tj = 1 
wmj =
m
j
yj
(4.1)
where the local tax rate is decreasing in the ratio of median to mean income. Similarly to
the early contribution of Meltzer and Richard (1981), equation (4.1) predicts that the higher
the income inequality the higher the tax burden.14 Not surprisingly, the tax rate is also
positively inuenced by the median voters preference for public services. As an illustration,
by supposing that preferences i can either be low or high, Kessler and Lülfesmann (2005)
have shown that an asymmetric tax equilibrium with (imperfect) sorting of population
according to intrinsic preferences exists.15
In this simple political economy framework on the determination of the equilibrium
tax rate, the average income yj in a local community was considered as given by the median
voter. This assumption could correspond either to a situation where individuals cannot move
freely across jurisdictions after tax rates in every locality have been chosen or to a myopic
voter case - where voters in each jurisdiction ignore the e¤ects of taxes on migration.
However, as both assumptions seem quite unrealistic, the next subsection relaxes them by
introducing a relocation stage in the model and by considering a non myopic median
voter.16
13This assumption has been borrowed from Kessler and Lülfesmanns (2005) framework on residential and
political choice.
14However, in the Meltzer and Richard model, the tax rate depends on the median to mean income through
a labor-leisure choice and not through an e¢ciency cost due to redistributive taxation.
15The smaller the taste di¤erential, the stronger the motive for wealthy individuals to escape taxation and
the stratication into rich and poor communities is more pronounced. However, if preferences are identical
for all individuals, no sorting equilibrium can exist and hence no migration equilibrium.
16One of the main results of Epple et al. (2001) is that empirical ndings reject myopic voting models
for explaining the provision of local public goods.
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4.3.2 Adding relocation
Adding a relocation stage to the framework described above, implies - by using backward
induction - that the average income of a given jurisdiction cannot be assumed to be exoge-
nous anymore. As every individual might move in response to own and neighbor tax rates,
the tax base of a given jurisdiction might depend on these tax rates. This relation can be
summarized as follows:
yj = yj(tj ; t j ; XjG; X jG) (4.2)
where the subscript  j is used to index neighboring communities and X are vectors of
exogenous variables. Since the tax base is supposed to be highly inuenced by the individual
residential choices, both the communal and the neighbors geographical characteristics17 were
considered as relevant X variables.
Supposing further that the mobile part of the population mostly consists of rich house-
holds and that their number is relatively small compared to lower income households, then
- regardless of the migration equilibrium - the median voter will always be one of the poorer
households which allows us to treat the median community income as exogenous. Given
this assumption, the local tax level - chosen by the median voter who maximizes his utility
taking into account the expected migration response - can be written as:
tj = tj(yj ; XjP ; XjG j w
m
j ; 
m
j ) (4.3)
where yj depends on the outcome of the preceding stage of the game and X are vectors of
exogenous variables. Which variables should be included in X? As communal expenditures
are mainly devoted to nancing proximity services, the communal population characteristics
(XP ) are surely important determinants of tax multipliers.
18
For instance, the proportion of school-age children in a commune may highly inuence
its expenditures as one of the communes main role is to nance public schools. Another
set of variables to be considered includes the geographical characteristics of the communes
(XG) such as their altitude or their share of industrial area.
Finally, replacing equation (4.2) into equation (4.3), the reduced form of the tax setting
equation can be written as:
tj = tj(t j ; XjP ; XjG; X jG j w
m
j ; 
m
j ) (4.4)
where Xj are vectors of exogenous variables composed of all the variables discussed above.
In the strategic interaction literature, this equation has been referred to as a reaction
17 If Xjc is a characteristic of commune j, X jc =
P
k 6=j wjkXkc is the weighted average of the neighbors
characteristics where wjk is a weight as described in appendix II.
18Since the communal tax multipliers may inuence the households residential choice, it may also inuence
the communal population characteristics. Due to the lack of available data on lagged population character-
istics, we had to use the contemporaneous values of these variables in our empirical part and tested for an
eventual endogeneity problem.
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function and has often been estimated empirically. It has to be emphasized that in the
framework developed here this reaction function is supposed to depend only on the migration
choice of the individuals through a tax base e¤ect.19
4.4 Results
Guided by the predictions of our theoretical framework, this section starts by estimating the
determinants of communal tax multipliers as predicted by a standard median voter model
which does not consider relocation issues. Since the results obtained are not conclusive, we
then estimate a reaction function which takes explicitly into account possible strategic
interactions between communes. Given the encouraging results obtained, we go one step
further and decompose the strategic interaction e¤ect into a tax base and a residual e¤ect
by estimating the two structural equations (4.2) and (4.3) rst separately and then jointly.
The summary statistics and some explanations on the construction of the variables used
in this section are given in appendix I.
4.4.1 Estimating the standard median voter model without relocation
To open the discussion about the empirical determinants of the tax setting behavior of com-
munes, we start by estimating a specication close to equation (4.1). Assuming that the
communes set their tax level independently from each other and that the tax setting behav-
ior of a commune can be approximated by a linear relationship, the empirical counterpart
to equation (4.1) can be written as:
tj = 
wmj
yj
+ 
0
PXjP + 
0
GXjG + "j (4.5)
where tj is the tax multiplier of commune j = 1; :::; 384,
wmj
yj
the ratio of median to mean
income, Xj are vectors of exogenous variables as described in the preceding section and "j
is an error term. Given that, in the theoretical part, we supposed that no relocation was
possible, the ratio of the median to mean income was considered as exogenous and OLS
with robust standard errors20 were used to estimate this specication.
The results of the estimation of equation (4.5) are reported in column [1] of table 4.2.
Interestingly, we notice that the ratio of median to mean income has the expected negative
19Relying on a similar set-up, Kessler and Lülfesmann (2005) have shown that explicitly modelling reloca-
tion does not necessarily destroy sorting of population if preferences between individuals are su¢ciently het-
erogeneous: Sorting thus remains a robust outcome if one extends the traditional Tiebout multi-community
model to a more dynamic framework which allows individuals to migrate again after local policies have been
determined.
20Robust to heteroscedasticity by using Whites estimator of the variance.
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sign but it is not signicant. This result conrms that relying on a myopic voting model
is not adequate to explain the tax setting behavior of communes and that a more complex
model is needed. For this reason, we do not discuss the other coe¢cients obtained for this
specication any further.
4.4.2 Spatial interaction tests
In order to assess that modeling the tax setting behavior of municipalities by the way of
a strategic interactions model - such as given by equation (4.4) - is relevant, we calculated
the Lagrange multiplier (LM) and the robust Lagrange multiplier (RLM) test statistics21
on the residuals of the OLS estimation reported in column [2] of table 4.2.
Table 4.1: Spatial interaction tests, specication [2]
LM lag RLM lag LM error RLM error
126.863*** 48.295*** 80.995*** 2.428
H0 (no spatial interaction) rejected: *** at 1%
Since under the hypothesis of no spatial interaction (H0) both test statistics follow a 
2
1,
we could reject - at a 1% level - the hypothesis of no spatial spatial lag dependence between
the communal tax rates. This result conrms our theoretical prediction, i.e. the tax rate
set by a given commune depends on the tax rates set by its neighboring communes, and
implies that we have to consider that communes set their tax interdependently. Similarly to
Revelli (2002), the RLM test reports no signicant evidence of spatial error dependence22
once spatial lag dependence has been controlled for.
4.4.3 A reaction function estimation
Since the LM and RLM tests for spatial lag dependence signicantly indicate that communal
tax multipliers are spatially correlated, we estimated a reaction function as given by
equation (4.4). Taking for simplicity a linear approximation, the specication to estimate
can be written as:
tj = 
P
k 6=j
wjktk + 
0
PXjP + 
0
GXjG + 
0
 GX jG + "j (4.6)
21To compute these tests, we used a 15 km weight matrix as described in appendix II. See Anselin et al.
(1996) for a description of these tests.
22The type of spatial error dependence we tested can be written as follows: "j = 
P
k 6=j
wjk"k + uj where
wjk is a weight coe¢cient and uj is an iid error term.
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where wjk represents the weight assigned to the neighbor commune k and "j is an error
term. Given the large number of weights wjk - 73
0536 - to determine, it is not possible
to estimate them along with the other parameters of equation (4.6). This implies that we
must assume them to be known and therefore specify them a priori. Supposing that scally
induced migration occurs mostly at a very local level and that communes have larger social
ties with communes nearby, we consider geographical distance between communes as a good
proxy for neighborliness. For all the estimations reported in this paper, a 15 km threshold
is used.23 The construction of the weights is described in appendix II.
The main econometric concern when estimating equation (4.6) is that the neighbor
tax multipliers are endogenous. The reason is that all the communal tax multipliers are
simultaneously determined in exactly the same fashion. As a result, the OLS estimates of
the parameters of equation (4.6) may be a¤ected by a simultaneity bias. This endogeneity
can be addressed by using either an instrumental variable (2SLS) approach or a maximum
likelihood (ML) method. For our estimations, we rely on the 2SLS technique as used, for
instance, by Besley and Case (1995), Brett and Pinkse (2000), Fiva et al. (2006), Solé-Ollé
(2006). The main advantage of using 2SLS instead of ML is that, even in the presence of
spatial errors dependence, the estimated coe¢cients remain consistent.24 Moreover, given
the set-up of the model, nding relevant instruments is not too di¢cult. Indeed, as all the
communes are considered as setting their tax rate in a perfectly identical way, the most
straightforward set of instruments to use is the weighted average of neighbor population
characteristics.
Before starting our analysis of the results, various tests were made. First, according to
the Sheas partial R-squared, the instruments we used for the weighted average of neighbor
tax rates are not weak. Second, we could not reject the null that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the 2nd stage equation.25
Third, to assert the utility of instrumenting for neighbor tax multipliers, we computed a
Hausman test26 and we could not reject the null that OLS yield consistent estimates, i.e.
endogeneity among the regressors has no deleterious e¤ect on OLS estimates. Given this
result, OLS and 2SLS are both consistent but OLS should be more e¢cient.27 Finally, the
overall t of our OLS estimation is very good since the R-squared is 59%.
23Using a 10 km or a 20 km threshold does not change the results signicantly.
24See Kelejian and Prucha (1998) for a formal proof of this argument.
25The Hansen J statistic reports a value of 11:231 which does not allow us to reject H0 (excluded instru-
ments are valid instruments).
26Under H0: bOLS and b2SLS are both consistent but bOLS is more e¢cient, the Hausman test is given
by: (b2SLS bOLS)0[var(b2SLS) var(bOLS)](b2SLS bOLS) d! 2m where m is the number of instrumented
variables.
27We also tested for the possible endogeneity of communal population characteristics and we were never
able to reject the null of exogeneity.
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Table 4.2: Tax setting and tax base estimations
Model without relocation Strategic interactions model
M-R mod. Benchmark Tax rate (reduced form) Tax rate (structural form) Tax base (structural form)
[1] OLS [2] OLS [3] OLS [4] 2SLS [5] OLS [6] 2SLS [7] 3SLSa [8] OLS [9] 2SLS [10] 3SLSa
Med./mean income -7.404
[0.49]
Tax -36.780*** -37.214*** -67.495***
[5.55] [3.94] [7.13]
Neighbor tax 0.922*** 0.942*** 0.550*** 0.696*** 0.546*** -55.066*** -54.653*** -24.406**
[8.76] [8.51] [5.67] [5.10] [4.44] [8.18] [4.14] [2.20]
Tax base -0.005*** -0.003* -0.004**
[6.31] [1.85] [2.30]
Age 6 7 -7.142 -2.172 8.574 8.804 -6.95 1.453 11.589
[0.24] [0.08] [0.33] [0.34] [0.29] [0.06] [0.54]
7 < age 6 15 69.330** 58.158** 49.306* 49.117** 38.295 43.391* 29.813
[2.19] [2.03] [1.93] [1.98] [1.60] [1.84] [1.60]
Age > 65 0.625 -1.462 -33.629* -34.314** -46.035*** -40.607** -15.628
[0.02] [0.08] [1.87] [1.97] [2.84] [2.39] [1.08]
Foreigner -59.035*** -43.246*** 2.811 3.793 13.916 9.538 -4.41
[3.98] [2.82] [0.21] [0.29] [1.16] [0.74] [0.44]
Primary 47.830*** 37.785*** 35.810*** 35.767*** 24.814*** 30.076*** 25.450***
[4.54] [3.68] [4.16] [4.28] [3.32] [3.53] [3.38]
Public 59.210*** 48.190** 29.338 28.936 36.861** 32.799* 18.82
[3.04] [2.44] [1.55] [1.56] [2.09] [1.84] [1.52]
Unemployed 81.150* 75.846 40.475 39.721 26.609 33.134 25.395
[1.66] [1.55] [0.93] [0.94] [0.70] [0.86] [0.85]
Owner -47.859*** -40.403*** -24.899*** -24.568*** -4.097 -12.14 -24.356***
[6.41] [5.41] [3.51] [3.49] [0.60] [1.36] [2.92]
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[1] OLS [2] OLS [3] OLS [4] 2SLS [5] OLS [6] 2SLS [7] 3SLSa [8] OLS [9] 2SLS [10] 3SLSa
Density 0.310** 0.365*** 0.379*** 0.379*** 0.394*** 0.368*** 0.287*** -10.082 -9.87 6.353
[2.52] [3.06] [3.52] [3.62] [4.09] [3.84] [2.72] [1.47] [1.33] [0.65]
Acreage 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001**
[3.89] [2.42] [3.46] [3.56] [3.22] [3.27] [1.99]
Altitude 0.022*** 0.006 0.013* 0.013** 0.006 0.007 0.009* -0.537* -0.533 -0.295
[3.10] [0.78] [1.93] [2.00] [1.10] [1.30] [1.78] [1.68] [1.57] [0.65]
Industry -0.544 -0.61 -1.370*** -1.386*** -1.535*** -1.482*** -1.421*** -85.022*** -85.517*** -118.526***
[1.15] [1.24] [3.05] [3.14] [4.20] [3.88] [4.17] [4.43] [3.51] [3.89]
Agriculture 0.124*** 0.039 0.042 0.042 0.086** 0.068* 0.073** 2.25 2.259 4.617
[2.68] [0.78] [0.94] [0.96] [2.47] [1.84] [2.03] [0.75] [0.78] [1.46]
Lake -7.023*** -8.595*** -6.727*** -6.687*** -4.670*** -5.335*** -5.725*** -50.273 -53.484 -263.92
[3.47] [3.30] [2.95] [3.02] [3.17] [3.50] [3.17] [0.24] [0.32] [1.44]
R-squared 0.45 0.5 0.59 0.66 0.63
Neighbor control no yes yes yes no no no yes yes yes
Robust t-statistics in brackets, Constants not reported, a jointly estimated
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
Notes:
Neighbor controls: density, altitude, industry, agriculture, lake
IV for neighbor tax (specif. [4]): neighbor age dummies, foreigner, primary, public, unemployed, owner, acreage
Sheas partial R-squared: 0.8941***
IV for neighbor tax and tax base (specif. [6]): neighbor age dummies, foreigner, primary, public, unemployed, owner, acreage, neighbor controls:
Sheas partial R-squared: 0.3944*** (neighbor tax) and 0.1085*** (tax base)
IV for tax (specif. [9]): age dummies, foreigner, primary, public, unemployed, owner, acreage
Sheas partial R-squared: 0.1239***
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The estimated coe¢cients of the reaction function are reported in columns [3] and [4]
of table 4.2. The result of main interest is that the coe¢cient on the weighted neighbor tax
multiplier is signicant at a 1% level with an estimated coe¢cient  close to 0:9, i.e. an
increase [decrease] in the weighted neighbor tax multiplier leads to an almost similar increase
[decrease] of the own tax multiplier. This result seems to conrm that tax interactions are
quite high at a municipal level, thus omitting to take them into account may strongly bias
the estimations.28
Among the communal characteristics having a signicant inuence on the tax multiplier,
we nd that the share of young between 7 and 15 has a positive impact on the tax multiplier.
This result conrms that the nancing of primary schools29 weighs on the budget constraint
of the communes and hence compels them to increase their revenues by setting higher taxes.
The share of people over 64 has surprisingly a negative impact on tax multiplier. Generally,
we would expect citizens over 64 to be on average less mobile than the younger and to
need more public services such as health care. However, this negative impact could be
explained by older people being also more conservative and hence favoring lower taxes at
the booths. We also nd that the share of primary sector workers has a positive impact on
tax multipliers. This result is quite in line with the theoretical predictions since primary
sector employees are on average less mobile than secondary or tertiary sector employees.
A high owner share in a commune has a signicant negative impact on its tax multiplier
which could be explained by owner being on average richer and voting more. Relying on the
median voter theorem, a high share of foreigners - without voting rights and earning low
incomes - should decrease the level of taxes. In the case of Switzerland, since the foreigners
are on average either very high or very low skilled, their impact on the income distribution
is not clear cut which may explain that the foreigners share has no signicant inuence on
the communal tax multipliers.
What about geographical characteristics? First, the higher the communal density and
size, the higher the tax rate. The result associated with density is not surprising as the
communes with a high density are mostly urban and have proportionally more to spend for
social security, culture and infrastructure than the communes with a low density. Second,
the communes lying at the side of a lake set signicantly lower taxes than the other. The
lake dummy may capture some unobservable feature such as a high property value - entry
barrier - which prevent poorer household to settle in such a commune. Finally, the share of
industrial area in a commune has a very signicant negative inuence on its tax multiplier.
One explanation could rely on the complementarity between the taxes collected: for a
given level of communal expenditures, if the corporate income taxes collected are high, the
personal income taxes can be set at a lower level.
Contrary to the estimation without strategic interaction presented in column [2], the
28For instance, an almost 1 to 1 reaction has been found by Brett and Pinkse [?] for municipal tax rates
in British Columbia. Fiva et al. [?] have found a coe¢cient of 0:8 and Revelli [?] of 0:6.
29As parents have not the choice to which public primary school to send their children, the share of children
between 7 and 15 is highly correlated with the observed share of primary schoolchildren in a commune.
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neighbor geographical characteristics - not reported - have no signicant inuence on the
tax multiplier set by a commune. This result informs us that neighbor geographical char-
acteristics only have an indirect e¤ect - through neighbor taxes - on the own tax multiplier.
Even if these reaction function estimations give some very interesting insights on the
determinants of the tax rates and on the size of strategic interactions, no information on
the channels through which tax interactions occur can be extracted from them. A positive
 could reect either tax competition for the mobile tax base, or public spillover, or a
tax mimicking behavior of communes. To get a further intuition about the underlying
determinant of tax interactions, the coe¢cient  should be split into two components as
follows:
 = 1 + 2 (4.7)
where 1 is the direct e¤ect of neighbor tax rates on own tax rates - such as for instance
tax mimicking or spillover e¤ects30 - and 2 is an indirect e¤ect possibly associated with a
tax base e¤ect as emphasized in the theoretical part.
4.4.4 Estimation of the structural form of the tax setting equation
Relying on the structural equation (4.3), it is possible to get an estimation of the coe¢-
cient 1 which is the direct e¤ect of neighbor taxes on own taxes. The explanation goes as
follows. The linearized empirical counterpart of equation (4.3) can be written as:
tj = 'yj + 
0
Sj + "j (4.8)
where yj is the taxable income per capita of commune j, Sj is a vector of explanatory
variables and "j is an error term. Given that the weighted neighbor tax level can have a
direct e¤ect on the own tax level, it should also be included among the explanatory variables
Sj . Thus, splitting Sj into a weighted neighbor tax rate and communal characteristics, we
can rewrite equation (4.8) as:
tj = 'yj + 1
P
k 6=j
wjktk + 
0
PXjP + 
0
GXjG + "j (4.9)
where 1 is the direct e¤ect of neighbor taxes on own taxes.
31 Even if equation (4.9) and
equation (4.6) look alike, it has to be kept in mind that the former is a structural form
relation and the latter a reduced form.
Before estimating equation (4.9), we tested for spatial lag and spatial error dependence
of the tax rates using the LM and RLM tests statistics described earlier. According to these
30Alternatively, as noted by Saavedra (2000), strategic behavior may [also] arise if welfare migration is
negligible, but if state o¢cials think that it occurs.
31Carlsen et al. (2005) have used a similar method to identify the determinants of infrastructure fee in
Norway.
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tests, we could reject the hypothesis of no spatial lag dependence which implies that neighbor
taxes have to be considered among the determinants of communal taxes.32 Moreover, we
found no evidence of spatially correlated errors.33
For the estimation of equation (4.9), we rely alternatively on OLS and on 2SLS. In-
deed, as emphasized in the theoretical section, the communal tax base (taxable income per
taxpayer) may be endogenous since tax rates may induce a migration of rich households.
Moreover, relying on the same explanation as given in last subsection, the weighted neighbor
tax level is also endogenous. To instrument both of these variables, we used the weighted
neighbor characteristics.
The estimations of equation (4.9) are reported in columns [5] and [6] of table 4.2. As
expected, the taxable income per capita has a signicantly negative e¤ect on the tax rate
set by a commune, i.e. the higher the taxable income per taxpayer, the less the commune
has to tax its residents in order to the get the su¢cient amount of money to provide its
public services. The weighted neighbor tax rate has also a signicant inuence on the own
tax rate with an estimated coe¢cient 1 around 0:6 and very close to the one estimated by
Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) for Belgian municipal taxes and by Feld and Reulier (2005)
for Swiss cantonal taxes.
Referring to relation (4.7), some additional results are worth emphasizing. First, since
(b   b1) < b1, the direct e¤ect of neighbor tax rates on own taxes is stronger than their
indirect e¤ect. Unfortunately, without additional informations, we cannot identify more
precisely the nature of this direct e¤ect, it can be for instance a spillover or a tax mimicking
e¤ect. Second, as (b  b1) > 0 and ' > 0, there is also some evidence that one part of the
positive interactions between communal tax rates can be explained by an indirect tax base
e¤ect.
4.4.5 Some insights on the determinants of the tax base
With the estimation of the structural equation (4.9), we were able to disentangle the direct
e¤ect of neighbor taxes on own taxes from the indirect tax base e¤ect. However, to fully
assess that the indirect e¤ect of neighbor taxes on own taxes is due to a tax base competition
linked to scally induced migration, we must also show that tax rates have a signicant
inuence on the communal tax base.34 In order to do so, we estimated the structural
relation (4.2) which can be written, in a linearized form, as:
yj = tj + 
P
k 6=j
wjktk + 
0
GXjG + 
0
 GX jG + "j (4.10)
32The value of the RLM for spatial lag dependence is: 42:735, thus H0 (no spatial interaction) can be
rejected at a 1% level.
33The value of the RLM for spatial lag dependence is: 0:012, thus H0 cannot be rejected.
34A similar assumption has been used by Buettner (2003) for estimating the determinants of the local
capital tax base in Germany.
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Given that the tax base can have an inuence on the communal tax multiplier, we instru-
mented for the tax multiplier by using the population characteristics of both the commune
itself and of the neighboring communes.
yj = tj + 
P
k 6=j
wjktk + 
0
Xj + "j (4.11)
Columns [8] and [9] of table 4.2 summarize the results obtained for the estimation of
equation (4.10). The communal tax multiplier has, as expected, a signicant negative e¤ect
on the communal taxable income per taxpayer but this e¤ect is rather small. Indeed, for
a given commune, a decrease of 10 percentage points in its tax multiplier will increase its
annual taxable income per taxpayer by about 40440 Frs. But, at the same time, since
the tax rate applied to its whole tax base has decreased, the nal impact of this change is
ambiguous.35 The only possible benet a commune can obtain by lowering its tax multiplier
is to attract individuals with above average taxable income who will also pay proportionally
more taxes due to the underlying progressive tax schedule.
As an additional result, we nd that the weighted neighbor tax multiplier has also a
signicant negative e¤ect on the taxable income per taxpayer. How can it be explained? If
an individual chooses rst the region where to locate and then a specic commune within
this region, it may explain this simultaneous negative e¤ect of own and neighbor taxes on
the communal taxable income per taxpayer. Another explanation could be found when
looking at the robustness checks reported later on. Indeed, when the average rent level is
added as an explanatory variable in the taxable income equation, the neighbor tax level
looses its signicance. As neighbor taxes and rents are highly negatively correlated ( 0:72),
it may be that neighbor taxes have captured a large part of the rent e¤ect. Indeed, the
higher the rents in a commune, the less the poorer individuals are able to reside in such a
commune, thus the higher the taxable income per taxpayer.
Among the other signicant results, the lower the industrial area in a commune and the
higher the neighbor density - not reported here -, the higher taxable income per taxpayer.
These results can well be explained by high income individuals rather setting in nice areas
not too industrialized but close to high density area providing numerous commodities. This
may also be the reason explaining that communes having agricultural neighbors and being
located close to high altitude neighbor - not reported - have higher taxable incomes.
35As an illustration, let us consider the commune of Aigle which initial monthly taxable income per
taxpayer is 40240 Frs and tax multiplier is 100. If this commune had decreased its tax multiplier by 10
percentage points, its monthly taxable income per taxpayer would have increased by about 370 Frs. However,
since the tax multiplier has decreased for all the taxpayers, ceteris paribus, the annual tax revenue collected
by that commune would have increased by only 7 Frs per taxpayer!
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4.4.6 Joint estimation of the tax setting and tax base equations
As emphasized in the theoretical part of this paper, the structural equations (4.3) and
(4.2) both enter in the determination of the equilibrium communal tax multiplier. To take
this information into account, we estimated our equations (4.9) and (4.10) simultaneously
by using 3SLS. Contrary to 2SLS, 3SLS allows to estimate both equations jointly by taking
into account that the errors between the two equations might be correlated. The 3SLS are
constructed according to a three steps procedure. In the rst step, the coe¢cients of both
equations are estimated by 2SLS. In the second step, a matrix of variances-covariances
is constructed by using the residuals obtained from the rst stage estimation. The last
step consists of reestimating the two equations by GLS by using the matrix of variances-
covariances computed in the second step and the instrumented values of the endogenous
variables. The main advantage of using 3SLS is an increase in the e¢ciency of the estima-
tions, but it comes at a cost: as it relies on the consistency of the variances-covariances
matrix, if one equation of the system is misspecied, all the coe¢cients estimates will be
inconsistent.
The results of this joint estimation are reported in columns [7] and [10] of table 4.1.
The estimated coe¢cients found are very close to the one obtained by running two separate
estimations36 and do not a¤ect our main conclusions, i.e. the communes geographically
close set their tax interdependently but only a small part of these interdependencies can be
explained by a tax base e¤ect linked to scally induced migration.
4.4.7 Robustness checks
In order to validate the results obtained so far, we ran di¤erent robustness checks.37
First, even if the RLM test for spatial error dependence provided some evidence against
the need to control for spatially correlated errors in the estimation of the reaction func-
tion, we re-estimated equation (4.6) by using Kelejian and Pruchas (1998) method.38 As
expected, taking explicitly into account a possible spatial correlation of the errors barely
a¤ects our results. This result conrms that the Swiss communes only react on observed
changes in the tax setting behavior of their neighbors.
Second, as suggested by Schmidheinys (2006a,b) analyses of the individual residential
choices in Switzerland, we added rents amongst the determinants of the communal tax
36One interesting exception is that the joint estimation reports that the e¤ect of own taxes on the tax
base is stronger than the e¤ect of neighbor taxes. This result is probably more realistic as the one found
when running two separate estimations.
37The results of these robustness checks are reported in table 4.7 of appendix IV.
38This method is based on a three steps procedure:
(i) estimate equation (4.6) by 2SLS
(ii) use the residuals of (i) to get a consistent estimate of  via the nonlinear least square procedure
proposed by Kelejian and Prucha
(iii) re-estimate the regression model in (i) by using 2SLS on a Cochrane-Orcutt type transformation that
takes into account possible spatial correlation.
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base.39 The results we obtain show that rents always have a signicantly positive e¤ect on
the municipal tax base and that the e¤ect of the own tax multiplier, even if lowered, remains
signicantly positive. In a specication where both rents and taxes have been instrumented
for, the e¤ect of the neighbor tax multiplier on the tax base becomes insignicant.
Third, considering the migration ows between communes as an alternative way to dene
neighborliness and to weight neighbor variables, we nd that when estimating a reaction
function - as dened by equation (4.6) - the neighbor tax multipliers have a signicant
positive impact on the own tax multiplier but this impact is smaller than when using
geographical weights. Moreover, using the same weights, the estimation of the structural
form of the tax equation - given by relation (4.9) - reports that the weighted neighbor tax
rate has no signicant inuence on the tax setting behavior of a commune while the taxable
income per taxpayer is very signicant.40 Taking both of these results into account suggests
clearly that the direct e¤ect of neighbor tax rates - found in the preceding section - only
exists between geographically close communes.
Finally, we nd that the determinants of the tax rates and of the tax base in 1990 are
similar to those reported in our analyze of the year 2000.
4.5 Concluding remarks
As emphasized by Oates (1999) [f]iscal decentralization is in vogue. The main appeal
of scal decentralization is an increased e¢ciency both in the provision of public goods -
as local jurisdictions better know the preferences of their population - and in the manage-
ment of public revenues - local jurisdictions are better controlled by their citizens and hence
have less power to act as a leviathan. Hampering these advantages is the fear that scal
decentralization would lead to a race to the bottom of the tax levels as well as of the
redistributive expenditures. Indeed, a high level of tax competition aiming at attracting the
mobile tax base, could lead to an ine¢ciently low level of taxation and of redistribution. The
observed actual trend in freeing migration between countries - such as for instance between
EU members - has strongly reinforced the need to nd the optimal level of decentraliza-
tion of scal competencies. However, despite an ever increasing political discussion on the
e¤ects of scally induced migration on the levels of taxes and hence on public spending, the
empirical literature on this issue is still scarce.
39Given the lack of availability of data on the average rent level on the dwellings newly rented during
the year - reecting current market conditions such as market tightness -, we used the average communal
rent level on all the rented dwellings. Moreover, due to a collinearity problem between neighbor rents and
neighbor tax rates (correlation:  0:92), we could not use both variables simultaneously in our estimations.
40Using the same migration weights, the estimation of the determinants of the communal tax base shows
that the own and neighbor taxes still have a signicant negative inuence. As emphasized earlier, this result
may be attributed to the large correlation existing between taxes and rents.
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This paper aimed to ll this gap. The highly decentralized Swiss scal system combined
with well dened scal competencies at every level of jurisdiction provides an adequate set-
up to test the importance of strategic interactions between local tax rates and also to test
if tax base e¤ects play a role in these interactions. Drawing on a unique communal level
data-set, we nd that strategic interactions between Swiss communes are very high over
geographically close communities. While this result is in line with past empirical evidence,
we have been able to control much better for the institutional setting underlying local
jurisdictions scal choices.
In addition, we could improve on past empirical ndings by decomposing the communal
strategic interactions into a tax base e¤ect and an tax mimicking/spillover e¤ect. As a main
result, we nd that the tax base e¤ect only explains a small part of the communal strategic
interactions. The largest part of strategic interactions is explained by other e¤ects such as
for instance tax mimicking e¤ects, i.e. local governments consider their neighbors taxes as
a yardstick to help them to choose their own, or by strong social ties between communes
geographically close together, or by spillover e¤ects. Conrming the results of Feld and
Kirchgässner (2001) and Schmidheiny (2006a), we also nd that the tax multipliers have a
statistically signicant inuence on the tax base available to a commune, though this e¤ect
is quite small.
What can be inferred from these results? Can they inform us about policy issues? The
Swiss experience suggests that concerns about scally-induced migration having a detri-
mental e¤ect on tax rates should not be a main source of concern for communities wanting
to allow free mobility of workers with some neighboring communities having a similar level
of economic development. However, it should be recalled that Swiss communes are submit-
ted to an exogenously given tax schedule which implies that they cannot o¤er substantial
tax cuts exclusively to the high-earner individuals whose residential choice is signicantly
inuenced by taxes.
Second, in interpreting the low impact of tax rates on the tax base, it seems that
heterogeneity of preferences is present among Swiss citizens, i.e. a Tiebout-like sorting
of population may exist. According to Schmidheiny (2006b) who studied the residential
choice of citizens in another Swiss region: some rich households can also be found in poor
communities and vice-versa. [T]aste heterogeneity reduces the distributional e¤ects of local
tax di¤erences. If this interpretation is correct, scally induced migration should not lead
to an ine¢ciently low level of taxes.
Combining these two results, this paper suggests rst that the scal decentralization
trends observed in many European countries should not be slowed down because of public
fears of a race to the bottom, and second that the tax progressivity should be set at
a higher jurisdictional level, e.g. EU, in order to avoid a detrimental tax competition for
high-earner individuals.
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4.6 Appendices
4.6.1 Appendix I: Data description
Communal tax multipliers come from the Cantonal Statistical O¢ce of Vaud (Service Can-
tonal de Recherche et dInformation Satistique SCRIS). The communal taxable income and
the number of taxpayers are issued by the Swiss Financial Department. The taxable in-
come per taxpayer is the monthly taxable income divided by the number of taxpayers. To
be underlined, the taxpayers who have earned part of their income abroad, who did not
work the whole year, or who were taxed according to their expenditures are not included
in these statistics.
Table 4.3: Summary statistics, 2000
Variables Mean Std. Min. Max.
Tax multiplier 96.63 17.33 40 135
Taxable income / t. [Frs] 5069 1353 3036 16038
Taxpayers 599 2480 8 44582
Mean income [Frs] a 4763 436 3656 6371
Median / mean income [Frs] a 0.96 0.07 0.69 1.15
Age 6 7 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.22
7 < age 6 15 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.27
Age  65 [%] 14.33 4.72 3.72 32.85
Foreigners [%] 13.63 9.69 9.69 53.57
Primary sector [%] 13.89 10.10 1.00 64.29
Public employee [%] 12.96 4.21 0.00 31.82
Unemployed [%] 3.11 1.69 0.00 10.16
Owner [%] 52.92 13.63 3.61 81.40
Population 1668 6926 33 124914
Density [pop./ha] 3.02 7.19 0.08 69.24
Rent [average Fr.] b 1161 321 447 2408
Agriculture [%] c 58.69 21.69 0.75 94.34
Industry [%] c 1.22 2.08 0.00 16.78
Altitude [m] c 600 163 374 1320
Acreage [ha] c 731 1192 30 11250
Lake [%] c 0.16 0.37 0 1
Unweighted mean, 384 communes
a constructed (see text)
b based only on 378 observations
c averages over 1992/1997
Due to the unavailability of the communal median income, we had to construct it.
Thanks to the Swiss Wage Structure Survey (LSE) conducted by the Swiss Statistical O¢ce
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(OFS), we were able to estimate a standard Mincer wage equation at the Swiss level.41
Based on the estimated coe¢cients of the Mincer wage equation and on the individual
characteristics reported in the Census, we could construct, for every individual of the canton,
an expected monthly wage value.42 Using these individual values, we could then easily
calculate the communal mean income of the resident population over 17 and the communal
median income of the Swiss - only Swiss have voting rights - residents over 17.
Except if otherwise cited, the communal population characteristics summarized in table
4.3 were constructed thank to data issued from the Swiss Harmonized Census 2000. The
total population in each commune also comes from Census and the variable density is total
population divided by acreage. The average rents are issued from the Swiss Federal Census
of Buildings and Housing 2000 and the owner rates are issued from the Swiss Statistical
O¢ce.
The geographical characteristics of the communes summarized at the bottom of table
4.3 come from Geostat (a department of the Swiss Statistical O¢ce) and are an average
value over the period 1992/1997.
Table 4.4: Summary statistics, correlations
Tax mult. Tax base Mean inco. Med./mean Rent
Tax mult. 1.00
Tax base -0.71 1.00
Mean inco. -0.62 0.77 1.00
Med./mean -0.12 0.15 0.36 1.00
Rent -0.61 0.80 0.80 0.21 1.00
Notes: Unweighted correlation / 384 communes
4.6.2 Appendix II: Constructing geographical weights
A central issue to be addressed when working with spatial data is how to determine the
neighbor characteristics such as the neighbor tax multiplier. One way to address this prob-
lem is to construct a variable of weighted neighbor characteristics by using a spatial weight
matrix W .
Using the information on the centroid of each commune,43 we constructed the weighting
41The Mincer equation is given by: ln(w) = X + ", where w is a standardized monthly wage, X is a
matrix containing dummies for the level of education, for married, for foreigner and for the sector of activity,
and continuous variables for experience (age  schooling   6) and for experience squared, and " is an error
term.
42Adjustments have been done in order to take into account the individual status on the labor market
such as: part time worker, unemployed, retired, etc.
43Povided by Geostat.
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matrix W as follows:
wjk = (1=djk)
P
l(1=djl) if j 6= k and djk  T
= 0 otherwise
where djk is the euclidean distance between commune j and k, and T is a given distance
threshold in kilometers. By construction, this matrix is squared and row-standardized, i.e.
the weights for each line - each commune - must sum up to one.
This matrix has been row-standardized in order to allow us to consider the values as-
signed to neighbor commune as weighted averages of their characteristic which are easily
interpretable.
4.6.3 Appendix III: Some descriptive statistics of the communes of Vaud
As summarized in table 4.5, the average tax multipliers of the communes of Vaud have
remained quite stable over the last 20 years.
Table 4.5: Communal tax multipliers, in percent, by years
Mean Std. Min. Max.
1980 96.75 22.81 20 160
1985 94.88 20.89 30 160
1990 95.70 21.08 40 150
1995 96.67 19.26 40 140
2000 96.63 17.33 40 135
Source: Vauds Statistical O¢ce (SCRIS)
The correlation matrix given by table 4.6 indicates that changes in communal tax mul-
tipliers are rather smooth. Indeed, the correlation coe¢cients are very close to 1 at a ve
years interval, but, as time passes, this correlation coe¢cient decreases, i.e. the ranking of
the communes in term of standardized tax multiplier shows some smooth evolution.
Table 4.6: Correlations between communal tax multipliers
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
1980 1
1985 0.89 1
1990 0.77 0.92 1
1995 0.69 0.86 0.94 1
2000 0.62 0.80 0.87 0.94 1
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To get a visual insight on the relationship between communal tax multipliers and taxable
income per taxpayer, we represented them geographically in the following two gures: gure
4-2 shows the distribution of the tax multipliers and gure 4-3 shows the distribution of the
taxable incomes per taxpayer. In both gures the dark (light) points represent the tercile
of the highest (lowest) values of tax multipliers or of taxable incomes per taxpayer. As
a rst reading of these gures, we notice that, on average, the low tax communities are
also the communities with the highest tax base. Moreover, geographical clustering of low
tax/high income and high tax/low income communities seems to be strongly present. For
instance, the low tax and the high income communities are mainly clustered around the
lake of Geneva, especially on its western coast.
Figure 4-2: Geographical distribution of tax multipliers per tercile, 2000
Figure 4-3: Geographical distribution of taxable income per taxpayer per tercile, 2000
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4.6.4 Appendix IV: Robustness checks estimations
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Table 4.7: Tax setting and tax base estimations
Spatial error (2000) Rents (2000) Migration weight (2000) 1990
[a] [b] [c] [c] [a] [b] [c] [a] [b] [c]
K.-P. K.-P. OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Tax -28.933*** -18.734** -53.932*** -35.189***
[4.47] [2.24] [7.90] [4.48]
Neighbor tax 0.960*** 0.686*** -22.350*** -19.522 0.622*** 0.155 -34.944*** 1.042*** 0.722*** -30.548***
[11.08] [6.60] [2.91] [0.83] [4.63] [0.93] [4.83] [9.72] [7.24] [3.59]
Taxable income -0.003** -0.009*** -0.005***
[2.32] [3.79] [2.87]
Age 6 7 7.727 -0.552 7.314 -22.482 -19.506 -15.592
[0.29] [0.02] [0.26] [0.82] [0.73] [0.64]
7 < age 6 15 49.635** 42.856** 53.291* 31.565 -14.362 -10.124
[2.12] [1.97] [1.87] [1.29] [0.54] [0.43]
Age > 65 -36.009** -42.094** -8.633 -42.241** -53.365*** -53.429***
[2.06] [2.53] [0.43] [2.36] [2.86] [3.24]
Foreigner 2.423 7.134 -23.372 7.301 1.24 10.139
[0.21] [0.65] [1.62] [0.52] [0.08] [0.70]
Primary 35.709*** 29.023*** 43.735*** 21.891** 29.555*** 23.103***
[4.54] [3.64] [4.68] [2.39] [3.67] [2.88]
Public 30.190* 35.101** 49.756** 52.346*** 12.484 17.185
[1.88] [2.46] [2.42] [2.93] [0.62] [0.93]
Unemployed 34.296 25.621 35.089 21.203 87.353* 88.182**
[0.88] [0.72] [0.80] [0.56] [1.84] [2.05]
Owner -25.813*** -13.259* -34.088*** 2.678 -18.295** -4.188
[4.21] [1.77] [4.70] [0.24] [2.34] [0.47]
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[a] [b] [c] [c] [a] [b] [c] [a] [b] [c]
K.-P. K.-P. OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Rents 1.579*** 2.071***
[6.29] [2.63]
Density 0.358*** 0.355*** -6.209 -8.78 0.326*** 0.419*** 5.725 0.368*** 0.356*** -6.042
[2.94] [3.33] [1.06] [1.31] [3.01] [4.22] [0.81] [2.97] [2.97] [0.88]
Acreage 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[2.99] [2.60] [4.06] [3.41] [2.81] [3.28]
Altitude 0.015*** 0.008* -0.157 -0.101 0.021*** 0.007 -0.454 0.019*** 0.010* -0.624*
[2.64] [1.74] [0.57] [0.26] [2.71] [1.29] [1.15] [2.64] [1.77] [1.73]
Industry -1.351*** -1.444*** -40.535** -17.83 -0.995** -1.427*** -90.019*** -1.162** -1.349*** -88.055***
[3.43] [4.30] [2.13] [0.69] [2.13] [4.04] [4.02] [2.42] [3.25] [3.40]
Agriculture 0.047 0.070** -1.496 -2.831 0.106** 0.130*** 3.31 0.176*** 0.192*** 8.017***
[1.10] [2.04] [0.53] [0.78] [2.11] [3.76] [1.16] [3.26] [4.37] [3.00]
Lake -6.313*** -4.533*** 75.125 171.599 -4.959** -3.700** -209.995 -3.878 -2.257 225.18
[2.70] [2.80] [0.39] [0.92] [2.31] [2.12] [1.32] [1.45] [1.09] [1.34]
Neighbor control yes no yes yes yes no yes yes no yes
Observations 384 384 378 378 384 384 384 384 384 384
Robust t-statistics in brackets, Constants not reported
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
[a] tax rate (reduced form), [b] tax rate (structural form), [c] tax base (structural form)
K.-P. = Kelejian and Pruchas (1998) method
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